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ABSTRACT

THE NORMATIVE APPROACH OF THE CATHOLIC TRADITION IN THE
ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR RESOLVING ETHICAL
DILEMMAS REGARDING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY

By
Deacon David Garvis
December 2017

Dissertation supervised by Gerard Magill, PhD
The dissertation engages the Catholic Tradition enunciated in the Ethical and
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services to provide a normative approach
for resolving ethical dilemmas regarding pivotal breakthroughs in medical technology.
This normative ethical approach has two components: a normative framework for
Catholic health care ethics that adopts practical ethical principles as enunciated in the
Ethical and Religious Directives (Chapter 2) and secular decision-making models in
organizational and clinical ethics that are consistent with the Catholic Tradition (Chapter
3).
At the end of the theoretical analysis in these chapters, the conclusion to Chapter
3 explains how this normative approach reflects the Catholic Tradition on Natural Law.
This normative approach is then applied to significant ethical dilemmas regarding a
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variety of pivotal issues that deal with medical technology: reproductive technologies
(Chapter 4), regenerative technologies (Chapter 5), and end-of-life technologies (Chapter
6). The conclusion of each of these practical chapters applies the Natural law approach of
the Catholic Tradition to offer an ethical critique of each topic based on the Ethical and
Religious Directives.
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Technological Imperative in Health Care.
The thesis of the dissertation is that the Catholic Tradition enunciated in the
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services provides a normative
approach for resolving ethical dilemmas regarding pivotal breakthroughs in medical
technology.
The dissertation analyses the normative approach of the Catholic Tradition for
resolving ethical dilemmas regarding medical technology. Specifically, the normative
approach focuses upon the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services, published by the United States Bishops (5th edition, 2009). The normative
ethical approach has two components: a normative framework for Catholic health care
ethics that adopts practical ethical principles as enunciated in the Ethical and Religious
Directives (Chapter 2); and secular decision-making models in organizational and clinical
ethics that are consistent the Catholic Tradition (Chapter 3).
This normative approach in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Care Services is then applied to resolve significant ethical dilemmas regarding a
variety of pivotal issues that deal with medical technology. Chapter 4 applies the
normative approach to discuss reproductive technologies that deal with the status of the
human embryo regarding personhood, stem cells, in vitro fertilization, prenatal testing,
and newborn screening. Chapter 5 applies the normative approach to discuss regenerative
technologies that deal with genetic enhancement, germline genetic modification,
mitochondrial DNA interventions, and gene editing using clustered-interspaced short
palindromic repeats protocol (CRISPR). Chapter 6 applies the normative approach to
discuss end-of-life technologies that deal with changing attitudes to death and dying, the
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debate over medical futility, and the controversies around the withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment.
The concluding chapter summarizes the analysis to highlight the contribution of
the Ethical and Religious Directives as a normative approach for resolving ethical
dilemmas regarding pivotal breakthroughs in medical technology.
With the rapid advancement in medical technology, significant ethical dilemmas
emerge that challenge the established norms. Due to accelerated medical technology
advancements, ethics is pressured to keep pace.
The distinctive contribution of the dissertation is to analyze the normative
approach of the Catholic Tradition for resolving ethical dilemmas regarding medical
technology.
The significance of this dissertation is to engage the ever-accelerating pace of new
medical technology and its impact on patient care; there is a need for normative guidance
that the Ethical and Religious Directives offer to those in Catholic health care,
recognizing that the analysis also could be helpful for non-Catholic health care. The
outcome is to provide normative guidance offered by the Ethical and Religious Directives
that can systematically be applied to new technology.
Chapter 2. Normative Framework of Catholic Health Care Ethics.
I. The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services.
The normative framework of Catholic health care ethics is presented in the Ethical
and Religious Directives. The Ethical and Religious Directives are a body of moral
principles that introduce Catholic Church teaching on ethical standards for behavior to
provide authoritative and normative guidance on moral issues in health care. The Ethical
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and Religious Directives are grounded on three leading concepts: social responsibility,
pastoral responsibility, and professional responsibility.
A. Social Responsibility.
The first foundational concept in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Care Services is that of social responsibility. Here, the Ethical and Religious
Directives present a biblical foundation that is integrated with moral responsibility in
health care.1 On the one hand, regarding the issue of the biblical foundation with moral
responsibility, recognition of and attention to the spiritual dimensions and spiritual
struggles of patients are imperative to those charged with their care. With regard to
spiritual dimensions, a community of healing and compassion incorporates not only the
treatment of the malady but encompasses the psychosocial and the spiritual dimension of
the human person.2 Without health of the spirit, little hope for healing the whole person
can be achieved through focused technology alone.3 The spiritual dimension, “the search
for the sacred” or spirituality, must be nurtured for us to become communities of healing
and compassion. With regard to spiritual struggles, they may emerge in this quest for the
sacred when patients are very sick.4 Stressful life events can throw a pall over the view
that God is a loving, all-powerful being who seeks only good things for us.5
B. Pastoral Responsibility.
On the other hand, to expand on the concept of pastoral responsibility, the concept
of pastoral care accompanies that of spiritual responsibility. The concept of pastoral care
involves two related features: to minister and to shepherd the patient. With regard to
ministering to patients, we must maintain an attitude of protectiveness and solicitude.6

3

With regard to shepherding, empathy, genuineness, humility, and hope, tempered with
realism are essential. Hope can foster healing.7
C. Professional Responsibility.
In addition to foundational concepts of social and pastoral responsibility, the
Ethical and Religious Directives also address the basic concept of professional
responsibility. In the concept of professional responsibility that addresses the patientphysician relationship, three areas stand out: informed consent, surrogate decisionmaking, and the need for a conscience clause that protects physicians. Each is considered
briefly.
On the one hand, regarding informed consent, there are two constituent parts: the
purpose and the components of consent. With regard to the purpose of informed consent,
it is to provide a safeguard for a patient’s dignity and autonomy.8 With regard to the
standard components of informed consent, they are competency, disclosure,
understanding, and voluntariness.9 To accomplish an effective process, five more specific
elements are needed for informed consent: (1) the diagnosis, (2) the treatment plan, (3)
the risk and benefits of treatment, (4) any alternative treatments, and (5) the risk and
benefits of declining treatment.10
On the other hand, the topic of professional responsibility addresses the role of
surrogate decision-making. With regard to the function of the surrogate, it is to serve as
the patient’s representative making health care decisions based upon substituted judgment
for patients who no longer have decisional capacity. 11 With regard to naming and
advising surrogate decision-makers are critical in making the patient’s wishes known.12
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Furthermore, professional responsibility typically involves the need for a
conscience clause to protect clinicians. Three topics shed light on the conscience clause:
the historical perspective, consent paradigms, and physician perspectives. With regard to
the historical perspective, with the advent of secularism and the effect of patient
autonomy, a need arose for the protection of physicians.13 With regard to consent
paradigms, they exist to critique the just distribution of medical services.14 With regard to
the physician’s perspective about the patient, a variety of topics arise for discussions,
such as physician refusal, disclosure, discrimination, and abuse of power.15
II. Practical Ethical Principles for Catholic Health Care.
The above basic concepts of social, pastoral, and professional responsibility led
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services to develop
practical ethical principles for Catholic health care. These principles are based on the
premise that man is not the master of his life; God is and has dominion over it.16 The
practical ethical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives address the following:
the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of treatment, the principle of
double effect, and the principle of cooperation. These are discussed in turn.
A. Ordinary and Extraordinary Means.
First, the focus on practical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives
deals with the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means. On the one hand,
historically two perspectives emerged, the pivotal distinction made by early theologians
and concerns over subjectivism and vitalism. With regard to early theologians, a stance
emerged that is explained in the Ethical and Religious Directives in this way, “A person
has a moral obligation to use ordinary or proportionate means to preserve his or her
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life.”17 The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means can be traced back to
St. Thomas Aquinas (1274 d.). With regard to concerns arose over subjectivism and
vitalism these points are pivotal. Subjectivism tends to focus only on the self, ignoring
other relevant aspects of proper patient treatment. And the concern over the concept of
vitalism is that it can seek to maintain life at all cost, again ignoring other relevant
aspects of proper patient treatment.18
On the other hand, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means
sheds light on decision-making foundations. Two points need to be addressed here:
defining elements and moral assessment. With regard to ordinary means, there are four
major defining elements for making distinctions: (1) reasonable hope of benefit, (2)
common means, (3) proportionate according to status, and (4) undemanding means.19 On
the other hand, there are four aspects in helping to determine extraordinary means: (1)
great effort, (2) enormous pain, (3) significant expense, and (4) severe dread.20 With
regard to moral assessment, each case must be considered on its own merits. The criteria
for decision-making need to relate primarily to the patient, not the remedy.21
B. The Principle of Double Effect.
The second focus of practical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives
deals with the principle of double effect. Here the distinction between ordinary and
extraordinary means is applied to provide practical distinctions to resolve moral
dilemmas. To discuss the principle of double effect, it is helpful to look at its historical
perspective before considering its implementation.
On the one hand, the historical perspective of the principle of double effect has
two related aspects, the formulation of the principle and the debate-shaping standard.
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With regard to the formation of the principle, St. Thomas Aquinas (1274 d.) was the first
to formulate the principle. Aquinas was the first to explicitly develop the principle
regarding self-defense where there are two effects, one good and one bad. With regard to
the debate-shaping standard, in developing the principle, the concepts of dual effects,
intentions, and proportionality were adopted.
On the other hand, in the implementation of the principle of double effect, two
aspects are highlighted: the conditions and application. With regard to the conditions,
there are four that must be satisfied:
1. The action and its effects must not be morally evil.
2. The good effect must not be caused by the bad effect.
3. There must be no intention of the bad effect.
4. The good effect must outweigh the bad effect.
If an action meets all four conditions, then it is considered legitimate and acceptable.22
With regard to the application of the principle of double effect, it was adopted to
distinguish between killing and allowing to die. The principle of double effect is one of
the most useful normative tools of Catholic moral theology in general and health care
ethics in particular.23
C. Principle of Cooperation and Complicity.
The third focus of practical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives
deals with the principle of cooperation to address issues of complicity. The principle of
cooperation was developed to analyze a person’s moral action and to help determine
whether one’s action contributes to the wrongdoing of another.24
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On the one hand, from a historical perspective, the purpose and theological
development of the principle are pivotal. With regard to the purpose of the principle, it
was originally formulated with the goal of helping confessors clarify how to act morally
when individuals came in contact with the actions of others involved in wrongdoings.
With regard to theological development, St. Thomas Aquinas (1274 d.) was one of the
first theologians to give direction for the principle. The principle can be seen as an
application of the principle of double effect. Cooperation involves two agents with
distinct moral actions while the principle of double effect involves a single moral agent
with good and bad effects related to the action.25
On the other hand, the historical development of the principle has led to these two
basic distinctions: formal and material cooperation. With regard to formal cooperation, it
addresses actions that are wrong in all circumstances and distinguishes the action of a
person cooperating. Intentionality is critical in assessing formal cooperation.26 With
regard to material cooperation, in some way, one is involved with the wrongdoer but does
not share in the intentionality of the wrongdoing. Prudence must guide those involved in
regards to questions of intention, duress, distance, and gravity.27
The practical ethical principles of Catholic health care including ordinary and
extraordinary means, double effect, cooperation, and complicity have given us basic
principles to better implement the Ethical and Religious Directives. All of this provides a
normative framework for Catholic health care ethics, thus providing a foundation for the
ethical decision-making models to be dealt with in the following chapter.
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III. Conclusion.
The final section of the chapter presents a critique of the ethical analysis from the
normative perspective of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services.
Chapter 3. Ethical Decision-Making Models Consistent with Catholic Ethics.
To discuss ethical decision-making models consistent with Catholic ethics
requires examining three related topics: moral agency and organizational ethics, the
competence of patients for making end-of-life decisions, and the role of clinical ethics
consultation services.
I. Organizational Ethics and Moral Agency.
Moral agency in organizations means that organizations, as well as individuals
within them, are accountable for making right or wrong decisions. Both the organization
as an institution and its employees must be morally responsible for the performance of
assigned duties.28 The significance of moral agency here can be understood by examining
its characteristics and their connection with moral theories.
A. Characteristics.
First, the characteristics of organizational moral agency engage two foundational
issues: the purpose of moral agency and the role of ethics in the organization.
On the one hand, organizational moral agency highlights ethical aims and
accountability. With regard to ethical aims, they are manifested as organizational goals
related to mission statements, strategic plans, and budgets.29 With regard to ethical
accountability, this involves creating an ‘ethical climate’ and evaluating whether actions
fit within that climate.30

9

On the other hand, the role of ethics in the health care organization engages
clinical and organizational ethics. With regard to clinical ethics, there are organizational
ramifications.31 With regard to organizational ethics, the health care organization can
negatively impact the clinical environment by not giving appropriate ethical
considerations to organizational as well as clinical decisions.32
B. Ethical Theories and the Ethical Climate in Health Care Organizations.
Second, in addition to the above characteristics, ethical theories impact the health
care organization in two ways: relating business ethics with the ethical climate of the
organization.
On the one hand, business ethics raises issues about stakeholder theory and
professional ethics. With regard to stakeholder theory, it is defined as a framework for
discerning conflicts of value, loyalty, commitment, and interest of the affected group of
individuals.33 With regard to professional ethics, there can be conflict among the
organization’s various interests.34
On the other hand, fostering an ethical climate in the organization is
indispensable, requiring a focus on managed care organizations and organizational ethics
programs. With regard to health maintenance organizations, they are designed to slow
health care costs while simultaneously providing enhanced health care to a defined
group.35 With regard to organizational ethics programs, they have emerged because of the
prodding and insistence of the Justice Department and Organizations that deal with health
care standards, i.e. The Joint Commission.
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II. Clinical Ethics and Competency.
The challenges mentioned above of organizational ethics and moral agency has
often led to the compromise of patient’s rights. The Catholic Church asserts patients have
a right to make their health care decisions.36 “The decision should be made by the patient
if he is competent and able or, if not, by those legally entitled to act for the patient, whose
reasonable will and legitimate interest must always be respected.”37 To discuss clinical
ethics and competency consists of examining two related topics: competency of the
patient and advanced directives.
A. Competency.
First, the fundamental concept in bringing decision-making of the patient to
fruition is that of determining competency. Competency engages two foundational issues:
decisions by competent patients and decisions for incompetent patients.
On the one hand, the competencies of patients are highlighted by paternalism and
treatment decisions. With regard to paternalism, it is when another decides on behalf of
the patient; as a result, the patient's autonomy is limited.38 With regard to treatment
decisions, when they are contextual, only the patient knows what is most important.39
On the other hand, another challenging aspect of competency is dealing with
incompetent patients. With regard to determining capacity, it is one of the most vexing
and crucial problems for physicians; performance of capacity assessment is the only
means to offer protection to both patient and physician.40 Assessing decision-making
capacity falls into four categories: ability to articulate a choice, capacity to understand
information, ability to appreciate consequences, and capacity to manage information.41
With regard to guidance standards, once incapacity has been determined, three clear

11

guidance standards apply to decision-making: substituted judgment, substituted judgment
combined with best interests, and best interest offering guidance to the surrogate and the
health care providers.42
B. Advance Directives.
Second, these competency-determining challenges reveal the crucial need for
advance directives. The advance directives are impacted in two ways: advance care
planning and end-of-life care planning.
On the one hand, advance care planning raises issues about both a definitive
process and clear communication. With regard to the process, patients must explore,
discuss, articulate, and then document their preferences for medical treatment reflecting
their values and goals. With regard to clear communication, once values and goals are
determined, clear communication of these must be made to appropriate stakeholders.43
On the other hand, care planning at the end-of-life involves choosing a surrogate
and the Patient Self-Determination Act. With regard to selecting a surrogate decisionmaker, it is a critical decision.44 With regard to the Patient Self-Determination Act
(1990), it is a federal statute passed to ensure patient preferences guide medical care in
the event of their incapacity assuring the desired medical care the patient wishes.45
III. Clinical Ethics Consultation.
An inherent relationship exists between clinical and organizational ethics. Thus an
ethics infrastructure is an essential component of an organization's ethics integration and
strategy. The ethics infrastructure links fundamental processes in clinical practice to the
mission and core values of the organization. To accomplish effective clinical ethics
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consultations require examining three related topics: the ethics approach, the quality and
professionalism, and case analysis.
A. Ethics Approaches.
First, the focus of ethics approaches engages two foundational issues: ethics
consultation system and the Veterans Health Administration.
On the one hand, the ethics consultation system highlights ethical dilemma
analysis and various models. With regard to ethical dilemmas they can be analyzed using
the following four topics: (1) medical indications, (2) patient preferences, (3) quality of
life, and (4) contextual features.46 With regard to models, three distinct models exist to
accomplish ethics consultations: an individual consultant, an entire ethics committee, and
the ethics consultation team.47
On the other hand, the Veterans Health Administration System has two models,
the IntegratedEthics model, and the CASES approach. With regard to the
IntegratedEthics model, it is an innovative and comprehensive design impacting multiple
areas of health care by changing the focus of ethics from a reactive, case-based encounter
to one that adopts a proactive and comprehensive model.48 With regard to the CASES
approach, it is the Veterans Health Administration system’s five-step approach to ethical
consultation: (1) clarify, (2) assemble, (3) synthesize, (4) explain, and (5) support.49
B. Quality and Professionalism.
Second, accomplishing quality and professionalism is a key to success of the
ethics consultation. To that end, process standards and certification and attestation are
two fundamental elements in achieving quality and professionalism.
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On the one hand, process standards raise issues about goals of the health care
ethics committee and knowledge and evaluation areas. With regard to the health care
ethics committee, quality and professionalism in health care are overreaching goals of the
health care ethics committee.50 With regard to knowledge and evaluation areas, the
American Society of Bioethics and Humanities has established six areas necessary for
operating a successful health care ethics service.51
On the other hand, to achieve professionalism in the health care ethics,
certification and attestation are comprised of certification requirements and the evaluation
process. With regard to the certification requirements, they would entail a formal training
program and supervised apprenticeship.52 With regard to the evaluation process, a
collection of written work and an oral exam would demonstrate the consultant’s skills,
experience, and ability to express ideas; this is the model currently being implemented.53
C. Case Analysis.
Third, a final integral part of an ethics consultation is the creation of a patient case
analysis. For clinical ethics and case analysis to be useful, one must start with as clear a
perspective as possible. Integral to case analysis are constituents features and value
judgments.
On the one hand, constituent features raise issues about medical indicators and
patient preferences. With regard to medical indicators, they help properly document the
patient’s condition to facilitate the appropriate treatment.54 With regard to patient
preferences, the fundamental principle of all morality is respect for persons and that every
person has value and dignity.
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On the other hand, an additional area in an effective case analysis is determining
the value judgments of the patient. Comprising value judgments are quality of life and
contextual features. With regard to quality of life, it is an aspect of determining patient
satisfaction.55 While satisfaction is a value judgment, it is important to provide empirical
basis using such measures as mobility, daily living activities, pain, social interaction, and
mental acuity.56 With regard to contextual features, they are prerequisites for a successful
case analysis. Contextual features include proximal factors such as family, financial,
security, education, employment, leisure, and social support. The elements included are a
community, culture, economics, healthcare system, historical, social factors, media,
geography, and the ecosystem.57
IV. Conclusion of Chapters 2 and 3: Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious
Directives.
Discussed here are the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services whereby Catholic teaching is applied to dilemmas in health care. This involves
an alignment of the two main approaches of Natural Law, the nature-oriented and the
person-oriented approaches. The final section of the chapter presents a critique of the
ethical analysis from the normative perspective of the Ethical and Religious Directives.
Chapter 4. Reproductive Technology.
Reproductive technology raises fundamental questions about the normative
framework of propagation. To adequately discuss reproductive technology requires
examining four related topics: embryo and personhood, stem cell technologies, prenatal
testing, and newborn screening.
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I. Embryo and Personhood.
The relation between embryo and personhood integrates prenatal status, and
personhood, with an accompanying ethical framework.
A. Embryo: Prenatal Status.
First, a consideration of the prenatal status of the embryo engages two
foundational issues: the meaning of essence and the problem of dualism.
On the one hand, the meaning of the essence of the prenatal embryo highlights
debates on essentialism and personhood. With regard to essentialism, humans are deemed
to be persons who could not exist without being a person at the time of being an
embryo.58 With regard to personhood, the embryo has qualities that give rise to its moral
worth. The core biological similarity is the first argument for moral equivalency; each
embryo has a human genome.59
On the other hand, the debate on dualism connects dualism with animalism each
focusing on what exists. With regard to dualism, it has a variety of forms, including
ontological and metaphysical, soul-body, mind-body, constitutionalism, and moral.60
With regard to animalism, it highlights the biological life of the vast majority of
individual humans (except twinning) because human DNA is established at conception.61
Animalism highlights the biological life of human nature; thus humans, the argument
claims, are entitled to moral respect.62
B. Personhood.
Second, the debate on personhood revolves around two opposing views, the
secular and religious.
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On the one hand, the secular view raises issues about fertilization and potentiality.
With regard to fertilization, when it occurs a unique genotype is established that
determines the organization and development of the embryo.63 With regard to
potentiality, proponents of this view contend that the zygote is not yet an individual but
does have the potential to become one.64
On the other hand, the religious view focuses on the Catholic Tradition and
contemporary religious traditions. With regard to the Catholic Tradition, varying views of
the status of the embryo and fetus existed.65 With regard to other contemporary religious
traditions, they have varying views of the moral significance of the early embryo.66
C. Ethical Framework.
Third, an ethical framework has developed around the above discussions on the
prenatal status and human personhood. This framework revolves around theologicalbased frameworks and discussion on spirituality and humanity.
On the one hand, theologically based frameworks raise questions about embryo
protection and respect for wholeness. With regard to embryo protection, the bioethical
principle of non-malfeasance frames the debate.67 With regard to respect for wholeness,
the argument is driven by the potential for medical benefits and a vision of what
humanity could become.68
On the other hand, discussions on spirituality and humanity engage two normative
aspects about the spiritual soul and human dignity. With regard to the spiritual soul, it
refers to the innermost essence of an individual in relationship with God. The soul is the
seat of both self and moral agency.69 With regard to human dignity, it refers to the
inherent value that cannot be reduced to one’s instrumental worth.70
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II. Stem Cell Technologies and In Vitro Fertilization.
The previous section on the personal or “ensouled” status of the human embryo
raises significant ethical issues for human embryonic stem cells and in vitro fertilization.
The most intense debates engage three related topics: the relevance of personhood, the
resourcing stem cells, and in vitro fertilization used for embryo health.
A. Relevance of Personhood.
First, the relevance of personhood in the debate on stem cell technology engages
two foundational issues: the secular view and the Catholic view.
On the one hand, the secular view highlights discord in definitions and the
contribution of a utilitarian view. With regard to the discord in definitions, an agreed
stance on personhood has not been achieved.71 With regard to the utilitarian view, the
focus tends to be more on when an individual can contribute to social life.72
On the other hand, the Catholic view of personhood considers the beginning of
life and the protection of life. With regard to beginning of life, the above discussion has
indicated that semantic issues, biological issues, philosophical and theological issues
have to be taken into account when answering the question: When does life begin? 73 In
Catholic teaching, ensouled human life begins at the moment of conception thus must be
respected and protected. In this tradition, every innocent being has an inalienable right to
life. With regard to the protection of life, because a fertilized egg (zygote) is a human
person, a moral obligation exists to protect that person.74

18

B. Resourcing Stem Cells.
Second, the debate on personhood clarifies when stem cell can be resourced. In
the debate on resourcing stem cells, two primary sources should be considered:
embryonic and adult stem cells.
On the one hand, embryonic stem cells highlight the debate on moral status with
accompanying ethical dilemmas. With regard to the moral status of stem cells, it revolves
around the ethical debate on the beginning of human life and its moral value.75 With
regard to accompanying ethical dilemmas, embryonic stem cell research, even if it
involves the destruction of embryos, offers potential benefits of new medical treatments.
The argument contends that a moral middle ground is needed.76
On the other hand, adult stem cells have two unique characteristics that need to be
considered in the ethical debate: telomeres and the differentiation potential. With regard
to telomeres, they are protective coverings at the end of chromosomes that keep them
from unraveling. Efforts are now underway to reverse adult stem cells to their original
state called ‘induced pluripotency,’ which could eliminate the need for the utilization of
highly contentious embryonic stem cells.77 With regard to differentiation potential, stem
cells are cells that self-renew and can also give several differentiated cell types such as
muscle, heart, and brain cells.78
C. In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Health.
Third, the connection between the personhood debate and resourcing stem cells
raises significant implications for the use of in vitro fertilization for embryo health.
Hence, it is necessary to engage each point separately: in vitro fertilization and embryo
health.
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On the one hand, in vitro fertilization needs to be understood ethically from a
historical view and a Catholic view. With regard to a historical view, prior to 1978
infertile women were without an option other than adoption. The success of in vitro
fertilization has unleashed a barrage of social, ethical, and legal concerns.79 With regard
to Catholic teaching that prohibits in vitro fertilization, the Church states that a child has
a right to be conceived in the marital embrace of its parents. Human intercourse has two
components, unitive and procreative. In vitro fertilization separates these components,
thus the Catholic Church forbids it.80
On the other hand, in vitro fertilization can be used to foster embryo health (rather
than for fertility purposes as discussed above). When in vitro fertilization is adopted for
the health of the embryo, it engages two issues, the regulation of in vitro fertilization and
the development of the Catholic view. With regard to regulations, significant progress has
been achieved in the promotion of quality management, risk management, and safety. 81
With regard to the development of Catholic Church’s view, it is feasible that using this
technology to foster the life of the embryo or to use unwanted and frozen in vitro
fertilization embryos for research might be acceptable.82
III. Prenatal Testing.
The above discussion on the personal status of the embryo and its relevance for
stem cell technology connects with the ethical debate on prenatal testing as a crucial
aspect of the ethics of reproductive technology. To discuss prenatal testing requires
examining two related topics: the availability of testing and interventions and what may
be in store for tomorrow’s children.
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A. Availability of Testing and Interventions.
First, the availability of testing and interventions raises two issues: options for
prenatal testing and prenatal genetic interventions.
On the one hand, prenatal testing deals with issues related to non-invasive
prenatal testing and expanded carrier screening. With regard to non-invasive prenatal
testing, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology concluded that this testing
should be offered to patients who may be high risk for fetal aneuploidy (abnormal
number of chromosomes).83 With regard to expanded carrier screening, which contributes
to next-generation sequencing, it is shifting from ancestry based to one that screens for
disorders to decrease inherited genetic diseases.84
On the other hand, prenatal genetic interventions deal with the prenatal genetic
diagnosis, prenatal genetic therapy, and prenatal genetic enhancement. With regard to
prenatal genetic diagnosis, which has been used for adverse selection and targeting
genetic diseases, ethical dilemmas need to be considered including: devaluing the
disabled and discrimination of people with disabilities.85 With regard to prenatal genetic
therapy, there are three types: therapy on the gametes before fertilization, therapy on
embryos before implantation, and therapy on fetuses by injecting genetic material. Each
can be problematic.86 With regard to prenatal genetic enhancement, a primary concern is
the best interests of the child-to-be as well as the effects on society.87
B. Tomorrow’s Children.
Second, the availability of prenatal testing has significant implications for
tomorrow’s children. Here, two issues must be addressed, the selection of characteristics
and savior babies.
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On the one hand, the selection of characteristics of embryos raises issues about
disabilities and sex selection. With regard to disabilities, the welfare of the child is of
primary ethical concern, raising many ethical concerns such as in cases of that deal with
the debate on wrongful life or on life not worth living.88 With regard to sex selection,
bioethics, public policy, and law intersect.89
On the other hand, in addition to the debate about selection characteristics of the
embryo, there is an extensive debate on creating what is known as savior babies. The
debate on savior babies raises ethical issues about instrumentalization and
commodification. With regard to instrumentalization (treating a child as a means) is
defined as the child being used for other’s well being or the other’s satisfaction.90 With
regard to commodification, there are different concerns to be addressed including price,
interchangeable with other goods, and value. From the perspective of normative morality,
commodification of the embryo should be denounced as wrong.91
IV. Newborn Genetic Screening.
Closely related to the ethical debate on prenatal screening is the debate on
newborn screening, which requires examining two related topics: screening programs and
screening consequences.
A. Screening Programs.
First, to understand screening programs, it is important to engage two pivotal
issues: the national research framework and the future of genetic screening.
On the one hand, the national research framework for newborn screening deals
with two essential elements: an overview of genetic testing and challenges of research for
newborn screening. With regard to an overview of genetic screening, in the 1960s, a
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simple blood test to detect a genetic metabolic disorder was developed; this was used to
detect phenylketonuria a genetic disorder that can lead to retardation.92 With regard to
challenges of research, crucial issues deal with whether morbidity and mortality are
reduced as a result of screening.93
On the other hand, the future of genetic screening needs to focus on expanded
newborn screening and whole genome sequencing. With regard to expanded newborn
screening, the emergence of new technology, tandem mass spectrometry, has created
pressure to add numerous tests to the newborn screening.94 With regard to the prospect of
whole gene sequencing, the potential exists for integration with the newborn screening
programs that could lead to unsought information and questions of meaningful informed
consent.95
B. Screening Consequences.
Second, programs for newborn screening inevitably create concern about
screening consequences. To discuss concerns about screening consequences, there are
two areas of consideration, an overview of the problem and a consideration of disease
ontologies.
On the one hand, an overview of the problem sheds light on two interrelated
concepts, the origins and the successes of screening. With regard to origins, Robert
Guthrie (d. 1995), made a breakthrough.96 With regard to the successes, phenylketonuria
screening has largely been a success story that celebrates the marriage of patient
advocacy with concerned health professionals to promote screening.97
On the other hand, disease ontology can be best understood through pre-screening
and post-screening. With regard to pre-screening, the understanding of medium-chain
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acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency was very limited.98 With regard to postscreening, several variants that were previously unknown have been identified. After
screening, geneticists have a better understanding of diseases like medium-chain acylcoenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency and have adjusted treatment regimens.99
This chapter has considered major issues in reproductive technology that have
significant applications for the Catholic ethical tradition. Catholic teaching engages each
of them dynamically to develop its moral doctrine. This is based on emerging science, but
also to indicate clearly where there appears to be wrongdoing from individual and social
perspectives. The next chapter continues this analysis of engaging the Catholic Tradition
with breakthroughs in science and medicine by examining emerging issues in
regenerative technology.
V. Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious Directives.
The final section of the chapter presents a critique of the ethical analysis from the
normative perspective of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services.
Chapter 5. Regenerative Technology.
With the progress in human genetics, enhancement via germline genetic
modification is replete with bioethical concerns. A general ethical landscape for assessing
specific germline technologies has four related topics: genetic enhancement, germline
modification, mitochondrial DNA, and gene editing with clustered-interspaced short
palindromic repeats (CRISPR).
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I. Genetic Enhancement.
The ethical debate on genetic enhancement focuses upon human progress and
future generations.
A. Human Progress.
First, a consideration of the significance of genetic enhancement for human
progress engages two foundational issues: human development and human nature.
On the one hand, discourse on human development highlights ethical dilemmas
that arise and a consideration of historical enhancements. With regard to ethical
dilemmas, ethics discourse revolves around goods or benefits. In these approaches, the
key focus is eliminating any social harm that could arise from enhancements.100 With
regard to historical enhancements, society has benefited from what is construed as noncontroversial enhancements such as literacy, the agrarian revolution, computer
technology, and health care, etc.101 All have offered benefit to humanity.102
On the other hand, to approach the meaning of human nature in a nuanced manner
requires a consideration of its common characteristics combined with sensitivity to the
precautionary principle. With regard to common characteristics, human nature involves a
set of common characteristics differentiating human beings and other creatures.103 With
regard to the precautionary principle, there is an ethical responsibility to honor the
concern of humanity overreaching its legitimate moral authority.104
B. Future Generations.
Second, the impact of germline genetic modification on human progress raises the
question of influencing future generations focusing upon the significance of identity and
perfection.
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On the one hand, discussion about identity raises issues about superhuman
enhancements and enhancements that deal with disease avoidance. With regard to
superhuman enhancements, three moral concerns emerge: goals of medicine as
incompatible with enhancement, the Positional Goods Argument (giving one person
advantage over another), and the argument that enhancements generate inequality.105
With regard to disease avoidance, the ethical debate revolves around therapy (healing a
pathology), functionality (improving the human functioning), and transhumanism
(changing human nature).106
On the other hand, discussion about perfection via genetic enhancement engages
two pivotal issues: stewardship of nature and naturalism versus transhumanism. With
regard to stewardship of nature, a central concern deals with non-malfeasance to future
generations.107 From this perspective of avoiding harm, stewardship entails an obligation
about many interrelated issues: the use of natural resources, preservation of the
environment, and oversight of the human gene pool.108 With regard to naturalism versus
transhumanism, the core debate revolves around the quest for perfection. These extreme
versions of human development raise significant ethical challenges.
II. Germline Genetic Modification.
The ethical debate on genetic enhancement, in general, leads to the more specific
focus on genetic germline modification that requires examining two related perspectives:
the religious and secular perspectives.
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A. Religious Perspectives.
First, two mainstream religious perspectives of germline genetic modifications are
represented in the views of the Roman Catholic Church and traditional Protestant
Christianity.
On the one hand, the views of the Roman Catholic highlight what is permissible
and what is prohibited. With regard to what is permissible, several illustrative points can
be made. Two theological issues need to be stressed. Modifying human genetics is
directly tied to the person’s good and raises concerns that are problematic.109 With regard
to what is prohibited several issues arise. First, because embryos are living human beings,
any experimentation that is not therapeutic is illicit. Second, every individual human
body has dignity thus it is not allowed to engage in cloning. And thirdly, personal dignity
must be maintained hence attempting to alter human chromosomes or genetic inheritance
must not be allowed.110
On the other hand, from the perspective of traditional Protestant Christianity, just
as with Catholicism, there are issues that are prohibited and issues that are permissible.
With regard to what is prohibited, Protestant Christianity is replete with cautionary tales
limiting the embrace of acts that extend beyond natural limits.111 With regard to what
may be permissible, there is agreement that human nature was not created in its present
form.112 One intriguing possibility that Protestantism is open to considering regarding
germline genetic modification is when it is adopted to increase resistance to deadly
disease that impacts the human species.113
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B. Secular Perspectives.
Second, the secular perspective on germline genetic modification revolves around
discussions on justice and the common good, and also implications for risk and safety.
On the one hand, discussion on justice and common good raises issues that focus
on social concerns and long-term impact. With regard to social concerns, germline
genetic modification could be justified if it could make medical and technological
modifications to solve potential problems.114 But justice would require treatments to be
made widely available.115 There are different approaches to the discourse on justice, such
as distributive, commutative, and rectification justice.116 Equitable distribution of benefits
is crucial for the common good.117 With regard to long-term impact, with germline
genetic modification the potential for good and harm is great.118 Long-term impacts affect
our common interests. Therefore, regulation of germline genetic modification is
indispensable. An interdisciplinary approach is needed because of the complex
interaction between genetics and ethics.119
On the other hand, accompanying discussion of justice, crucial concerns regarding
risk and safety arise.120 These concerns deal with differing approaches to germline
modification and human-nonhuman chimera research. With regard to differing
approaches, the most dangerous aspect of germline modification is the unintentional
results that affect the species, even though restricting enhancement to a limited scale can
diminish risk.121 There are different approaches to the risk reduction of unintentional
germline modifications, including total prohibition, implementing a risk-reducing
principle, or using cautionary heuristics.122 With regard to human-nonhuman chimera
research, there is widespread consensus that denigration of human dignity would result
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from germline modification that arises in chimera creations.123 In sum, the concept of
human dignity is crucial for evaluating the morality of these new genetic technologies.124
III. Mitochondrial DNA.
The previous sections on genetic enhancement and germline genetic modification
delineate the ethical landscape for evaluating new genetic technologies that will impact
future generations. Two recent technologies have emerged that are now considered in
further detail: mitochondrial DNA and gene editing technology, CRISPR.
To discuss the ethics of mitochondrial DNA, the pivotal ethical topics require
examining two related topics: the science of mitochondrial DNA and the ethical, social,
and policy considerations.
A. Science of Mitochondrial DNA.
First, to understand the ethical debate on mitochondrial DNA, a discussion must
address human reproduction as well as mitochondrial DNA biology and the
mitochondrial DNA diseases and research.
On the one hand, fundamentals of human reproduction and the mitochondrial
biology raise ethical issues related to propagation and mitochondrial DNA science. With
regard to issues dealing with propagation, the ethical debate revolves around the point of
fusion of an egg and sperm that create the zygote as the first step in human
embryogenesis.125 With regard to issues dealing with mitochondria DNA science, the
focus is upon mitochondria being in nearly all cell types. Understanding the basic science
is indispensable for ethical debate on mitochondrial DNA interventions.
On the other hand, giving attention to mitochondrial DNA diseases and research
requires a focus on maladies and various techniques utilized. With regard to maladies, the
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diseases of mitochondrial DNA are similar, manifesting themselves in respiratory chain
activity, primarily in organs of the highest energy demand. Some of the maternally
inherited mitochondrial DNA diseases are Leigh syndrome; mitochondrial
encephalomyopathy, lactic acidosis, and stroke-like episodes; myoclonic epilepsy with
ragged-red fibers; neuropathy, ataxia, and retinitis pigmentosa; maternally inherited
diabetes and deafness; maternally inherited Leigh syndrome; and Leber hereditary optic
neuropathy.126 Research of mitochondrial DNA diseases has led to gene editing of
somatic cells. With regard to various techniques for mitochondrial replacement, the main
focus is on maternal spindle transfer and pro-nuclear transfer. Other techniques, such as
polar body transfer are being explored.127
B. Ethical, Social, and Policy Considerations.
Second, an understanding of the science of mitochondrial DNA sets the stage for
addressing ethical, social, and policy considerations. These considerations are in large
part addressed in discussions of unintended consequences and the recommendations of
the Institute of Medicine.
On the one hand, to assess the unintended consequences, two points must be
considered: evaluating unknowns and predicting impact. With regard to evaluating
unknowns, considerations need to be addressed: heteroplasmy, the mitochondrial DNA
bottleneck, and mitochondrial evolutionary theory.128 With regard to predicting impact,
the science of mitochondrial genetics makes preclinical studies difficult.129
On the other hand, the Institute of Medicine recommendations indicate that with
attention to impact and with proper criteria for research expansion clinical investigation
of mitochondrial replacement technique should be allowed to move forward. With regard
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to considering impact, mitochondrial replacement techniques should be considered if the
following conditions are met: safety must be established, and risk to all parties must be
minimized, especially to future children, the likelihood of success must be evident,
investigations must be limited to women who risk transmitting severe mitochondrial
DNA diseases, risk should be minimized to alleviate adverse health for pregnant mothers
and fetus, investigators and centers have to have demonstrated expertise for this
technology, investigation should be limited to male embryos for intrauterine transfer, and
every possible risk of mitochondrial DNA-nuclear DNA incompatibility needs to be
mitigated.130 With regard to criteria for research expansion, the United States Food and
Drug Administration must review and approve, with subsequent marketing of
mitochondrial replacement techniques incorporating the following elements: transparency
that maximizes public sharing of information, public engagement through the
involvement of relevant stakeholders, partnership with other regulatory authorities in
aiding the assessment of benefits and risks, maximization of data quality through crossreferencing and pooling, circumscribed use by limiting the utilization of the technology
to individuals and settings for which it’s approved, and long-term follow-up with periodic
review must be a requirement.131
IV. Gene Editing with Clustered-Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR).
Closely related to the mitochondrial DNA ethical discussion is the debate on
clustered-interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR). This is gene editing technique
targeting and modifying DNA. The pivotal ethical discussions on clustered-interspaced
short palindromic repeats address two related topics: the science of genome editing and
the ethical, social, and religious concerns.
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A. Science of Gene Editing with CRISPR.
First, to appreciate the science of genome editing with CRISPR requires
understanding of its history and its methodology.
On the one hand, in the historical development of CRISPR, two perspectives are
helpful, biological breakthroughs and the current status of science. With regard to the
breakthroughs in biology, CRISPR emerged from the new era of biology with the
development of recombinant DNA technology in the 1970s. With regard to the current
status of science, a major development occurred in 2010 when observing that the
CRISPR system could recognize specific patterns of DNA from foreign invaders. In
2013, CRISPR successfully modified the primary mechanism of DNA. Because of that
success, it has become a powerful tool that can now reliably cut human genome DNA at
any location.132
On the other hand, to properly discuss the methodology of CRISPR two points are
involved: tools for genome editing and its potential. With regard to the tools for genome
editing, the methodology was by targeted molecular machines. With regard to the
potential of CRISPR, experts believe these advances could have wide-ranging clinical
applications with the potential to prevent or cure a variety of diseases.133 The simplicity
of this technology drastically reduces the time for conducting genome experiments.134
The ethical debate on this technique will expand in the years ahead as treatments emerge.
B. Ethical, Social, and Religious Concerns.
Second, the concerns about CRISPR technology need to be discussed from the
perspective of social and ethical dimensions as well as from the religious perspective.
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On the one hand, from social and ethical perspectives, CRISPR raises concerns
about impact and regarding the need for regulation. With regard to impact, the CRISPR
approach to ‘reprogramming DNA’ raises similar concerns to those of genetic
manipulation in general. Most notable of the concerns are the passing on to subsequent
generations deleterious impacts on the human genome.135 Before this technology can be
utilized for germline modification, important knowledge needs to be gained regarding
human genetic interaction in the interplay between diseases.136 With regard to the need
for regulation of this technology, it is crucial because of the potential for exploitation in
non-therapeutic uses, off-target modifications, and embryonic screening.137
On the other hand, from the religious perspective, this technology raises
significant concerns about dignity and respecting the unitive and procreative connection
in human reproduction. With regard to the maintenance of dignity, a distinction must be
made between editing for therapeutic purposes and enhancement to augment human
capacities.138 With regard to respecting the connection between the unitive and
procreative aspects of human reproduction, the Catholic Church insists on not breaking
that connection.139
This chapter has explored the ethical debates on the emerging regenerative
technologies. The next chapter moves to address technological issues that arise at the end
of life.
V. Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious Directives.
The final section of the chapter presents a critique of the ethical analysis from the
normative perspective of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services.
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Chapter 6. On Death and Dying.
Throughout history, the attitudes of death and dying have transformed gradually,
shifting focus from the dying and their families to the role of the physician and the health
care team. As a result, the dying process has become rife with ethical dilemmas. To
adequately discuss death and dying requires examining three related topics: changing
attitudes to death and dying, the meaning of medical futility, and the withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment.
I. Changing Attitudes towards Death and Dying.
Death is the final journey all must take. To discuss the changing attitudes to death
and dying, two areas elicit attention: the contemporary characteristics of death and dying
and related philosophical approaches.
A. Characteristics.
First, contemporary characteristics of death and dying can be revealed in
discussions about the locus of control and about accompanying rituals.
On the one hand, discussions about the locus of control tend to revolve around the
meaning of a tame death, and around prolonging life. With regard to the meaning of a
tame death, it can be a kind act of nature. Society has moved from the time when death
was not a struggle; it was part of life. Philippe Aries refers to this perspective as “tamed
death” or death that comes with natural warning signs.140 A long lingering death was very
unusual. People typically died of disease with rapid onset and a quick end.141 With regard
to the prolongation of life, there can be inappropriate approaches that resist the dying
process as a natural phenomenon. Today’s sophisticated medical technology can lead to
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unjustified struggle against death in so far as health care is concerned as a master of
death.142
On the other hand, discussions on the locus of control of death regarding the use
of medical technology need to be situated within a broader context that respects rituals
around death. With regard to the historical developments, as the locus of control of death
shifted over the centuries, so did the rituals regarding death. For centuries, there was
simplicity about the rituals.143 As life expectancy began to shift, so did the view of death,
the “tame death” came to an end due largely to the rise of scientific medicine. In the
1900s, death was taken out of the hands of families and put in the hands of doctors and
medical institutions.144 With regard to the evolution of the rituals around death, by the
1800s, the rituals of mourning became more public. As a result, mourning developed a
double purpose, serving as a period of sorrow out of respect for the family while allowing
for the dissipation of grief.145
B. Philosophical Approaches.
Second, the changing characteristics of dying over time have been accompanied
by different philosophical tenets about death. Throughout history, as attitudes and
customs towards death and dying changed, two philosophical approaches emerged to
guide the dying process, one being physician-centered, the other being patient-centered
care.
On the one hand, for the philosophical approach that is physician-centered, two
interrelated issues are important: the meaning of the Hippocratic tradition and the role of
paternalism and beneficence. With regard to the Hippocratic tradition, in taking the
Hippocratic oath, physicians promise to act for the good and keep their patients from
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harm. This Oath requires physicians to use their skills not as they would prefer but for
human benefit.146 With regard to paternalism and beneficence, they became the norm in
the early 20th century. In this philosophy, the physician always knows best.147 Medical
paternalism ignores the patient’s viewpoint and can focus on the cure of disease, at times
leading to an inappropriate medical management of death.148
On the other hand, for the philosophical approach that is patient-centered, the
focus is on patient autonomy and the accompanying conflict that can arise. With regard to
focusing on patient autonomy, a tidal wave of change has occurred in medical ethics
starting in 1965, shifting focus from the physician to the patient in decision-making.149
With regard to the conflict that results from this new focus on autonomy can be an
excessive or reflexive medical deference to patient autonomy.150
II. Medical Futility.
The discussion above on changing attitudes on death and dying offer insight into
the ethical debate surrounding medical futility. The discussion over medical futility is
fraught with controversy. To discuss medical futility requires examining two related
topics: the debate about the meaning of futility and the goals of medicine.
A. Futility Polemic.
First, to clarify the meaning of medical futility, the ethical debate revolves around
the definition of futility and the definition of rationing.
On the one hand, the definition of medical futility can be clarified by considering
the purpose of treatment and by looking at an example of a futility policy, specifically the
Texas Advance Directives Act. With regard to the purpose of treatment, clinicians need
to recognize when interventions offer benefit. Hippocrates (d.375bce) stated that
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physicians should not treat those who are overmastered by their disease.151 To deal with
situations of futility, three concepts are essential. First, treatments that are ineffective or
harmful to patients are not obligatory. Second, physicians must engage in dialogue
concerning futile treatments. Thirdly, physicians must convey concern even if there is no
cure.152 With regard to the policy enunciated in the Texas Advance Directives Act
(September 1999), it became law to regulate end-of-life futility in the state of Texas. The
law allows the physician to practice according to their conscience and the law seeks the
good of the patient by preventing a prolonged dying process.153
On the other hand, discussing of medical futility needs to be distinguished from
rationing. With regard to defining rationing, it needs to be separated from futility because
they are very different ethical concepts. Futility deals with continuing treatment that has
no benefit. Rationing is defined as withholding a treatment that does have a benefit.
Limiting access to beneficial health care services both explicitly and implicitly rations
health care resources. The core ethical debate is not whether health care can be rationed
but how it is rationed, by whom, and to what degree. With regard to the purpose of
rationing, it should be understood within the context of the organizational stewardship of
scarce resources in health care.154
B. Compassionate Goals of Medicine and Health Care.
Second, the debate on medical futility connects the meaning of futility with the
goals of medicine. To understand the goals of medicine when facing situations of medical
futility, two issues must be addressed: the meaning of compassionate succor and how to
deal with end-of-life dilemmas.
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On the one hand, the meaning of compassionate succor refers to situations that
deal with the prevention of disease and prevention of untimely death. With regard to
situations dealing with the prevention of disease, compassionate succor has three roles.
First, it is better to avoid disease. A physician’s duty is to help patients stay well.
Secondly, there can be a beneficial economic consequence for patients and society by
helping reduce chronic disease. Thirdly, the public at large, as well as the medical
community, needs to be aware that the preventive health care has significant benefits and
needs emphasis.155 With regard to prevention of untimely death, a goal of medicine is the
prevention of premature death. In medicine today, its first aim should be to reduce
premature death. The secondary purpose is proper care and support for those whose death
is not premature.156
On the other hand, the goals of medicine raise issues regarding end-of-life
dilemmas. End-of-life dilemmas raise ethical issues about balancing criteria of burden
versus benefit and about the sanctity of life. With regard to balancing criteria of burden
versus benefit, patients are now often subjected to prolonged lives and acute
complications, forcing them to make decisions about how vigorously to treat and when it
is permissible to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures.157 With regard to the
sanctity of life, the determination of the balance burden and benefit must demonstrate
respect for life (used interchangeably with the religious concept of sanctity of life),
thereby respecting the human person.158
III. Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment.
Related to the above discussion regarding attitudes to death and medical futility,
is the ethical debate around the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. This discussion
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requires consideration of two related topics: medically assisted nutrition and hydration
and the relief of suffering at the end-of-life.
A. Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration.
First, medically assisted nutrition and hydration are especially significant as a
medical intervention at end-of-life and for patients in a persistent vegetative state.
On the one hand, at end-of-life, the ethical debate on medically assisted nutrition
and hydration revolve around clarifying its medical purpose and how these encounter
cultural pressures. With regard to medical purpose of assisted nutrition and hydration at
the end of life, two reasons are typically cited for using this technology: to improve
fatigue and to avoid ‘starving to death.’159 With regard to cultural pressures, family
members often feel helpless in the face of disease progression.160 Often the conversation
around nutrition and hydration has more to do with acceptance of dying. When used
inappropriately due to cultural pressure, artificial feeding can cause needless pain-andsuffering and prolongation of death.161
On the other hand, medically assisted nutrition and hydration are used for patients
in a persistent vegetative state. With regard to definition, a persistent vegetative state is a
clinical condition of complete unawareness of self in the environment, accompanied by
sleep-wake cycles, with either complete or partial preservation of brain in brainstem
function. Patients in a persistent vegetative state show no evidence of sustained,
deducible, purposeful, or voluntary behavioral responses.162 With regard to moral
direction about providing persistent vegetative state patients with artificial feeding, in a
papal allocution March 20, 2004, Pope John II is helpful. He stated that hydration and
nutrition constitute a morally ordinary treatment for persistent vegetative state patients
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and that foregoing would be considered ‘euthanasia by omission.’163 The United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops interpreted this papal statement by explaining “certain
measures to provide nutrition and hydration may become excessively burdensome and
therefore not obligatory.”164
B. Relief of Suffering.
Second, the withdrawal of life–sustaining treatment is designed to address the
relief of suffering at the end-of-life. This raises specific ethical concerns regarding
palliative care and assisted suicide.
On the one hand, to address palliative care, two interrelated concepts need
consideration: care at end-of-life and palliative sedation. With regard to care at the end of
life, patients near the end-of-life often have multiple transitions; these transitions can
cause medical errors, poor care planning, and lack of coordination and continuity of
care.165 To aid in the alleviation of these obstacles, palliative care provides pain control as
well as providing relief from other distressing symptoms.166 With regard to palliative
sedation, symptom control (pain, dyspnea, shortness of breath, restlessness, and
nausea/vomiting) is one of the reasons for not having a good death. 167 When symptoms
are not controlled, palliative sedation has been approved and endorsed by the American
Medical Association, American Nurses Association, the American Academy of Pain
Medicine, and the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine.168 Rarely is it
necessary to sedate patients to the point of sleep to accomplish symptom control. But if
necessary, sedation for the control of intractable suffering in an imminently dying patient
is humane, appropriate, and medically acceptable. Palliative sedation therapy is the use of
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specific sedative medications to relieve intractable suffering from refractory
symptoms.169
On the other hand, assisted suicide raises issues related to symptom control and
patient autonomy. With regard to symptom control, the predominant reason for
requesting physician-assisted suicide is symptom control.170 With regard to patient
autonomy, paradoxes have surfaced in the argument about physician-assisted suicide.171
This chapter has extended the discussion of medical technology from the start of
life to address end of life dilemmas. The contribution of the Catholic Tradition is to be
highly attuned to protecting the dignity of the patients, especially at the end-of-life and
even when they request medical technology for assisted suicide. The Catholic Tradition
urges the use of medical technology to alleviate patient suffering without intending their
death.
IV. Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious Directives.
The final section of the chapter presents a critique of the ethical analysis from the
normative perspective of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care.
Chapter 7. Conclusion.
This proposed dissertation has presented an explanation of the contribution that
the normative approach of Catholic teaching for resolving ethical dilemmas regarding
medical technology in Catholic health care. The Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Care Services have provided authoritative and normative guidance on
moral issues while grounding us in three concepts: social, pastoral, and professional
responsibility. This normative framework for Catholic health care ethics is utilized to
discuss ethical decision-making models that are consistent with Catholic ethics. The
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following topics are examined in light of these foundational principles: moral agency and
organizational ethics, the competence of patients for making end-of-life decisions, and
the role of clinical ethics consultation services. Additionally, reproductive technology is
examined in light of the normative guidance, addressing these topics: the embryo and
personhood, stem cell technologies, prenatal testing, and newborn screening. Catholic
teaching engages these areas of emerging science to indicate where there may be
wrongdoing from individual and social perspectives. Additionally, in light of Catholic
teaching, emerging issues are examined in the area of regenerative technology: genetic
enhancement, germline modifications, mitochondrial DNA, and gene editing with
clustered-interspaced short palindromic repeats. Finally, the technological issues that
arise at the end-of-life are addressed in light of Catholic teaching, focusing on these
pivotal topics: changing attitudes on death and dying, medical futility, and withdrawal of
life-sustaining therapies.
The analysis will emphasize that the commitment to promote and defend dignity
of the human person from the moment of conception until natural death has remained at
the forefront of the discussion.
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Chapter 2. Normative Framework of Catholic Health Care Ethics.
To discuss the normative framework of Catholic health care ethics requires
examining two related topics: the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health
Care Services and practical ethical principles for Catholic health care.
I. Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services.
The normative framework of Catholic health care ethics is presented in the
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. The Ethical and
Religious Directives are a body of moral principles that introduce the teaching on the
ethical standards of behavior and provide authoritative and normative guidance on moral
issues in health care. The Ethical and Religious Directives are grounded on three leading
concepts: social responsibility, pastoral responsibility, and professional responsibility.
The Ethical and Religious Directives are designed to address the challenges raised by
medical technology in order to provide normative guidance for ethical decision-making
when trying to resolve complex ethical dilemmas.
With the Catholic Church’s commitment to the mission of healing and the everchanging health care delivery, a body of moral principles has emerged from the Church’s
teachings. The Ethical and Religious Directives have the purpose of affirming ethical
standards of behavior. They also provide authoritative guidance on certain moral issues.
The Ethical and Religious Directives do not offer guidance on every detail of all the
complex health care issues but are periodically reviewed. This review is in light of
maintaining the true dignity of the human person. It is often argued that science and faith
contradict each other but both are grounded in truth and freedom. As knowledge and
technology expand, it is each individual’s task to form a correct conscience guided by
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moral norms. The Ethical and Religious Directives should be followed with deliberation
and often need to be considered on a case-by-case basis. The Ethical and Religious
Directives strike the precarious balance between absolutism and relativism.
In sum, the Preamble and the Introduction to the Ethical and Religious Directives
for Catholic Health Care Services highlight the need for an ethical framework to
critically engage and normatively guide the use of medical technology today. Hence, the
main sections of the Ethical and Religious Directives are designed to present a cogent and
consistent ethical framework that is adopted throughout this dissertation to provide a
critical appraisal of the ethical debate on medical technology. The ethical framework
combines the integral relation between human dignity and social responsibility with a set
of ethical principles to provide normative guidance. This integral relation and its
accompanying ethical principles are discussed in the next two sections to present a robust
foundation for the analysis in the subsequent chapters. The integral relation between
human dignity and social responsibility in the Ethical and Religious Directives are
described in terms of social responsibilities of Catholic health care services (Part One of
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services), the Pastoral and
Spiritual Responsibility of Catholic health care (Part Two of the Ethical and Religious
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services) and the professional-patient relationship
(Part Three of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services).
Each of these is considered in turn.
A. Social Responsibility.
To address the social responsibility of Catholic health care, the Ethical and
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services emphasize that the “complex
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health care system confronts a range of economic, technological, social, and moral
challenges.”1 This dissertation focuses upon the technological and moral challenges that
present themselves. The response of Catholic health care to these challenges “is guided
by normative principles”2. The foundation for these principles is the integral relation
between human dignity and social responsibility. This integral relation builds upon a
biblical background to guide moral responsibility in health care, as discussed in the
following two sections.
1. Biblical Background.
The Bible emphasizes that human dignity and vulnerability must be understood in
relationship to God and in relationship with others. This reciprocal relationship highlights
the reciprocity between God’s invitation and human response.
God’s Invitation and Human Response.
The biblical concept of the person is defined in terms of word and response
enabled because of the human being made in the image and likeness of God. In light of
that image and likeness of God we are assured the sacredness of all human life.3 The
person is a speaker of the word and the hearer of the word because we are addressed by
God and given inalienable dignity. In the Old Testament, the widows and orphans had no
one to defend them thus they were given protection under the law; consequently they
maintained an inviolable dignity. In the Old and New Testament, dignity is based upon
the relationship with God not on the autonomous and inviolable selfhood. Because of that
relationship with God we too are called to maintain a mutual respect for those most
vulnerable.4 In the earliest writings, God gives human dignity and He unconditionally
accepts, affirms, sustains, and supports that dignity. In the Synoptic Gospels, Jesus
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invites those who were sinners and thought to be absent of dignity into his company.5
Jesus is the greatest example for us, thus we must become animated advocates for the
most disadvantaged and vulnerable.6 As imitators of Christ, we are mandated to care for
the needs of the poor as well.7
Dignity is also characterized by the human response to God’s invitation. Dignity
is intrinsic to every human being and cannot be given or taken away by the state, human
laws, or another human being. Integrated with the soul, dignity is given by God at
conception and is an aspect of personhood. Man’s life is a wonderful gift that should
never be disrespected or used as a way to accomplish another’s selfish end. Man was
created in God’s image and likeness and has an eternal place in heaven prepared for him.
Man is endowed with the capacity to accept or reject God and our relationship with
others. Respect for human dignity means that everyone must have what they need to lead
a truly human life: food, clothing, shelter, the freedom to choose a state of life and to
establish a family, the right to education, employment, a good reputation, respect,
appropriate information, action in good conscience, protection of privacy, and religious
freedom. God made us into one family, and we should treat one another in the spirit of
community.8 Thus we are called to contribute to man’s common good.9
Understanding human dignity and its origin from God provide the foundation for
our relationship with others. This relationship with others highlights the importance of
objective dignity and its recognition of human vulnerability.
Dignity and Vulnerability.
Historically, in the classical time of Rome, dignity was confined to individuals
and never applied to humans in general. From the early Christian writings, humans
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possessed dignity because they are unique from other creatures. Unconditional forms of
dignity continued during the Renaissance period when dignity was opposed to misery.
After the Renaissance, a new form of dignity called subjective dignity was formulated.
Based on subjective dignity, it was argued that God says that all created things are
constrained within prescribed laws of man who may choose the limits of his nature. Man
has the opportunity to fashion himself in whatever shape he chooses. Immanuel Kant
introduced another form of dignity during the age of reason: objective dignity. This
means that rational beings have dignity as long as they are capable of moral action. In
modern times, an increasing emphasis on respect for dignity has taken place and even
adopted into the charter of the United Nations. This understanding of objective dignity
highlights the reality of human vulnerability.10
Understanding dignity in relation to others not only highlights the objective nature
of human dignity but also emphasizes the recognition of humans as being vulnerable.
This is especially important for health care. Dignity should be viewed from the
perspective of policy principle as well as the view that the value of dignity is a standard
of patient care. These two concepts are not mutually exclusive. Human dignity has
emerged as an obligation to be recognized that all people have a basic right. Human
dignity is not viewed as merely a metaphysical hypothesis but emerges as an
indispensable basis for the fair functioning of all of human society. Humans are granted
dignity because of their capability to be kind, understanding, self-aware and loving.
Dignity should be a standard of health care reflecting the understanding of the patient as a
vulnerable person relates to the dynamic of interaction between patient and health care
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professionals. Because of the vulnerability of the patient, great care needs to be exercised
to promote the dignity of the patient.11
Briefly, with the biblical background of dignity highlights the reciprocal relation
with God and with others. This presents the foundation for understanding moral
responsibility in health care.
2. Moral Responsibility in Health Care.
Moral responsibility in health care emphasizes the importance of social
accountability and natural law as exemplified in the Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Care Services.
Accountability.
Moral responsibility highlights two related components of social accountability:
the common good and professional accountability. Sociality is a dimension of the human
person. Man is a social individual, a member of society but only as a being, infinitely
transcending the society. Humanity is worthy of being called human if a society of
persons is founded on the principle of common good. The human person has the capacity
for inter-relations and communication. The human social dimension is based on human
personhood. We have obligations and responsibilities to always respect the rights of
others and to work for the common good. Man creates society; man is not created by
society. Man must fulfill himself by being a full participating member of human
society.12
To heal the whole person, health professionals must understand not only what
disease is attacking the body but also what that disease is doing to the patient as a
spiritual being. Illness is a spiritual event disturbing both the soul and the body. Spiritual
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questions raised at this time can be of meaning regarding value and relationships. Health
professionals have to address these questions themselves before they can help their
patients. The transcendent is present in the midst of daily practice. The transcendent can
be found not only in conversations about spiritual dimensions with patients but in the
moments in which meaning and value can be communicated to the patient. Barriers can
stand in the way to the awakening of health care as a spiritual enterprise. Scientific
reductionism, the denying of the transcendent, and the industrialization of health care
threaten the restorative relationship that can begin when one person feels sick and
another, skilled and socially authorized person provides support.13
Social accountability, with its related components of respecting the common good
and inspiring health professionals, fosters moral responsibility especially in the health
care environment that is illustrated by the Ethical and Religious Directives. The Ethical
and Religious Directives arose from the development of ethical norms that express the
Church’s teaching on medical and moral matters.
Natural Law.
Engaged professionals in health care have always tried to maintain the spirit of
Christ in the ministry and in accord with the church’s teachings. Theologians beginning
in the 16th century engaged ethical issues in the practice of medicine. These included the
elongation of life and methods to determine when death occurred. Standards of care were
applied to treatments and general norms emerged. Written directives were established
because of the development of Catholic health care and the need for guidance for serious
moral issues. Initially these directives were rather legalistic, not explaining the church’s
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teaching or scriptural basis but merely laid out rules. Recent additions of the Catholic
health care directives have adopted a more theological approach to ethical guidance.14
The Ethical and Religious Directives have emerged as a body of moral principles
of the Church that are applicable to ever-changing health care. The Ethical and Religious
Directives have two main purposes: (1) to provide guidance for health care today and (2)
they set forth the ethical standards that flow from the church’s teaching about dignity of
the human person. The Ethical and Religious Directives are helpful for health care
professionals and also offers guidance on health care decisions of the Catholic faithful.
Natural law, knowing God through reason in addition to knowledge through biblical
revelation, and the authority of the Church Magisterium provide the foundation for the
moral teachings. The Ethical and Religious Directives call for each person to form a
correct conscience. The Ethical and Religious Directives should be considered on a caseby-case analysis. These directives were not developed with absolutism in mind nor were
they developed from a relativist’s perspective.15
In sum, human dignity and social responsibility highlight the contribution of the
biblical foundation for moral responsibility in health care. The combination of our
relation with God and others (based on the Bible) enables us to understand the social
accountability of the Ethical and Religious Directives as applications of our moral
responsibility.
B. Pastoral Responsibility.
The foundational concept of social responsibility is accompanied with the concept
of pastoral responsibility. To fulfill our pastoral responsibility, two areas must be
expounded upon: spiritual responsibility and pastoral care.
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1. Spiritual Responsibility.
To fulfill the pastoral responsibility we must recognize and attend to the spiritual
dimension and the spiritual struggles that are brought to the struggles of the patient in
health care. Both will be discussed in this section.
Spiritual Dimension.
A community of healing and compassion incorporates not only the treatment of a
malady but encompasses the psychosocial and the spiritual dimension of the human
person.16 Without health of the Spirit, little hope for healing the whole person can be
achieved through focused technology alone.17 Spiritual dimension or commonly referred
to as spirituality, has not stopped evolving in its meaning. Spirituality has a “fuzzy”
construct and is not purely an academic question.18 Spirituality can be defined as a “the
search for the sacred.” The heart and soul of spirituality is the sacred, a higher power or
divine being. For others the sacred is in the broader sense, such as objects, music,
vegetarianism, virtues, or visions. The sacred can be aspects of life that have divine
character or represent divinity as well as the concept of God, the divine or transcendent
reality.19 Problematic of the divine is that it is inherently mysterious, elusive, and
indescribable and language, symbols, and stories fail to capture its essence. Regardless of
our understanding or varying ways of imagining at the core of the sacred is God, divine
beings, or a transcendent reality.20
To aid our understanding and to become communities of healing and compassion,
we must understand that even though God is central of the sacred, sacred matters
encompass other aspects of life.21 Personal illness or injury, illness or death of a family
member, can be great life stressors perceived to be violations of the sacred. Spiritual
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violations impact people emotionally and physically, these may be viewed as sacred
losses. The sacred losses can elicit anger and rage as well as sadness and depression.22
Even guilt may be a manifestation of the personal violations of the sacred. The spiritual
integration of an individual will have an impact on how well these individuals cope.
Holding on to the sacred is the first choice in trying to cope with these violations.
Spiritual Struggles.
Spiritual struggles may emerge if holding on to the sacred seems no longer viable.
But two major ways of spiritual coping will emerge: one is to conserve the sacred while
the other transforms the sacred.23 To maintain their relationship with the sacred, various
methods of coping can be used to deal with threatening situations. These coping methods
come in a variety of shapes and forms. In the midst of crisis, these methods help sustain
people psychologically, socially, physically, and spiritually. Some of these methods of
spiritual coping are: (1) reevaluating a stressor as to its potential benefit, (2) seeking love
and concern from the sacred, (3) seeking a connectedness with the transcendent, (4)
providing spiritual support to others, (5) seeking a partnership with the transcendent, and
(6) using ritual for spiritual cleansing. Spiritual struggles can be a sign of disorientation,
tension, and strain. Within spiritual struggles there are three types: interpersonal,
intrapersonal, and the divine. Interpersonal spiritual struggles involve conflicts with
families, friends, and congregations.24 The intrapersonal struggles question one’s own
value, efficacy, or spiritual purpose.25 And finally, spiritual struggles involve strain
between the individual and the divine. Stressful life events can throw a pall over the view
that God is a loving all-powerful being who ensures only good things for us.26
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Spiritual transformation may occur as a result of stressors. The place and
character of the sacred in a person’s life may fundamentally change, as well as the path to
the sacred. Spiritual transformation can be a painful process but can be the normal part of
the search for the sacred. Transformation of the spiritual can end in failure but success as
well and the right of passage may feel empty and meaningless. Spirituality may ebb and
flow over our lifespan and can become downright puzzling but a very normal dimension
of our human experience. It is simply part of what it means to be human.27
2. Pastoral Care.
To fulfill our pastoral care responsibility, we first have to understand and
appreciate the spiritual dimension of the human person. In that understanding and
appreciation we must then minister and shepherd the patient within our care.
Ministry.
The human person was created by God to be in relationship and this relationship
continues by God’s hearing us, remembering us and meeting us in our relationships with
one another. Pastoral care is a ministry that occurs in a Christian community through
remembering God’s action for us. Additionally, hearing and remembering those we
minister to as we remember who we are as God’s people.28 A natural thing for us is
caring for one another because we are created for fellowship with God and one another.29
The human beings deepest need is to be cared about by God and in God’s name care for
others. In that caring for others, we must have an attitude of protectiveness and
solicitude.30 An additional characteristic of a caring attitude is supportiveness.
Supportiveness is acknowledging the worthiness and integrity of another in their own
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right referring to qualities of warmth, empathy, and unconditional positive regard for
another. Encouraging is the final quality important to caring.31
Shepherding is a particular kind of caring relationship and attitude, one that we all
are called to cultivate towards others.32
Shepherding.
The foundation of a shepherding relationship begins with empathy. Empathy is
the capacity to know and feel others feelings. The total acceptance of others with
whatever feelings they may exhibit is essential in establishing a caring relationship.33
Empathy requires discernment of how another is feeling, a sense of feeling with,
requiring appropriate distance and appropriate detachment.34 Another foundation of the
shepherding relationship is that of genuineness and humility. This involves offering
ourselves as finite, fallen, redeemed people, and only able to help others by God’s grace
and love. Simply stated, being humble and grateful is the essence of being genuine. It is
more than consistency, integrity, and wholeness. Being transparent to the One in whom
we have our being is the chief constituent of genuineness.35 Additionally, another basic of
the shepherding relationship is that of respect. Respect is valuing the dignity and worth of
one of God’s creations. With respect, there is no obligation to feel the way they feel about
things, to agree with them in their way of thinking or decisions, or are we to agree with
their every action. But we are to have regard for and protect their rights as human
beings.36 An unconditional positive regard is an obligation of every caregiver. People
must set aside their prejudices, animosities, and their inclination for judgment in order to
minister and be a good shepherd.37 Hope tempered with realism, another characteristic of
good shepherding, is in anticipation of the positive change in the external conditions as
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well as the inward process of reacting to them. Hope must prevail to have any semblance
of healing but hope is more than a basic outlook or attitude. Hope is alive in us already; it
does not have to be created. Hope is derived from a desirable self-image, healthy selfesteem, and belief in the ability to exert influence on the world. 38 The most helpful and
appreciated skill to be someone’s shepherd is the skill of listening. We must develop the
skill of genuine interest in what a person wants and needs. Rather than being an
obligation, when we listen from interest we are then most able to respond thoughtfully
and appropriately.39 Listening runs against our self-centeredness but in doing something
for another we have to take a basic attitude that we are going to open ourselves and
actively listen to the care receiver. To hear what is beyond, behind, and beneath the
surface is the ultimate aim of listening. Good listening is vital to good shepherding.40
C. Professional Responsibilities.
In addition to foundational concepts of social and pastoral responsibility, the
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services also address the basic
concept of professional responsibility. In the concept of professional responsibility that
addresses the patient-physician relationship, three areas stand out: informed consent,
surrogate decision-making, and the need for a conscience clause that provides protection
for physicians. Each is considered briefly.
1. Informed Consent.
In this discussion of informed consent, purpose along with components and the
effective process will be engaged.
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Purpose.
Historically, informed consent as it is practiced today is a relatively new arrival in
medical ethics. Now, informed consent is central to professional-patient relationships.41
Informed consent has often remained controversial because as practiced questions are
raised as to whether it is really an informed choice by the patient. Because of past abuses,
controversial cases, and the growing of patient rights movements as well as a skeptical
attitude of patients toward medicine, the importance of informed consent may be more
assumed than actually practiced.42 The justification for informed consent is for the
safeguard of the patient's dignity and autonomy. Autonomy, being one of the four parts of
“common morality” shared by “all morally serious persons,” is the ability to make
independent decisions.43 To better understand the professional-patient relationship,
autonomy should be looked at as the kind of contract where the patient is empowered to
play an active equal part in the decision-making about their treatment. It has been argued
that this kind of contractual model can present dangers if fulfilled to the letter of the
contract but no more or conversely if one performs every possible test and procedure with
unlikely benefit. Even so, this contractual model has significant advantages over the
paternalistic model of the past.44
Informed consent has become the primary tool for protecting the legal rights of
patients and in guiding the ethical practice of medicine. Legally, informed consent
protects patients against assault and battery as well as safeguarding the rights of
autonomy, self-determination, inviolability, and dignity.45 The ethical purpose of
informed consent is intended to shift the decision-making away from the physician
toward the patient. Informed consent should not be an event but a process that continues
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as long as choices remain. All too often the consent form is confused with the consent
process.46 In the informed consent process four basic elements are necessary: (1) the
decision-maker has capacity to make decisions, (2) the physician must disclose sufficient
detail for the decision-maker to make an appropriate choice, (3) the decision-maker
displays understanding of the information given, and (4) the decision-maker should be
allowed to freely agree.47
Components and Effective Process.
Five components should be included in the conversation regarding informed
consent: the diagnosis, the treatment plan, the risks and benefits of the treatment, any
alternative treatments, and the risks and benefits of declining treatment.48
Well-documented limitations complicate the practice of informed consent. These
limitations include patient comprehension, patient use of disclosed information,
autonomy, and the pressure placed on health care providers. During the informed consent
process patients often remember very little of the information disclosed. Their level of
comprehension is overestimated because of factors such as age, education, intelligence,
cognitive function, and anxiety all deleteriously affecting the patient’s understanding. 49
Even though patients are uniformly interested in learning about their proposed
procedures, some patients make decisions in a linear, rational fashion considering the risk
and benefits while others base their decisions on intuition or instincts. Social forces can
undermine the effectiveness of informed consent as well.50 Rather than exercising their
autonomy independently many patients prefer to delegate their decisions to others or
make decisions collaboratively with their support systems.51 Clinical schedules are
extremely busy thus making a rigorous informed consent process very difficult. Health
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care administrators rarely recognize or accommodate for such time commitments.52
Despite the consensus that informed consent should pervade medical practice, physicians
rarely meet minimal standards of disclosure in obtaining informed consent. The consent
process is primarily viewed as a tool for building trust rather than a technique for
decision-making.53
The move from physician-centered to patient-centered decision-making has been
accomplished with regards to the law and ethics of informed consent. There are
increasing concerns that the pendulum may have swung too far by mandating the
patients’ self-determination must be exercised in a very particular way.54 To ally this
concern, there is a growing focus on a shared process of decision-making. This would be
a process that emphasizes the critical importance of the patient’s input while recognizing
that it should be tailored to each patient’s ability and interest in participation. This
process recognizes the physician’s contribution to the decision, which is important and
deserves its own respect.55 This process also recognizes that medical treatment is a
partnership between the patient and clinician and there is moral responsibility assumed by
both partners. Neither can dominate the decision nor can they abrogate.56 Another
approach regarding informed consent pertains primarily to those decisions that involve
choices about the goals of medical treatment. Interpretations of informed consent that are
overly rigid confuse the roles of the physician. Eliciting patients values allow the
physician and the patient to reach agreement. Once agreement of the goals has been
reached then the physician is free to make appropriate medical decisions.57
The practice of informed consent can be complex and confusing requiring
flexibility to accomplish goals. These goals are legal ones such as protecting patients’
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rights, ethical goals pertaining to autonomous decision-making, administrative goals
assuring efficient healthcare, and finally interpersonal goals of building trust needed to
accomplish medical interventions.58 To accomplish these goals the following suggestions
are for optimizing the clinical informed consent process:
1. Make a practice of involving patients in making medical decisions.
a. Be aware of patients’ preferences and their unique decision-making styles.
b. Openly address the risks and benefits, alternatives, and what is to be expected.
c. These practices will aid in:
Patients’ decision-making
Free choice devoid of undue influence
Patients’ understanding
2. Determine the goals of care.
a. Clarification of goals of care may be needed.
b. The more complex the decisions the more explicit the discussion.
3. Allow the informed consent process to fulfill its varied purposes.
a. Legal to protect patients’ rights.
b. Ethical to support autonomy and dignity.
c. Administrative to promote efficient health care.
d. Interpersonal to accommodate and build trust.
4. To ensure understanding and permanence document electronic medical record
including:
a. Consent forms.
b. Education materials.
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c. Notes describing the process.
d. Decision aids utilized in the process.59
This suggested process serves as a pragmatic approach to facilitate and document the
involvement of patients in medical decision-making. These practices of establishing
informed consent of patients making medical decisions demonstrate the ethical spirit of
informed consent.60
2. Surrogate Decision-Making.
In keeping with the consideration of the professional-patient relationship in the
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, it is imperative that a
discussion of surrogate decision-making takes place. In surrogate decision-making, two
areas will be discussed: the function and naming and advising.
Function.
Traditionally, physicians have acted paternalistically on behalf of their patients.
Contemporary health care ethics contend that physicians should not take on this role
alone. Particularly in light of health care moving to team consultation, physicians do not
know what their intact patients want done in the event of serious illness.61 Additionally,
physicians typically underestimate their patients’ quality-of-life and are thereby less
likely to favor life-sustaining treatments than are the patients themselves.62 A surrogate
serves as the patient’s representative; ideally the patient should make this choice when
they are able to make an informed decision. Often next of kin serve this role in the
absence of a formally designated surrogate.63 The surrogate is expected to make health
care decisions based upon substituted judgment; making decisions based upon what the
patient would have wanted if they had decisional capacity.64 Many maintain that the
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incapacitated patients’ family is the most appropriate surrogate decision-maker but
empirical studies suggests that nuclear family members generally do not know the
preference of patients regarding the termination of life-sustaining treatments and thus
would not reach the same decisions that the patient would have reached.65 Studies have
found that shared decision-making about end-of-life treatment choices has been often
incomplete, especially among less educated families. But what was noted was the higher
levels of shared decision-making were associated with greater family satisfaction.66 In the
interest of justice and dignity, the families members making certain medical decisions
must ensure that the patients’, not the decision-makers, needs are most important in
determining decisions.67 Additionally, one third of surrogates had a significant prolonged
negative psychological experience after making an end-of-life decision for a family
member. A small number had a positive emotional response when they were confident
they knew which treatment the patient would have wanted.68
Naming and Advising.
In light of these findings, naming and advising a surrogate decision-maker is
extremely critical in making the patients’ wishes known. Surrogates often have to play a
role in decision-making even when the patient is not at the end-of-life.69 The important
considerations in naming a surrogate decision-maker are someone you trust, someone
who knows you well, and will honor your wishes. Often people assume their closest
relatives would be the ones who would know their wishes the best. However, people
often find when actually talking to their loved ones about situations needing a surrogate
decision-maker their views is very different. The key to assuring that your surrogate
decision-maker knows what one would want is talking openly about one’s preferences.70
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Sharing your personal concerns, values, your spiritual beliefs, and about what life worth
living would look like then share that with your surrogate decision-maker. To alleviate
any disagreement and to ensure that one’s wishes are followed, one must communicate
with family that you have knowingly shared your desires with your surrogate decisionmaker and would ask them to abdicate totally to your decision-maker and your wishes.71
Some of the most difficult problems in contemporary health care ethics are in the area of
decision-making for patients who no longer have capacity to make their own decisions.
The main issue is on what moral grounds such decisions ought to be made. Respect for
the non-autonomous patients’ autonomy should be the guiding norm for the surrogate
decision-making. Thus, the surrogate in making health care decisions should use the
substituted judgment standard. This will be possible because of the information shared
with the surrogate decision-maker by the patient prior to incapacity.72
3. Conscience Clause.
Furthermore, professional responsibility typically involves the need for a
conscience clause to protect clinicians. Three topics shed light on the conscience clause:
the historical perspective, consent paradigms and physician perspectives.
Historical Perspective.
Because of the tidal wave in the patient autonomy movement that has been
gaining momentum for decades, the physician is sometimes viewed as only the patient’s
agent. Because of advertising, Internet and peers, the physician has just become the
patient’s technical accomplice. Sometimes the physician has had to abandon their own
moral agency in order to fill the role that the patient desires, thus threatening the
autonomy of the physicians.73
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With the advent of secularism and the effects of patient autonomy, many
physicians, ones with moral conviction or religious beliefs, feel marginalized. A need for
statutory protection for these physicians arose. Congress has passed the Church
Amendment to specifically address abortions and forty-six states followed suit. This
amendment protects physicians from consequences for their refusal to participate in
abortions. Some states expanded this law to cover other morally objectionable services
such as contraception, sterilization assisted reproduction, human cloning, physicianassisted suicide, fetal experimentation, and withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
treatments. Laws have gone even further to cover other health care providers such as
nurses and pharmacists, as well as the health care institutions, hospitals and insurers. This
legislation is still in effect today and is called the ‘conscience clause.’74 These conscience
clause laws have given significant protection to physicians. Patients are unlikely to have
any remedy against the physician that refuses to give medical services because of their
personal moral objections. It can be argued that these clauses allow physicians to refuse
too many situations without concern for the patient’s ability to acquire these medical
services.75
The real issue with conscience clause legislation results in too many situations
where physicians arbitrarily refuse medical services to patients and, therefore, restrict the
patient’s ability to access much needed medical care. The current conscience clause
policy strikes the wrong balance between patient access to medical services and the
physician’s ability to refuse to offer services for many patients; thus, needed medical
services are denied.76 Furthermore, state boards have the authority to regulate the medical
profession. Conscience clauses for physicians limit many state licensing boards from
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discriminating against conscientious refuters. Without these laws stated as a conscious
clause, the licensing boards could have freer rein on constraining physician’s conscience.
A physician’s refusal to provide morally objectionable service might be construed as
unprofessional.77 The concept of professionalism plays a significant part of this conscious
clause debate. At the heart is the question: whether or not a professional is always willing
to place the needs of others before themselves. Often professional organizations disagree
as to the correct model for doctor-patient relationships and to what specifically the
physician owes the patient.78 One such organization is the American Medical
Association. Its code of medical ethics states that physicians have a responsibility to
place “the patient’s welfare” above their own while allowing physicians, beyond
emergency circumstances, the discretion to refuse to provide medical services. Moreover,
professionalism does not require a physician to completely subordinate his own personal
interest in lieu of those of the patient; this standard is known as the ‘primary principle.’79
Historical developments have changed the concept of what it means to be a
physician and even sparking the controversy of the conscience clause itself, beginning
with the emergence of a consumer-based medical system. A change in the paternalistic
role of the physician toward the patient autonomous model has eroded the professional
stature of the physician. The relationship between physician and patient has become one
of a contract.80 Likewise technological developments, particularly at the beginning and
end-of-life, have had a tremendous impact on what it means to be a “good doctor” and
raise many issues about what is his true duty. Finally, the physician may no longer be
willing to totally pay the price to be the “professional” that has permeated the definition
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of a professional physician. Instead the physician may be looking to have significant
balance in his life and not totally sacrifice himself for his patients.81
The use of the conscience clause may allow a physician to use it inappropriately,
thus calling into the question one’s professionalism. Different paradigm models have
emerged that may give insight into answering this question: What is a professional?
Paradigms to be discussed include the models of consent, patient-centered, physiciancentric, and gatekeeper.
Consent Paradigm.
In the consent model, both a physician and his professional obligations are
voluntary. This model recognizes that certain physical risks involved in the profession
exist. By becoming a physician, voluntarily one has acquiesced to these risks.82 A
physician has to accept a set of obligations that are “all-or–nothing” when it comes to
selecting personal obligations and potentially rejecting others. The services that a
physician provides is determined by what is socially acceptable of a “good” physician,
not by an individual physician. Right and wrong are not determined by the norms of the
physician.83
In the patient-centric model, the physician has to provide all medical services
within his specialty. One should not be a doctor if he has moral conflicts. The physician
should provide any appropriate medical care as long as it is legal and desired by the
patient. This is a model for the “technician,” where there is no room for personal morality
or personal autonomy.84 In the physician-centric model, the physician has an inalienable
right to conscientiously object on moral grounds not to provide services he deems
morally offensive. In this model, a physician does not have to sacrifice his freedom just

74

because he chose to be a physician.85 The gatekeeper model contends that the physician
has a duty to provide service when he has a special ability and when others rely on this
specialty of medicine. In this model it has been suggested that there could be ‘just’
distribution of medical services without impacting the autonomy of the physician. One of
the physician’s obligations would be to prevent their conscientious refusal from
becoming a burden to patient access.86
Physician Perspective.
The balancing act continues between supply of physicians and patients needing
medical services that may be deemed morally objectionable. It would become a
professional obligation for a physician, who refuses medical services because of their
moral conviction, to register with their licensing board. A licensing board would be
responsible for determining if the physician is sincere in invoking the conscience clause.
The licensing board would test both the validity and sincerity of the physician’s beliefs,
thus alleviating potential conflict. A registration system would be a simple means of
measuring supply of physicians as well.87 If there were a sufficient supply of physicians
willing to provide potentially morally objectionable medical services to a potential
population, there would be no imbalance. An outcry to question the conscience clause
would no longer be necessary. Still remaining is the question of imbalance. If the balance
were deemed a reality, then licensing boards could be required to be engaged in helping
to assess the patient demand for medical services. Licensing boards could glean this
information from various sources such as insurance companies and hospitals that
routinely collect such data.88
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Informed consent, which has developed only in the last 40 years, is a result of a
shift from paternalism to patient autonomy. Informed consent is a doctor’s obligation.
The physician has an ethical responsibility to disclose all reasonable treatment options
even those that the physician does not provide. The responsibility to disclose options
extends to the physician who refuses to perform a particular medical procedure even if
one finds it morally repugnant. Their duty is not unlimited. The physician must provide
all the facts to allow a reasonable patient to make an appropriate decision.89 Physicians
cannot discriminate against patients based on patient characteristics; they must fulfill
their obligation to notify patients about services not performed based on moral grounds.
The physician must offer information regarding medical options even if the patient’s
physician does not offer that service. In an emergency, the physician must provide for
patient to the best of their ability. Some suggest that the physician must be required to
refer to someone who can provide the needed medical services. Furthermore, physicians
should not abuse their power when giving advice as to the patient’s best course of
treatment.90
Patients also have a responsibility to show respect and consideration for the
autonomy of the physician. Both sides of the physician-patient relationship have rights
and obligations. It is in the best interest of the patient to glean, as early as possible, the
physician’s moral beliefs to foster a better doctor-patient matching to avoid conflicts.91
The issue of referral is one of the most difficult aspects of the conscience clause
debate. Much conversation has circulated around a physician who morally refuses to
provide medical services. The physician should be required to offer a patient a referral to
a physician who will provide that service. Problems arise for many reasons but most
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notably that the physician could view this as participating in formal cooperation. A
potential remedy could be for the refusing physician to provide a list of cooperating
physicians. This too has questions of moral complicity and the culpability. At the very
least a physician could refer the patient to a state licensing board to secure a potential
physician who would provide the medical services requested.92
In cases of emergencies, the medical institution has a legal obligation under the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act to stabilize the patients presenting
themselves with a medical condition without regard to their being unfunded. Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act does not preempt the conscience clause in
protecting individual physicians. In an emergency situation, a physician may have a
moral issue but is able to pass the patient to another physician who is more morally inline without imposing risk to the patient. The major concern is where a transfer is not
possible; in this case, the patient could be seriously wronged and/or harmed.93 Another
emergency might occur when a patient lacks access to services within a specific
geographic area deemed deficient in those medical services; such areas could be defined
as an emergency situation and require the physician to treat it as an emergency. This
declaration of an emergency could be made by the state licensing board.94
II. Practical Ethical Principles for Catholic Health Care.
The above basic concepts of social, pastoral, and professional responsibility led
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services to develop
practical ethical principles for Catholic health care. These principles are based on the
premise that man is not the master of his life; God is and has dominion over it.95 The duty
to preserve our life and use it for God’s glory is a positive precept but it is not absolute.96
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The practical ethical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives address the
following: the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of treatment; the
principle of double effect; and the principle of cooperation. These are discussed in turn.
A. Ordinary and Extraordinary Means.
In the Catholic moral tradition a balance of proportionality has to be achieved. To
that end an historical survey and decision-making foundations will be discussed with
regard to ordinary and extraordinary means. There will be an accompanying analysis and
appropriate discussion in referencing applicable Ethical and Religious Directives.
1. Historical Survey.
In the section, a discussion of early moral theologians and subjectivism and
relativism will ensue.
In the tradition of the Catholic Church it is held that man is not the master of his
own life. God is the master and has dominion over it. Human life is a gift from God.97
Since man does not have absolute authority over life one can conclude that we do have an
obligation to take care of it.98 This point is indicated in the Ethical and Religious
Directives in this manner: “We are not owners of our lives.”99 Therefore, we do not have
life and death decision-making authority when it comes to the final disposition of our
lives. God has given us the gift of life, not as a right that we can claim but a gift that we
may receive.100 We are more life’s administrator.101 The duty to conserve our lives is one
side of the moral coin while the prohibition of suicide is on the other.102 This point is
mentioned in the Ethical and Religious Directives in this manner: “We have a duty to
preserve our life and use it for the glory of God.”103 God's attitude towards us is marked
by generosity, faithfulness, and grace. We must extend those similar qualities to others.
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Having received so much from God’s bountiful care, we can give to others gratitude of
our hearts and this is what gives glory to God.104 This duty to preserve our lives is a
positive precept but it is not absolute. The significance is described in Ethical and
Religious Directives in this manner: “We do not have absolute power over life.”105 Life
has infinite value and lived well leads to gratitude, wisdom, and sanctity. We must realize
that we are sent to fulfill a God-given task.106
This begs the question, “When is it enough?” raising the core distinction of
extraordinary means versus ordinary means in preserving our lives.107 The distinction is
expressed in the Ethical and Religious Directives in this manner: “A person has a moral
obligation to use ordinary or proportionate means of preserving his or her life.
Proportionate means are those that in the judgment of the patient offer a reasonable hope
of benefit and do not entail excessive burden or impose excessive expense on the family
or the community.”108 Often at the beginning of a serious illness many medical
interventions seem appropriate but there usually comes a time when continued treatments
are no longer a benefit to the patient. This is not abandoning the hope of cure rather
acknowledgment of the human condition and the limits of medicine.109
Early Moral Theologians.
Historically, the seed of this distinction can be traced back to St. Thomas Aquinas
(1274 d.). Although he did not specifically develop this concept regarding the duty to
preserve life, he recognized that it does have limits. This point is explained in the Ethical
and Religious Directives in this manner: “no person should be obliged to submit to a
health care procedure that the person has judged, with a free and informed conscience,
not to provide a reasonable hope of benefit.”110 In Catholic moral tradition, simply
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prolonging physical life, especially when that means precarious and burdensome, is not a
requirement. The “hope of success” is best used in thinking of assessment of any medical
procedure.111 Later theologian, Francisco de Victoria (1545 d.) clarified that it is one
thing not to protect life and it is another to destroy it. He expounds by saying that one is
not obligated to expensive or extravagant cures or the best food or the healthiest air.
Victoria says the obligation to conserve our life does not bind us when food or medicine
exceeds what is customary, even if death is probable.112 This point can be explained using
the Ethical and Religious Directives in this way. Excessive burden is not required to
prolong life if determined by a free and informed conscience. The conscience, the “most
secret core and sanctuary” where one is alone with God to help make judgments about
what one ought to do or not do. To aid in that conscience formation, one must search for
truth, discern what is right and good, and then act accordingly.113
Dominic Soto (1560 d.) makes a similar point about the preservation of life due to
an infected leg and subsequent amputation. Dominic Baenz (1604 d.) is the first to
contrast ordinary means and extraordinary means. This point can be explained using the
Ethical and Religious Directives in this fashion. A free and informed conscience by the
patient is required to determine what is proportionate and what is excessive. Making such
decisions in the Catholic moral tradition is the right of the patient or their surrogate. Such
decisions should not be taken lightly and should be made taking into consideration
Catholic moral teachings.114
With the rapid advancement of medical technology in the 20th century, Catholic
theologians were forced to clarify the view of sanctity of life and the enormous costs
associated with adhering to that concept.115 This subsequently led to the Church’s
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response in 1957 with Pope Pius XII’s (1958 d.) declaration that normally one is required
to use only ordinary means.116 The essence of this response in the Ethical and Religious
Directives is posited in this way: “Disproportionate means are those that in the patient’s
judgment do not offer a reasonable hope of benefit and or entail an excessive burden, or
impose excessive expense on the family or the community then there is no requirement to
use extraordinary means to preserve life.”117 Medical interventions that seem no longer to
correspond to the real situation of the patient may be discontinued. That real situation can
involve disproportionate means or an imposition of an excessive burden. The Catholic
moral tradition has been very willing to acquiesce to the free and informed conscience of
the patient.118
Subjectivism and Vitalism.
This declaration of Pope Pius XII (1958 d.) aligned the issue of
ordinary/extraordinary means with the distinction between subjectivism and vitalism. The
two key principles of medical ethics for assessing this are beneficence and nonmalfeasance. Subjectivism maintains that one’s primary obligation is to oneself, human
life having no intrinsic value and life only having value if an individual gives it such.
Fundamentally, the dignity of life is rejected because life only has worth and value if an
individual sees life as valuable.119 Vitalism claims that life itself must be sustained at all
cost because of its greatest possible value. Vitalism forbids discontinuation of efforts to
prolong life.120
2. Decision-making Foundations.
The defining of elements and making a moral assessment will be discussed as it
relates to ordinary/extraordinary means.
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Defining Elements.
To bring the argument back to ordinary/extraordinary means requires a set of
criteria for making important distinctions. On the one hand, ordinary means has four
major elements: (1) Reasonable hope of benefit: this benefit must have both quality and
duration. If something offers little benefit then it would be unreasonable for someone to
be morally obligated. (2) Common means: one does not have to go beyond what would
be common diligence. To go beyond the usual would increase the extraordinary nature.
(3) Proportionate according to status: it must be reasonable according to one’s financial
or social status. (4) Undemanding means: the balance must be struck between gravity of
the moral law and the recognition that the obligation is too difficult to fulfill. The
excessive difficulty is the key not the ordinary means being free of any difficulty. 121 In
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, the obligation to
submit to a health care procedure can only be judged by a “free and informed
conscience.” The Catholic moral tradition does not address specific technological
remedies or interventions but asks whether a medical treatment is burdensome or
beneficial to the patient.122
On the other hand, there are four aspects in helping to determine extraordinary
means: (1) Great effort: exerting tremendous amount of effort is not required. (2)
Enormous pain: an unreasonable amount of pain can be recognized as extraordinary. (3)
Extraordinary means and expense: an obligation to spend an exorbitant amount of money
to conserve life is not mandatory. A person may decide not to impose excessive cost to
oneself, one’s family, or the community. (4) Severe dread: an intense fear or abhorrence
toward a means can be viewed as extraordinary.123 A strong repugnance can also make an
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ordinary means excessively burdensome.124 In the Ethical and Religious Directives, all
four of these aspects presented help clarify what would be excessive and burdensome
judged by a “free and informed conscience” of the patient.125
Moral Assessment.
A moral assessment of each individual case must come before it can be decided
whether a particular treatment is ordinary or extraordinary. The definition of ordinary
means is usual, commonplace, not exceptional and conversely extraordinary means
unusual, uncommon, and exceptional.126 All these definitions could be rejected for terms
such as ethically indicated or non-indicated, which substantially make the distinctions
more understandable. The distinction between ordinary means and extraordinary means
can be very deceptive because of their appearance of simplicity.127 To clarify these terms,
the distinguishing aspect of ordinary from extraordinary in Catholic moral theology is
whether the treatment is beneficial (ordinary) or excessively burdensome
(extraordinary).128 The criteria for decision-making need to relate primarily to the patient
not the remedy.129 The specific criteria which can relate to risks, costs, pain and
likelihood of success, anticipated results and side effects can reduce confusion but also
provide an opportunity to discuss complex issues among all stakeholders.130 In the
Ethical and Religious Directives, the decision-making revolves around the judgment of
the patient not the treatment. The health care team and other stakeholders often overlook
this as well.131
B. The Principle of Double Effect.
The second focus of practical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives
deals with the principle of double effect. Here the distinction between ordinary and
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extraordinary means is applied to provide practical distinctions to resolve moral
dilemmas. To discuss the principle of double effect it is helpful to look at its historical
perspective before considering its implementation.
1. Historical Overview.
Formulation of the principle of double effect and an articulation of the debateshaping standard will ensue.
Formulation of Principle
Historically, since the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, Catholic medical ethics has
utilized the principle of double effect. The principle of double effect is still widely
utilized in Catholic bioethics today.132 It is thought that St. Thomas Aquinas (1274 d.)
was the first to formulate the principle. Some argue that the principle originates much
earlier in implicit moral reasoning even dating back to the Old Testament. There are
examples of a justifiable act that causes both good and bad effects in early Scripture.
These justifiable acts utilized moral reasoning, very similar to the principle of double
effect.133 Aquinas was first to analyze a case of self-defense from which two effects, one
good and one bad, would occur. Aquinas utilized this principle in the situation of selfdefense against an unjust aggressor. In developing the first nascent version of the
principle, the concepts of dual effects, intentions, and proportionality were utilized.
Clarity and attention to the principle of double effect did not occur until two centuries
after Aquinas. Cardinal Cajetan (1534 d.) clarified the principle's effectiveness.134 It was
not until the publishing of Jean-Pierre Gury’s (1866 d.) work in 1866 that awareness was
brought to the principle as a normative tool for all of moral theology.135 In the 20th
century, the Ethical and Religious Directives applied to principle to various dilemmas
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regarding death, emphasizing the following: the dignity of the patient as they approach
death is what is paramount.136 This point is explained in the Ethical and Religious
Directives in this manner: “Medicines capable of alleviating or suppressing pain may be
given to a dying person even if this therapy may indirectly shorten the person’s life so
long as the intent in not to hasten death.”137
Debate Shaping Standard.
In St. Thomas’ general statement about the application of the principle of the
lawfulness of killing in self-defense, an act can have two effects. We understand it today
as an articulation of the principle of double effect. One of the effects is intended while the
other is unintended.138 Even though one of the effects is bad but not intended then the act
itself can be licit. This occurs because the character of moral action derives from what is
intended, not from what is outside of that intention. But if there are two effects, one good
and one bad, even if only the good effect was intended we cannot always conclude the act
is licit.139 St. Thomas says, “An act that proceeds from a good intention may be rendered
illicit, if it is not proportioned to the end intended.”140 Thus, it is imperative to analyze
the action and its effects to determine its lawfulness. This was purported to be the only
time Aquinas directly addressed the principle of double effect.
After the contributions of Aquinas and others as mentioned earlier, the principle
reached a level of consistency in understanding and use with the work of Jean Pierre
Gury (1866 d.). It was Gury’s work that produced the distinct conditions that exists
today.141 The principle was further developed by Peter Knauer (1935 b.) in the 20th
century that led to the establishment of the following conditions of principle of double
effect.142
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2. Implementing the Principle of Double Effect.
Conditions that are applied to implementing the principle of double effect and the
application of the principle will be discussed.
Conditions.
To justify an action that may cause a bad effect, in addition to caused good
effects, the principle of double effect to be correctly applied has four main conditions that
must be satisfied. To apply the principle to an action, the conditions are listed in a logical
order. While the first two conditions deal with the act itself, the latter two deal with
intentionality and the consequences.143 The four conditions of the principle of double
effect are as follows:
1. The action and its effects, considered by itself must not be morally evil.
2. The good effect must not be caused by the bad effect.
3. There must be no intention of the bad effect.
4. The good effect must outweigh the bad effect.144
These four conditions give us a template to normatively judge good and evil
consequences. Being an effective normative tool, the principle of double effect can aid us
in morally distinguishing various ethical decision-making options.145 At the end of the
20th century, the United States bioethicist David Kelly argued for a further refinement of
these conditions. He argued that the third condition should be “intend as an end to be
sought” and not “intend either as a means or as an end” as is typically understood.146 He
argued that in foregoing life-sustaining treatment, the justification for doing so in the
Catholic Tradition sheds light on the conditions of the principle of double effect. He
insisted that the third condition of the principle of double effect is reduced to a form of
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the first two principles of double effect conditions.147 His point was to focus upon the
distinction between morally intended action and the unintended side effects.148 The
contributions of Knauer and Kelly continue to shape the development of the principle of
double effect.
One final point needs to be made about using the conditions of the principle of
double effect, the use of the terms “direct” and “indirect.”149 These terms are utilized to
apply to actions after they have gone through the scrutiny of the four conditions of the
principle of double effect. If an action meets all four conditions, then it is considered
“indirect” and acceptable. If they do not meet the four conditions then they are “direct”
and are considered forbidden.150
Application.
The application of the principle of double effect is commonplace. However, using
the principle of double effect to make the distinction between killing and allowing to die
can be one of the most heart-wrenching in medical care. It is sometimes moral to allow a
person to die but the direct killing is never morally correct.151 The withholding of lifesustaining treatment is an example of allowing to die. The Ethical and Religious
Directives explain this concern in this manner: “The free and informed judgment”152 of
the patient dictates utilization of the withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures if they are
not contrary to Catholic moral teaching. While living the many passages of life well, we
also should prepare for our final passage to death.153 This preparation requires us to
consider the use of life-sustaining technology.
The use of certain medical means (ventilator, cardio-vascular resuscitation, or
pressors, etc.) is not killing the patient but allowing a natural death. If it is “morally
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extraordinary,” then the decision not to use these means is generally accepted as moral.154
Withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is another action that requires evaluation as to its
acceptability. The action of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment would be considered
equal to withholding life-sustaining treatments in the Catholic moral tradition. This
would be contingent upon the assumption that the burden outweighs the benefit. The
Ethical and Religious Directives describe this situation in this way: “The person has a
moral obligation to use ordinary or proportionate means of preserving his or her life.
Proportionate means are those that in the judgment of the patient offer reasonable hope of
benefit and do not entail an excessive burden or impose excessive expense on the family
or community.”155
By embracing the reality of our mortal life, we anticipate eternal life.156
Withholding and withdrawing treatment may seem vastly different but morally there is no
difference.157 This point is explained in the Ethical and Religious Directives in this
manner: “A person may forgo extraordinary or disproportionate means preserving life.
Disproportionate means are those that in the patient's judgment do not offer a reasonable
hope of benefit or entail an excessive burden, or impose excessive expense on the family
or the community.”158 Only by facing our mortality can we anticipate the life that
transcends death. This vision of a perfect life, God has promised us.159
Another action that has traditionally been accepted as ethically justifiable by the
principle of double effect is that of palliative sedation. The Ethical and Religious
Directives elucidate this situation in this manner: “Patients should be kept as free of pain
as possible so that they may die comfortably and with dignity, and in the place where
they wish to die.”160 Care is certainly something other than cure. Cure can become
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violent, manipulative, and even destructive if it does not grow out of care. Care is being
with, suffering with, and feeling with another. Care is compassion. We may not always
be able to cure, but we are always able to care.161 When patients are experiencing
intractable pain at the end-of-life, extreme measures to gain control of that pain may have
to be utilized. One of those extreme measures is that of sedation. This concern is
addressed in the Ethical and Religious Directives in this way: “Medicines capable of
alleviating or suppressing pain may be given to a dying person if this therapy may
indirectly shorten the person’s life as long as the intent is not to hasten death.”162
Intentionality has to be tempered with the knowledge of proportionality.163
Palliative sedation potentially can cause the patient to lose consciousness to
adequately relieve the refractory symptoms. With the goal to eliminate pain, suppression
of respiration may be the cause of their death. Relieving pain is certainly a moral act.
Therefore appropriate palliative medication to relieve intractable pain at the end-of-life
can be considered ethically justifiable.164 This point is explained in the Ethical and
Religious Directives in this manner: “One of the primary purposes of medicine in caring
for the dying is the relief of pain and the suffering caused by it.”165 But what must be kept
in mind is that often the greatest suffering is loneliness, the feeling of being unloved and
unwanted. Supportive presence may be the most appropriate gift that one can give to the
dying.166
Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide cannot be justified by principle of
double effect. This point is emphasized in the Ethical and Religious Directives in this
manner: “Catholic health care cannot condone or participate in euthanasia or physician
assisted suicide.”167 We must live in response to God and face life’s challenges and
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difficulties in hope. Our challenge and goal is to share that with those who are struggling
and discouraged.168 The very act of purposefully ending life is morally evil and so is
prohibited by the first condition of the principle of double effect; the act cannot be
morally evil. The evil act must not produce a good effect is the second condition. It is not
fulfilled because the evil effect, the death of the patient, is the means of producing the
good effect, the relief of the patient’s suffering. The first two conditions of principle of
double effect are intended to alleviate any rationalizations of evil actions.169 These are
applications that are readily addressed but there are many other applications of principle
of double effect, as one of the most useful normative tools of Catholic moral theology.170
C. Principle of Cooperation and Complicity.
The third focus of practical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives
deals with the principle of cooperation to address issues of complicity. The principle of
cooperation was developed to analyze a person’s moral action and to help determine
whether one’s action contributes to the wrongdoing of another.171 Again, a historical
perspective clarifies basic distinctions in the principle.
1. Historical Overview.
In providing a historical overview, the original purpose as well as a discussion of
its theological development will ensue.
Purpose.
The principle of cooperation, a principle of Catholic moral theology, was
developed to analyze a person’s moral action. This theological principle also helps
determine whether ones action contributes to the wrongdoing of another.172 The principle
of cooperation came about because of the concern that there are times when bringing

90

about good is almost impossible without associating with others wrongdoing.173 The
Ethical and Religious Directives explain “activities must be limited to what is in accord
with the moral principles governing cooperation.”174 Cooperation is relevant for us
because of being called to be disciples to advance the kingdom of God. Because of our
identity and integrity, the principle of cooperation helps us to be who we claim to be and
act accordingly.175
“Cooperation” has a positive connotation in English usage. It connotes the
working together for common good. In the case of this principle, it involves one’s action
and has been expanded to include the actions of an institutions as well as an individual.
The message of the Ethical and Religious Directives is thus: “Catholic partners should
avoid entering into partnerships that would involve them in cooperation with the
wrongdoing of other providers.”176 The principle of cooperation has become a useful tool
for today’s health care environment by guiding us as we advance the kingdom of God.177
The principle was originally formulated to help individuals and their confessor determine
if and how they might act morally when they come in contact with the actions of others
who were involved in wrongdoing. In the context of the practice of the Catholic
sacrament of Reconciliation, guidance was needed to aid the penitent and confessor.178
Theological Development.
Historically, St. Thomas Aquinas (1274 d.) was one of the first theologians to
give some direction regarding this principle when his observations later became known as
the principle of double effect.179 In the 16th century moral theologian, Thomas Sanchez
(1610 d.) articulated a concern about individuals cooperating directly with evil.180 St.
Alphonse Liguori (1787 d.) gave the principle of cooperation much of its present form.
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The principle of cooperation can be seen as an application of the principle of double
effect.181 In this case, the principle deals with the action of individuals and organizations
involved with immoral actions of others.182 However, some scholars consider the
principle of cooperation as distinct from the principle of double effect. The reason is
because cooperation involves two agents with distinct moral actions, whereas double
effect involves a single moral agent with good and bad effects related to action.183
However, the principle of cooperation is quite different from the principle of toleration.
The principle of toleration, advanced from the time of St. Augustine, deals more with the
power of institution that has the wherewithal to overcome evil but chooses to tolerate the
immoral action for the greater good.184 Pope John Paul II (2005 d.) in his 1995 encyclical,
Evangelium vitae, acknowledged the principle of toleration explaining that “public
authority can sometimes choose not to put a stop to something which were prohibited
would cause more harm” (no. 71).185
2. Distinctions.
Addressed by the principle of cooperation are actions that are wrong in all
circumstances (intrinsically evil) and to justify cooperation, the action of the person
cooperating cannot be wrong. In avoiding moral culpability, the distinction between illicit
formal and licit material cooperation must be made.186
Formal Cooperation.
If one were to knowingly and willingly cooperate with someone who performs
evil acts or were to withhold actions that would prevent such acts, this would be
considered morally wrong. This point is explained in the Ethical and Religious Directives
for Catholic Health Care Services in this manner: “Catholic health care organizations are
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not permitted to engage in immediate material cooperation in actions that are intrinsically
immoral.”187 To maintain an individual and/or institutional identity and integrity, asking
these questions should precede every act of permissible cooperation: How will
cooperation likely affect one’s identity and integrity in this instance? How will this action
impact others? Does this action advance the kingdom of God?188 Additionally, to
encourage another to perform acts of evil or to agree with the evil purpose, even if no
physical action were extended, is also morally wrong. To directly intend the evil act is to
share in moral responsibility.189
The critical factor is intentionality or voluntariness.190 When a person cooperates,
clearly intending the wrongdoing, the formal cooperation would be explicit. If
cooperation were not explicit but nonetheless immediately associated with wrongdoing,
this category would be implicit formal cooperation. To clarify, explicit is when there is
clear intention in the wrongdoing, therefore wrong. Implicit formal cooperation is when
there is actual cooperation in the wrongdoing.191 When cooperation is utilized to justify a
cooperating action, that action is mediate material cooperation.192 In assessing formal
cooperation, one must assess the intention of the cooperating agent. Two questions must
be asked: (1) is the cooperating agent contributing to the morally wrong action in an
essential way? (2) is the cooperating agent in agreement with the morally wrong action?
If the answer is yes to both then this is explicit formal cooperation and illicit. If the first
answer is yes and to the second question, no, then the question has to be answered: is the
cooperating agent participating in the action in such a way as to assume that the
cooperating agent agrees with the morally wrong action? If yes, then this is implicit
formal cooperation and also not acceptable.193 The Ethical and Religious Directives
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explain that limitations must be placed on the participation in activities that would be
judged morally wrong by the Church. To apply the principle of cooperation, particular
arrangements have to be considered such as ownership, governance, management,
finances, actual performances of the deed, and scandal. Because of our call to be a
prophetic witness it may be necessary to cooperate in order to achieve some good and/or
avoid some harm.194
Material Cooperation.
With material cooperation, in some way one is involved with the wrongdoer but
does not share in the intentionality. In this case one should not participate in the illicit act
of another person and ought to be only involved with the acts that either proceed or
follow the wrongful act.195 Mediate material cooperation involves a cooperator only with
action and not with the will of the person doing the wrong. The wrong action is neither
approved nor desired by the cooperator, thus the cooperator is unwillingly involved.196
Prudence must guide those involved in regards to questions of intention, duress, distance,
necessity, and gravity.
To assess material cooperation there must be no intention or agreement of the
cooperating agent with the action. The cooperating agent still in some way contributes to
or facilitates the wrongdoing. The question that has to be asked in this case: is the action
of the cooperating agent performing good or at least morally indifferent action?
Additionally, does the cooperating agent contribute in a substantial way, providing an
essential element, without which the act would not be accomplished? If the answer to this
question is yes, the action is immediate material cooperation and usually not acceptable.
If the answer is no, the subsequent question has to be asked: does the cooperating agent’s
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action contribute some non-essential element? If the answer is yes, the action is mediate
material cooperation and can be morally permissible. In the utilizing the principle of
cooperation, the Catholic Church demonstrates the rejection of relativism as well as the
avoidance of the moralistic hyper-rigorous tradition that would reject any collaborative
efforts with those that the Church may have value disagreements.197
However, the use of the principle of cooperation requires that scandal be
avoided.198 To use material cooperation, the possibility of scandal must be eliminated.199
The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services explain as
follows: “The possibility of scandal must be considered when applying the principle
governing cooperation.”200 Scandal in this environment is not what might be newsworthy
but what may lead one to sin. Scandal is morally offensive to others, may incite others to
do evil, or might provide others with an occasion for morally wrongful conduct. How we
act or do not act may appear to encourage the virtuous conduct of others. The appearance
of scandal amounts to doing wrong against our neighbor; because love of our neighbor
dictates that we encourage one another to virtuous conduct.201
III. Conclusion.
The practical ethical principles of Catholic health care including ordinary and
extraordinary means, double effect, cooperation, and complicity give us basic principles
to better implement the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services. This provides a normative framework for Catholic health care ethics, creating a
foundation for the ethical decision-making models to be dealt with in the following
chapter.
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Chapter 3. Ethical Decision-Making Models Consistent with Catholic Ethics.
To discuss ethical decision-making models consistent with Catholic ethics
requires examining three related topics: moral agency and organizational ethics, the
competence of patients for making end-of-life decisions, and the role of clinical ethics
consultation services.
I. Organization Ethics and Moral Agency.
Moral agency is the state by which organizations, as well as individuals, are held
accountable for making right or wrong decisions. Both organizations and individuals are
expected to act ethically in all matters and to be evaluated accordingly. While most
Health Care Organizations have ethics committees to assist in establishing and
maintaining standards, often those committees are insufficient and cannot carry this
burden alone. All members of the Health Care Organizations must be responsible for the
organization’s understanding of moral agency, and all employees must manifest this
understanding as they perform their assigned duties. Health Care Organization are
ethically responsible yet are constantly being challenged by both internal and external
stakeholders. This chapter will discuss common dilemmas that must be addressed by
Health Care Organizations to meet expected ethical standards in clinical, professional,
and organizational environments.
A. Characteristics.
First, the characteristics of organizational moral agency engage two foundational
issues: the purpose of moral agency and the role of ethics in the organization.
Organizations like individuals have moral agency, but in different ways. They both have
purpose that must be evaluated in terms of being accountable through conscience.
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Organizational moral agency, as well as clinical and organizational ethics, has
distinctiveness in healthcare ethics that will be discussed.
1. Organizational Moral Agency.
To evaluate Organization Moral Agency, the ethical aims have to be identified
and ethical accountability has to be established.
Ethical Aims.
Organizations have moral agency because they have a defined purpose.
Individuals have a purpose and, if not fulfilled, will also be subject to the whims of the
universe. This purpose of organizations, like individuals, involves ethical aims. To pursue
these ethical aims, organizations set goals. In this goal setting, manifested as mission
statements, strategic plans, and budgets, organizations act like individuals insofar as they
pursue moral agency. This moral agency means they have responsibilities to society, to
other institutions, to other individuals within and without the organization, and ultimately
to the people they serve.1
Ethical Accountability.
Another aspect of moral agency is that organizations will periodically be
evaluated. This evaluation will occur internally as well as externally to monitor their
activities with regard to their ethical aims. Individuals they come in contact with, society
at large, as well as the recipients of their service measures this evaluation. Part of that
evaluation will be to determine whether they have been socially responsible, how they
treat their employees and individuals, and most especially how they have fulfilled goals
stated in their mission statement. Such evaluation highlights the ethical accountability of
organizations. Organizations are held morally accountable insofar as they are systems
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with ethical aims (goals, mission statements, etc.) that are evaluated. Here the difference
between organizational and individual moral agency becomes apparent. Individuals and
groups act as moral agents with ethical aims and accountability, whereas organizations
act as moral agents with ethical aims and accountability by analogy. That is,
organizations are not human individuals; but their ethical aims and accountability are
similar to that of human individuals. Hence, organizations have moral agency by analogy
to individual moral agency.2 Just as individuals are responsible for their formation of
conscience, organizations are responsible for creating that climate and evaluating whether
an act fits that climate.3
2. Health Care Organizations Ethics.
Within a Health Care Organizations, clinical ethics and organizational ethics need
to be discussed in a related manner.
Clinical Ethics.
Often clinical ethics have organizational ramifications. Structural problems in the
organization can come to light as clinical cases are reviewed. Such problems could be the
result of inadequate staffing, inept administration of medications, or the absence of clear
policies.4 Other clinical problems may materialize because of organizational changes,
such as policy or even directional changes of the Health Care Organization itself. The
Health Care Organization may have an impact on the clinical environment if they do not
give appropriate ethical consideration to their decisions. Problems can occur if the Health
Care Organization is not committed to an integration of ethics throughout the
organization. The organization can be accused of not meeting the “moral minimum” or
the lack of respect for other stakeholders.5 Most Health Care Organizations have an
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established clinical ethics committee that set guidelines and procedures to address ethical
issues occurring in the delivery of health care.6 Policies are not just theories but practical
tools and thus should be implemented with fidelity. Facilitating communications, dispute
resolution, and education are just some of the areas in which the ethics committee can aid
an organization in adhering to its written policies.
Organizational Ethics.
With the evolution of health care and having a larger stake in society, Health Care
Organizations must become more cognizant of their impact and perceptions. Clinical
ethics can no longer be confined to case-centered environment but must become part of
the organizational culture. Ethical implications must be considered in all their actions.
Often they are not addressed by the organization as a whole. The ethical implications are
often outside the purview of the ethics committee, yet issues are delegated to that group.
Consequently, the Health Care Organization feels they have satisfied their need to
consider ethical implications, and no other actions are taken. Areas outside the ethics
committee jurisdiction and often overlooked include executive hierarchy, organizational
structures, and relations with stakeholders.7
Organizational ethics problems can be analogous to individual acts in ethics (i.e.
informed consent, choice, appropriate disclosures, etc.) Effective Health Care
Organizations ensure protection of their patients in the areas of unauthorized access,
patient privacy, patient confidentiality, and safeguards for patient autonomy. In this time
of hypersensitivity to access, who has that access and what guidelines are in place to
protect the patient’s information? These questions and many others point out a significant
need for a forum to discuss areas of ethical concern throughout the Health Care
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Organization. As moral agents, organizations must pay particular attention to the ethical
expectations of society.8
B. Ethical Theories and the Ethical Climate in Health Care Organizations.
Second, in addition to the above characteristics, ethical theories impact the health
care organization in two ways, relating business ethics with the ethical climate of the
organization.
1. Business Ethics and Organizational Ethics.
Stakeholder Theory and Professional Ethics need to be discussed in both business
and organizational ethics.
Stakeholder Theory.
Health Care Organizations have unique challenges and obstacles. These obstacles
are inherent in an environment that is very competitive resulting in the Health Care
Organizations being caught in the tension between profitability and the demand to meet
high ethical standards. Therefore, it is necessary to look at various models of business
ethics to identify a feasible a model for effective Health Care Organizations.9 Models
such as rational choice theory, integrated social contracts theory, stakeholder theory, and
other theories need to be reviewed in light of a Health Care Organization. Each of these
theories has their strengths and weaknesses, but stakeholder theory offers the best option
for Health Care Organizations. Stakeholder theory is defined as a framework for
understanding the potential conflicts of value, loyalty, commitment, and interest of a
group of individuals who can be impacted by corporate actions. Stakeholder theory also
provides the best integration of financial issues and other considerations, while
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recognizing the role of moral agency.10 Stakeholders have a shared moral community and
appeal to fairness principles.11
Professional Ethics.
To the naïve, there would seem to be no conflict between organizational ethics
and professional ethics; however, an organization must integrate clinical, business, and
professional ethics. The latter may be the most important and most controversial. Health
care professionals are responsible for patients, to the health care insurers, and to their
community. All of these forces challenge the ethics of the individual professional.12 A
professional is defined as exhibiting five attributes: (1) a highly specialized training and
role, (2) an interest in society before self-interest, (3) personal self-control ruled by a
code of ethics, (4) a desire for rewards as symbols rather than ends, and (5) virtues and
morals as guides for ethical behavior. These guiding principles for the professional would
be control, responsibility, and virtue. Such guiding principles are the essence of a health
care professional whether doctor or nurse.13
Professionals, such as physicians, nurses, social workers, chaplains, and therapists
have codes of ethics that they all portend to abide by. Governing bodies of Health Care
Organizations expect competency and advocacy for patients as a minimal code of ethics.
The eradication of conflicts of interest and the elimination of conflicts of commitment,
honesty, respect for the law, continuing education in their specialized areas of expertise,
as well as a sense of responsibility to society are all attributes Health Care Organization’s
governing boards expect.14 Organizational ethics by the Health Care Organizations
should be a further attempt to combine all these different codes of ethics into a culture of
ethical behavior within a positive ethical climate.15
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2. Ethical Climate in Health Care Organizations.
Managed care organizations and organization ethics programs will be engaged as
they relate to an ethical climate within Health Care Organizations.
Managed Care Organizations.
With the perceived need for health care reform and its failure to come to fruition
in 1994, there was a major shift of power from inside the Health Care Organizations to
the outside. The power moved to government, both state and federal, and to American
business; both are large-scale consumers of health care. This shift was a result of the
perceived need voiced by the general population who believed there was “something
severely wrong with the health care system.”16 Managed Care Organizations and Health
Maintenance Organizations both grew because they were designed to slow health care
cost and to provide enhanced health care to a defined group. These types of Health
Maintenance Organizations were set up because there was such a tension between profit
and service. They were rife with ethical dilemmas. Controlling cost, changing provider
behavior, risk shifting, and risk sharing are just some of the potentially ethical
problematic areas for Health Maintenance Organizations.17 To further exacerbate the
ethical climate, physicians were subject to new reimbursement schemes, withholds,
capitation arrangements, bonuses, and gatekeeper arrangements. Also, physicians were
forced to sometimes compromise and balance the tension of good health care and
financial reward.18 Consolidation of Health Maintenance Organizations became the new
norm. Consolidation was done to negotiate more clout with all service providers and also
to accomplish the economies of scale. Health Maintenance Organization’s stakeholders
(including patients, physicians, nurses, staff, and the community) can experience
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significant angst because of staff reductions and reassignments; another reason to develop
desperately needed organizational ethical guidelines that help to create a healthy internal
ethical climate.19
Organization Ethics Programs.
To achieve a healthy ethical climate requires first looking at a Health
Maintenance Organizations relation to its mission and core values to determine if there
are any impediments. To help achieve an organizational ethics program, two major
stimuli have been instrumental in making Health Maintenance Organizations comply: the
first being the Justice Department; and secondly, the standards organization, Joint
Commission and Accreditation of Health Organizations.20 In establishing an effective
organizational ethics program, certain criteria must be met: respect, visibility, and proper
authority. The ethics program must bring into line mission and codes of ethics that
address specific issues such as marketing, admissions, transfer, discharge, billing
practices, providers, payers, and educational institutions. Each of these individual issues
is required to be evaluated.21
The organization’s ethics program should be established at the level of Board of
Directors and be given responsibility for morale, reputation and the Health Maintenance
Organization’s competitive advantage. The program should be give decision-making
authority but utilized very discriminately. The program should be more than an advisory
board.22 The organization’s ethics program should be the umbrella over three
subcommittees: the patient care ethics subcommittee, the organization ethics
subcommittee, and a professional ethics subcommittee. Each subcommittee should have
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its own functions in the areas of education, policy development, consultation activities,
and research activities.23
II. Clinical Ethics and Competency.
The challenges mentioned above of organizational ethics and moral agency has
often led to the compromise of a patient’s rights. The Catholic Church asserts patients
have a right to make their healthcare decisions.24 “The decision should be made by the
patient if he is competent and able or, if not, by those legally entitled to act for the
patient, whose reasonable will and legitimate interest must always be respected.”25 To
discuss clinical ethics and competency consists of examining two related topics:
competency of the patient and advanced directives.
A. Competency.
First, the fundamental concept in bringing decision-making of the patient to
fruition is that of determining competency. Competency engages two foundational issues:
decisions by competent patients and decisions for incompetent patients.
1. Decisions by Competent Patients.
Making decisions by competent patients will be engaged from the perspective of
paternalism and making treatment decisions.
Paternalism.
Patients that are capable of making decisions about foregoing treatment may
refuse that treatment based upon their legal right even against the advice of their
physician. The patient has rights of privacy, autonomy, and liberty thus choosing to forgo
treatment is within the purview of the competent patient. American law supporting these
rights comes from three sources, statutory law; laws passed by legislatures, and
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constitutional law. The American Constitution is the source for the right to privacy and
autonomy while common-law allows the refusal of unwanted treatments.26
Emphasis in modernity has been placed on respecting the patient's autonomy but
paternalism continues to occur.27 Paternalism is when another decides on behalf of the
patient; as a result the patient’s autonomy is limited. Someone else is making moral
choices for the patient about treatment decisions. When competency of a patient is not in
question, the patient should be making treatment decisions. The patient knows what
burdens they are willing to bear and what risks they are willing to take.28 Moral
responsibility in the case of decision-making continues to fall within the confines of
health care professionals. They are the ones responsible for presenting the possible
choices to the patient and facilitating the decision-making process.29
Another definition of paternalism is when one interferes with the patient’s
autonomous decision-making to avoid harm and to promote authentic welfare and values
of the patient. The physician may feel the expressed preferences of the patient may be
inauthentic and therefore may act counter to the preferences of a patient.30 The physician
may feel the patient is not competent or that the patient’s decision was coerced. Family
members may have appealed to duty or reciprocity and even possibly coercion to solicit
compliance with their wishes regarding a particular treatment that is not shared by the
patient. An implicit or explicit threat may be influencing the patient. Acting against an
inauthentic preference could be defined as “soft paternalism.”31
Treatment Decisions.
Treatment decisions are not based on knowledge alone but on patient’s values and
moral beliefs. Values guide a person’s behavior and choices while disclosing what offers
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meaning and worth. Values are integral to a person and thus often people do not even
realize that decisions are based on their values. Because values are unique to each
individual they are relevant to decision-making. Decision-making requires value
judgments.32
Treatment decisions are contextual in nature therefore more than the technical
aspects of that decision needs to be considered. Only the patient can know what is most
important, requiring their values being considered. Others cannot know a patient’s values
unless they have shared them. Even with that knowledge making decisions based on
other’s values is extremely difficult especially if the values are not shared. Consequently,
others should not make medical choices for competent individuals.33
The knowledge of one’s own values empowers the patient to act autonomously.
Often patients have not contemplated nor articulated what is most important to them
when faced with health care decisions. Health care professionals can and should help
individuals clarify their personal values through self-reflection and self-examination.34
This process includes the clarification phase in which patients select values from among a
group of values. Once these values are determined the patient moves on to the prizing
phase, a term used to describe values clarification. At the prizing phase, the patient has
determined their values and is willing and able to communicate those values to others.
The last phase, acting on one’s values, allows an individual to make decisions and take
appropriate action. The patient is the only one that knows what burdens they are willing
to bear therefore treatment decisions are moral decisions belonging to the patient only. 35
One of the most vexing problems for physicians is determining if the patient is capable of
making adequate medical decisions. Determination of competency is crucial for
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achieving the proper balance between autonomy of the patient and protecting the patient
that may have a cognitive impairment.36
Competency denotes a legal status that should be determined by a court therefore
referring to legal judgments and conversely capacity to clinical ones. These terms are
used interchangeably sometimes causing confusion. The physician should continue the
tradition of determining patient’s capacity and decide when to seek substituted consent.
Generally, a medical determination of incapacity is the trigger for activating directives.
Consent from an incompetent patient is invalid; a physician could be accused of treating
the patient without informed consent if he did not obtain a substitute decision-maker.37
An appropriate balance between respecting one’s autonomy and protection from the
consequences of a bad decision is what must be kept in mind. Performing capacity
assessment is the only means to offer protection of the patient and physician. Therefore
only patients with significant impairment should be considered incapacitated. The
preciseness of the test varies with the seriousness of the consequences of the patient’s
decision-making.38 Decision-making capacity should be a “sliding scale” approach rather
than an either/or argument.39
Assessing decision-making capacity falls into four categories: the ability to
articulate a choice, the ability to understand information, the ability to appreciate
consequences, and the ability to manage information.40 More formal bedside tests to
determine the patient’s cognitive function are available. The Mini-Mental Status
Examination, even though not developed for decision-making capacity assessment, has
performed reasonably well. The Mini-Mental Status Examination does not address areas
such as understanding or choices.41 The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tools for
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Treatment is considered the “gold standard” for capacity assessment tools. This test does
require training to administer and interpret. Additional tests available are the Capacity to
Consent to Treatment Instrument and the Hopemont Capacity Assessment Interview.42
2. Decisions for Incompetent Patients.
Determining capacity and applying guidance standards can complicate decisionmaking for incompetent patients both of these will have light shed on them.
Determining Capacity.
For incompetent patients, two central ethical issues for decision-making exist:
who should decide and what standards guide these decisions. If a durable power of
attorney for health care exists, that addresses the first ethical issue thus supporting the
value of self-determination or autonomy. It is in self-determination that one is able to
exercise control over and responsibility for one’s life. It may seem self-determination
would be irrelevant to decision-making for an incompetent patient but that patient, that is
now incompetent, was at some point competent to exercise self-determination by
selecting and instructing a surrogate.43
If the now incompetent patient has appointed no surrogate decision-maker, then it
is common to turn to a close family member to be the surrogate, which also respects the
patient’s autonomy. Family members are likely to know the patient’s wishes and values
and have the patient’s best interest in mind, therefore family members may be the best
suited to make medical decisions for the incapacitated patient. Decisions by the surrogate
must be guided by the standard of substituted judgment, the decisions would be based on
the now incompetent patients values and preferences and would reflect what the patient
would have wanted.44
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Guidance Standards.
Three distinct standards apply to certain decision-making: substituted judgment,
substituted judgment combined with best interests, and best interests. Ideally these three
standards should be applied in this order. The first standard, substituted judgment would
presume, with clear proof, that the patient actually said what they would prefer under
certain circumstances. The judgment of the surrogate should not substitute for the
patient’s wishes. The surrogate is only to decide what they know the patient would have
wanted and would decide.45 The second standard, the substituted judgment combined
with best interests, would assume that there is some proof about the patient’s preferences
but not sufficient to base a decision. In this case, objective standards regarding the best
interest of the patient would have to be taken in consideration. The third standard when
there is no proof of what the incompetent patient would want is the best interests
standard. Ideally, one would look to the purely subjective wishes of the patient but if this
information is not available we have to turn to the objective best interests of the patient.46
At this point in the decision-making process evaluating morally ordinary and morally
extraordinary treatments have to be considered. The surrogate cannot legally or ethically
prohibit a treatment that would be in the best interests of the patient. Beneficence and
autonomy have to be considered with the incapacitated patient. 47
To aid in the decision-making process for the surrogate, the treatment team should
attempt to be as explicit about the patient’s condition as possible. Treatment options need
to be presented to the surrogate clearly with benefits, risks, and any other possible
outcomes.48 Outcome of surrogate decision-making can be influenced by personal beliefs,
morals, and values of the health care providers as well as other clinicians, thus care
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should be taken to minimize the opportunity for influencing the surrogates decisions and
encouraging them to become appropriately educated to provide the best outcome for the
patient.49
B. Advance Directives.
Second, these competency-determining challenges reveal the crucial need for
advance directives. The advance directives are impacted in two ways: advance care
planning and end-of-life care planning.
1. Advance Care Planning.
In advance care planning, the process and the required communication need to be
discussed.
Process.
Advance care planning for patients becomes more critical as their ability to make
appropriate decision choices as physical and cognitive abilities diminish. Most people
want to be in control of decisions about their care. Advance care planning is preparation
for future medical care when and if the patients are unable to make their own decisions. It
should be part of the routine medical care conducted with their chosen medical decisionmaker. It is best to approach the process of advance care planning in incremental steps.
Advance care planning is a process in which patients explores, discusses, articulates, and
then documents their preferences. In the process, patients identify and clarify their
personal values and goals regarding their medical treatment. They articulate the care they
would like and who they are comfortable speaking on their behalf. This planning should
be done in a structured environment and woven into the regular care plan.50 It is best to
review the care plan and update it periodically. The advance care plan is designed to
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insure that the desires of patients are respected in the event they are unable to make
medical decisions for themselves. A sense of control and peace of mind are fostered by
this exercise. The proxy decision-maker, by being involved in this process, comes to a
much clearer view and appreciation for the desires of the patient.51
Communication.
Clinician-patient communication in advance care planning should involve family
members, patient and proxy decision-maker. Advance care planning process centers on
values, goals, and treatment preferences and provides a guide for future decisions. It has
been found that people who have had these open and frank discussions commonly choose
care that focuses on quality of life rather than life extension.52 Studies have also shown
that patients expect health care professionals to initiate these conversations and health
care professionals, especially physicians, expect patients to initiate them. Three possible
reasons why this may not be a comfortable area for physicians include (1) that they may
lack knowledge and be reluctant to discuss end-of-life care, (2) that they may lack
training to confidently speak of advance care planning, and (3) that they are not
compensated for their time involved in these discussions and may feel death is not an
appropriate outcome of care.53
Advance care planning is important for physicians. They have a legal and
professional responsibility because patients have a right to participate in the planning of
their own health care. This planning helps build trust and confidence with the physician
to better appreciate and understand the values, goals, and preferences of patients. This
process fosters open and frank conversations eliminating anxieties and fear for both
participants. The advance care planning is preventive medicine.54
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Even if advance care plans and advance directives have faithfully been executed,
they are often not followed. Family input is often a complicating aspect. Physicians are
often likely to follow family preferences rather than the advance directives. Sometimes
physicians follow their own values and choose not to implement directives they find
objectionable. Litigation fear also can play a role in not following the advance directive:
"Live people sue; dead ones don't." Advance directives should be executed long before
the end of life is imminent. Delaying the conversation until hospital admission is too late
in the process as patients can be overwhelmed with making other decisions.55
The Church has been moderately active in securing and encouraging parishioners
to engage their families and physicians to have frank and honest discussions regarding
their end of life wishes. The Church is very explicit about looking at life as a precious gift
from God and that humans are stewards of life rather than custodians. Preservation of life
is a duty and all are expected to use their lives for the glory of God. Likewise,
preservation of life is not absolute and may be rejected if it is deemed insufficiently
beneficial or excessively burdensome. “The task of medicine is to care even when it
cannot cure.”56
2. Care Planning at the End-of-Life.
To adequately advance care plan at end-of-life a discussion will ensue regarding
choosing a surrogate and the Patient Self-Determination Act.
Choosing Surrogate.
In the realm of advance care planning, there are two kinds of advanced directives.
First is the proxy or durable power of attorney for health care. The second, treatment
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directives are instructions regarding the care of a person that becomes incapacitated and
cannot make appropriate health care decisions.57
Adult individuals who are mentally competent to make health care decisions for
themselves have a right to do so. If incapacity should occur, an individual needs someone
to make decisions for them. Two types of surrogate decision-makers exist for health care,
a court appointed surrogate, guardian, for individuals whose incapacity has been
determined, and surrogate decision-makers allowing a competent person to designate
someone else as their attorney-in-fact. The second differs in two significant respects.
First, the individual not the court makes the decision. Secondly, the principle chooses the
specific power to be delegated. Additionally, their attorney-in-fact survives incapacity.58
Choosing a surrogate decision-maker is an extremely important decision because
one is giving them the authority to make life-and-death decisions. A surrogate will be
making decisions based on substituted judgment.59 One must make sure the person
chosen is willing to perform that task. The person chosen must be willing to talk with you
and know about your wishes, will understand what you want and your priorities about
health care and will exercise your wishes. One must choose very carefully because you
are entrusting someone with your life.60 Choosing someone who can be a strong advocate
and can handle conflicting opinions from family, friends, and medical personnel is
paramount.61
Patient Self-Determination Act.
Since the passage of the 1990 Patient Self-Determination Act, advance care
planning has been recognized as a means of improving decision-making at the end-oflife. The goal of the Patient Self-Determination Act is to ensure patient preferences guide
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medical care in the event of their incapacity.62 People may want and expect to control
decisions about their medical care throughout their lives, but many factors work against
realizing that goal. Many people nearing the end-of-life are not able to direct their
medical care because often they do not realize that end-of-life is nearing. The advance
directive was developed to aid people when they are fully competent to make the
determination of their desires when they no longer can communicate their authentic
wishes.63
Advance care planning should involve family members and clinicians and can
start at any state of health and age. Life’s goals, values, and treatment preferences are at
the center of any discussion. The information gained in periodic revisiting will give an
opportunity for matching subsequent care decisions with the wishes of the patient.
Patients that have executed an advance directive are more likely to receive end-of-life
care consistent with their preferences.64
Most physicians avoid end-of-life discussions until death is near. End-of-life
discussions should take place during periods of relative medical stability and not in
hospital settings. Medical deterioration is the reason the physicians will finally have the
end-of-life conversation. The primary care physician rather than an institutional physician
is best equipped to have conversations about patient’s values and goals at end-of-life. As
previously noted, most often patients expect physicians to initiate the end-of-life
conversations and physicians expect the patient to initiate. The lack of knowledge and
training is most often given for the reluctance of physicians to discuss end-of-life care.
Other reasons for avoidance of the end-of-life conversation by physicians are that (1)
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advance directives are not necessary for young and healthy patients and (2) the physician
is not compensated for the time involved in these discussions.65
Strong views are expressed when asked about what kind of care people want
when they are seriously ill and approaching death. They prefer to die at home and remain
in control of decisions about their medical care but that is quite opposite of the facts:
nearly 25% die in nursing homes and another 25% die in the hospital.66 Nearly 40% of all
adult patients in a hospital setting are incapable of making their own medical decisions.
The reasons for these abhorrent statistics are multiple: lack of awareness on the part of
the patient and families, unwillingness to adhere to patient’s wishes by clinicians, lack of
institutional support, including resistance within the medical community for completing
and following advance directives.67
Less than 30% of the population has completed advance care planning while 90%
believe having the conversation with the family is important. But that same report said
they would sooner concentrate on staying alive than talk about death and completing
directives. Most frequent conversation about advance care planning focuses on people
who want to avoid intensive and non-beneficial medical intervention but it is clear that
many worry about being denied care or being “given up on” too early.68
A living will and a durable power of attorney for health care offer a significant
impact on the outcomes of decision-making. In keeping patient’s wishes, advance
directives are positive tools and more patients should avail themselves of them. The
health care system should be allowed the time, the space, and the reimbursement to aid
people in planning appropriately for the end-of-life.69
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III. Clinical Ethics Consultation.
An inherent relationship exists between clinical and organizational ethics. Thus an
ethics infrastructure is an essential component of an organization’s ethics integration and
strategy. The ethics infrastructure links fundamental processes in clinical practice to the
mission and core values of the organization. To accomplish effective clinical ethics
consultations require examining three related topics: the ethics approach, the quality and
professionalism, and case analysis.
A. Ethics Approaches.
First, the focus of ethics approaches engages two foundational issues: ethics
consultation system and the Veterans Health Administration.
1. Ethics Consultation Systems.
A discussion of ethical dilemma analysis and various models within the ethics
consultation system will be discussed.
Ethical Dilemma Analysis.
Modern medical ethics depend on moral principles that respect autonomy,
beneficence, non-malfeasance, and justice. In clinical medicine, which is intensely
practical, one may find these ethical principles and the theories behind them too
cumbersome to apply and utilize quickly to assist in making ethical decisions. Thus,
ethical dilemmas can be analyzed by the means of the four following topics: (1) medical
indications, (2) patient preferences, (3) quality-of-life, and (4) contextual features.
Medical indications include the usual content of a clinical discussion: diagnosis,
prognosis, and treatment of a medical situation. “Indications” refer to the diagnostic and
therapeutic interventions. Patient preferences, patient’s values and assessment of burdens
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and benefits are all ethically important. A goal of medical intervention is to restore,
maintain, or improve quality of life. Therefore, the patient’s quality of life must be
evaluated and considered. The contextual features are the social, economic, legal, and
administrative context of the patient’s case.70
Models.
Three distinct models exist to accomplish ethics consultations: an individual
consultant, an entire ethics committee, or the consultation team. Because each model has
advantages and disadvantages, health care organizations should determine which is most
appropriate in specific situations. An individual consultant model is when one person, an
independent consultant or member of the ethics committee, performs a specific consult
alone. A second model is one in which an entire ethics committee jointly provides the
ethics consultation. This committee is a stable group of people made up of usually six to
twenty numbers. The final model, the consultation team, is the most adaptable to many
situations. The team should be comprised of a physician and individuals from other
disciplines, such as nursing, social work, etc., offering different perspectives, mutual
support, reflection, adaptability, and timeliness are the key components to the
effectiveness of this model.71
2. The Veterans Health Administration System.
The Veterans Health Administration System has two effective models for
approaching ethical dilemmas: the IntegratedEthics model and the CASES approach.
These two models will be discussed in a related manner.
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IntergratedEthics Model.
The IntegratedEthics model is a significant departure from the traditional
approach of ethics in health care organizations. This model has received positive press
nationally and internationally having become recognized for his innovation and
comprehensive design impacting multiple areas of health care. IntegratedEthics methods
and tools have been validated through testing and demonstration and thus been proven to
be authenticated and valuable. With Veterans Health Administration System’s excellent
reputation for addressing ethical concerns, it developed an approach to ethics it is called
IntegratedEthics. This methodology provides a significant paradigm shift: a unique and
innovative way to address ethics in health care. IntegratedEthics changes the focus of
ethics in health care from a reactive, case-based encounter, often fraught with a
fragmented approach, to one that adopts a proactive and comprehensive method.72
CASES Approach.
The Veterans Health Administration System has a five-step approach to ethical
consultation, known as CASES: (1) clarify, (2) assemble, (3) synthesize, (4) explain, and
(5) support. This process offers an exemplary guide for other Health Care Ethics
Consultants. Not every situation will lend itself to using all five steps, but it would
behoove one to systematically work through these relevant steps when confronted with
ethical health care decisions.
The first step is to clarify the request given to consultants. A preliminary
understanding as to why the ethics consultation is needed and what should be the mode of
action. In clarifying the request, it should be determined whether or not this is a request
for resolution of an ethical concern. If not, then assistance needs to be given to direct the
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requester to the appropriate offices or programs.73 If the case were an active clinical one,
then it would require the suggested CASES process. If this were a non-active clinical
case, it would be considered a non-case consultation and may not require the full use of
the CASES approach. Non-case consultations may involve answering questions about
ethics, interpreting policy and reviewing documents from an ethics perspective. Other
issues may consist of organizational ethics concerns or ethical analysis on a hypothetical
or historical question.74
Case consultations lend themselves to the CASES approach most often, but
consultations can also be very relevant in non-case consultations. The CASES approach
should be used when deemed appropriate. Additionally, in the clarifying stage, ethics
consultants should establish a clear statement of goals. The role of the consultant also
should be explained. At this point in the process, an ethics question should be formulated
which allows all involved to work productively toward a resolution.75
The second step in the CASES approach is to assemble pertinent information. At
this point, the consultant needs to determine the types of information that needed, such as
medical facts, patient values, and information about other parties. Visiting patients faceto-face is always desirable because certain information can be gleaned from that
encounter. Even if the patient is nonresponsive or not interactive, there can be many
useful pieces of information gathered. Access to the medical facts through the medical
records and the patient’s chart are essential in making a competent ethics consultation.
Likewise, staff and family members need to be interviewed to gain insight into the
patient. Verifying all the information gathered is important and carefully sorting through
facts from value judgment prospective is essential.76 In this phase, the Health Care Ethics
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Consultant must help others become aware of their own moral views and must be
attentive to the following factors: (1) each individual’s understanding of the issues, (2)
how the issues have arisen, (3) the individual’s perceptions, and (4) the stakeholders
understanding of decisional factors. By engaging in the discovery of the personal,
religious, and emotional values of the stakeholders, the Health Care Ethics Consultant
can listen attentively and begin to determine potential resolutions.77 Consultants should
always explain their role, explain the ethics question, and that the charge is to attempt to
protect the rights and interests of all involved. They need to keep in mind that
participation in the consultation by all parties is voluntary. Before the patient is visited,
notification of the patient’s attending physician is mandatory, both as a courtesy and as
an obligation, to ascertain if there are any medical considerations. Finally, after all
information is brought together and verified, this information should be summarized in a
clear and succinct manner for everyone’s benefit.78
Step three in the CASES approach is to synthesize the data. After gathering all
relevant information, ethics consultants should help resolve any remaining uncertainty or
conflict by analyzing and synthesizing information into practical terms utilizing ethics
knowledge.79 Next, consultants should determine whether the synthesis would be best
accomplished by a formal meeting, a face-to-face discussion, or in less difficult situations
telephone or email. If a formal meeting is utilized, it can be intimidating and fraught with
challenges.80 If a formal meeting is deemed necessary, however, consultants should
communicate with each stakeholder beforehand, allowing them to clarify and express
their values.81 Furthermore, formal meetings require ground rules and the establishment
of a goal for answering ethics questions. During synthesis, or the summary of the
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consultation, the appropriate decision-maker needs to be guided within an ethically
justifiable range.82
The fourth step is to explain the written synthesis. All stakeholders should have a
clear understanding of the completed synthesis. This can be accomplished by direct
communication to the key participants. Documentation needs to be made in both the
medical record and the consultation service record. Important information is thus
communicated to involved staff and serves as an educational tool when placed in the
medical record. The medical record note also promotes accountability and transparency.
In the consultation service record, observations of dynamics, performance improvements,
or any other appropriate comments regarding the consultation should be documented.83
Step five, the final step, is to support the consultation process. This last step
consists of a follow-up with the participants, a critical self-review, feedback from peers,
and an assessment of the participants in the case. Such elements will aid significantly in
the gleaning of information to help maintain an effective ethics consultation. Lastly,
ethical issues needing addressing at a system-level needs to be brought to the appropriate
individual or body.84 In this follow-up phase, it can become a complicated question as to
which part or parts one must follow up; it may not be a clinical activity. Overlapping
between methods and practices of an ethics consult can occur. Most often, however, the
follow-up has traditionally ignored quality measures and the emphasis has been focused
on the collection of data.85
Effective ethics consultations are essential in providing quality ethics practices
and patient care. By systematically working through a well-integrated process, the
CASES approach offers a means to accomplish those ends. In clarifying requests,
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assembling the information, synthesizing that information, explaining the synthesis, and
then finally supporting the process ensures the overall effective consultation process.
Serving the needs of patients and families as well as staff and the institution with an
ethical forum is a tremendous vehicle to improve patient care and to support an
environment of mutual respect.86
Of all of the steps in the CASES approach, the formulation of the ethical question
is the most important aspect to guarantee a successful outcome. Visiting the patient and
then listening to the family to better understand the values of the patient is often
overlooked. Participation of the attending physician and appropriate consultants are
necessary to accomplish goals. Families need the input of these health care providers.
Feedback and self–reflection, even though mandatory, are often neglected. 87
Briefly, presented are the goals, models, and steps to better understanding and
appreciation of ethical decision-making and the Veterans Health Administration Systems
methods utilized.
B. Quality and Professionalism.
Second, accomplishing quality and professionalism is a key to success of the
ethics consultation. To that end, process standards along with certification and attestation
are two fundamental elements in achieving quality and professionalism.
1. Process Standards.
To effectively have process standards, goals of a Health Care Ethics Committee
and knowledge and evaluation areas have to be brought to light.
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Goals of a Health Care Ethics Committee.
Quality in health care is an overreaching goal of a Health Care Ethics Committee.
Identifying and analyzing the ethical principles in question or the substance of the
conflict enhances quality improvement. All resolutions should be done in a respectful
atmosphere with all stakeholders’ interest taken into account. The Health Care Ethics
Committee can aid in reaching the goal of promoting ethical norms by providing
education about current and future ethical concerns. Clear standards have to be
established to bring about quality in health care. To establish what quality in health care
means, the Institute of Medicine gives a comprehensive definition: quality is defined as
the proportion to which healthcare outcomes are increased while maintaining congruency
with current practices.88
Knowledge and Evaluation Areas.
Regardless of the composition of the ethics consultation (e.g., individual, team,
committee), the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities has determined six
knowledge areas necessary for operating a successful Health Care Ethics Committee
service.89 The first area of competency is moral reasoning and ethical theory including
consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches, utilitarian and ontological
approaches, natural law, communitarian, and rights theories. The second area deals with
common bioethical issues and concepts such as patient rights, autonomy, paternalism,
surrogate decision-making advance care planning. A third area is in health care systems
that include managed care, organization and administration, institutional review boards,
and relevant federal and state government systems. Knowledge of clinical context implies
the understanding of terms and factors that influence the process of diseases, awareness
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of the grieving process, familiarity with technology, and an understanding and
appreciation of various services such as long-term care and hospice care. If not competent
in this fourth area, the Health Care Ethics Committee would be hampered and unable to
function effectively.
Additionally, a fifth area is the knowledge of the local health care institution with
its mission statement, structure, decision-making processes, and its clinical context. The
sixth and final area is the ability to understand the beliefs of local patient and staff
populations and perspectives. The knowledge of relevant codes of ethics and professional
conduct guidelines and relevant health law are essential.90 Recognizing that different
individuals bring different strengths, backgrounds, life experiences, and varying personal
attributes, each individual consultant, team or committee should aspire to be proficient in
these six areas.91
While all of the process standards and core competencies are important, reflection
and transparency are the most critical. Stagnation of the process can occur. Continual
growth can only be accomplished through reflection–action. Additionally, a concerted
effort to make all stakeholders aware of the availability of the Health Care Ethics
Committee is needed. This awareness will also instill in the culture of a health care
institution the positive benefits of Health Care Ethics Committee.
It is essential that a Health Care Ethics Committee be evaluated because of the
need to be accountable and to ensure common standards. This evaluation is critical to
improve the performance of the organization. Simultaneously, evaluations contribute new
knowledge and better ways to provide the ethics service in the future.92 Quality of
assessment is broken down and evaluated in terms of structure, process, and outcomes.93
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The first element requiring evaluation is structure. Structural elements of a Health Care
Ethics Committee service consist of personnel, resources, environment, and the mode of
documentation. Typical elements include: (1) to whom the Health Care Ethics Committee
reports, (2) policies and procedures, (3) the number of individuals in the Health care
Ethics Committee, (4) the members’ character and proficiency, (5) available time each
member devotes to the service and (6) Management support.94
Evaluating the quality of the Health Care Ethics Committee service with regard to
structure has often met with limited emphasis due to the lack of standards. Veterans
Health Administration Systems IntegratedEthics model offers tools to evaluate service.
The most often voiced concern in evaluating a service from the structural perspective is
the competency of the members of an ethics committee. Tools are available to aid in this
area, such as the Veterans Health Administration Systems Ethics Consultation
Proficiency Assessment Tool. Self-assessment, although convenient, may not lead to
competency. Third-party involvement as well as peer evaluation may be viable options.95
The second element requiring evaluation is process. The quality of the Health
Care Ethics Committee process, or the relationship between the Health Care Ethics
Committee service and the individuals served, likewise needs to be assessed. This
assessment can be viewed as to the degree in which the established standards match
actual practice. Standards commonly assessed include the following: (1) timeliness of
response, (2) appropriateness of ethical concern, (3) notification of stakeholders, (4)
interviewing and the gathering of appropriate knowledge, (5) determining the decisionmaker, (6) conducting moral deliberation and making decisions, (7) documenting and
following up with stakeholders, and (8) determining system concerns.96 Using tools that
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are available, collected data can help evaluate the quality of a Health Care Ethics
Committee’s recommendations. By utilizing the collected data, an internal review of
performance standards could be achieved. Additionally, participants could be asked to
rate the service provided.97
The third and final area needing evaluation is the Health Care Ethics Committee
service outcomes, or the results of the service provided. Outcomes include benefits and
burdens to both patients and staff. In need of outcome evaluation are four areas:
ethicality, satisfaction, conflict resolution, and education. In the area of ethicality, it
should be determined whether decisions were consistent with ethical standards. It is
highly recommended by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities that a peer
review or external raters evaluate this point. With regard to the area of satisfaction,
several studies reporting the results of stakeholder surveys have shown an
overwhelmingly positive satisfaction rate for the Health Care Ethics Committee service.
Comparably, conflict resolution has met with overwhelmingly high ratings in surveys.
Although a systematic evaluation has not been conducted in the area of education, it has
been shown that education has offered new knowledge, has made participants more
aware of ethical considerations, and has helped to clarify values. Because of ethics
education, a positive impact has occurred on staff morale and an improvement in ethical
awareness within the organization.98
Access can be defined as the availability to the group that it aims to serve. To this
end, all relevant parties must be encouraged and allowed to request Health Care Ethics
Committee services. The perception of usefulness, the ability to access, convenience, and
pleasantness must be paramount for Health Care Ethics Committee services to be
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effective. Services cannot be perceived as punitive. Because of the perception of being
punitive and the lack of awareness of the availability of Health Care Ethics Committee
services, only a fraction of the cases involving ethical concerns are ever brought for
ethics consultations.99 Evaluation of the access can be accomplished by looking at the
sources of the consultations and by determining whether all areas seemed to have access
to patients, families and staff.
Efficiency is evaluated in terms of cost (money, time, and effort). Return on
investment and cost effectiveness is increasingly a concern in health care. While the goal
of ethics consultations should not be cost savings, neither should it waste resources.
Given the limited resources available, standardization of the processes can lead to
significant cost savings. One of the most important efficiency and cost savings of Health
Care Ethics Committee services is in the area of identifying systems’ issues and
education of potential sentinel events, as well as preventing unnecessary costs in the
future.100 These three areas of quality, access, and efficiency are distinct ways of
assessing ethics consultation services within a healthcare organization.
Often, the evaluation of Health Care Ethics Committee services is non-existent or
evaluation is only performed to answer questions such as “Will we get sued?” or “Will
our health care institution make the ten o’clock news if we do ‘X’ or ‘Y’?” These two
questions are all too often the driving force behind most evaluations, rather than “How
might we improve the quality of our services?” Stakeholders, staff, patients, and families
are rarely polled to determine satisfaction nor informally asked to provide feedback.101
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2. Certification and Attestation.
A discussion regarding certification requirements of consultants and an evaluation
process needs to be discussed in a related manner.
Certification Requirements.
Ethics consultation training and recommendations for individual certification of
health care consultants is now being proposed by a number of health care professionals.
First, a formal training program should consist of standards and competencies necessary
for ethics consultation. Secondly, supervised apprenticeship should include case
consultations in which the apprentice serves as lead on several cases. The supervisor
however would have authority to determine competency of the individual to perform
ethics consultations. The training called for is one that requires Health Care Ethics
Committee to participate in formal verifiable training program in bioethics. The Health
Care Ethics Committee must possess knowledge in clinical medicine as well as bioethics.
One must have training and proficiency in interpersonal skills such as facilitation,
negotiation, and communication. In a formal training program, there should be written
evaluations of the potential Health Care Ethics Committee as well as the potential
consultants completion of a formal apprenticeship.
Evaluation Process.
Another way of establishing professionalism within the ethics community is
attestation, the analysis of one’s ability to perform a Health Care Ethics Committee
consultation. This review will evaluate consultants’ education, skills, and experience.
Quality attestation is different than privileging within a healthcare organization and also
different from formal board certification. Quality attestation falls between these two.102
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The need to establish clinical ethics consultation accountability and transparency
has become a rather contentious subject. This community has been unable for decades to
come to a consensus as to whether their work and the consultants themselves should be
accountable.103 The Health Care Ethics Committee has largely been operating outside of
regulations and oversight despite the gravity of their work. With findings showing that
the Health Care Ethics Committees can place patients at risk, a growing outcry has been
heard for some kind of standards for assessing knowledge, skills, and practice of clinical
consultants. In this time of evolution in the health care industry, a significant need exists
to establish quality standards for consultants who have privileges and responsibilities in
providing care to patients. The clinical ethics consultants are called upon to help facilitate
in a contentious, stressful and often emotional time. The Health Care Ethics Committee
must be thoroughly trained in many areas and especially to avoid asserting their judgment
or prejudice into emotional situations. The clinical ethics consultants’ authority is
procured because of education and skill not by institutional appointment. 104
The American Society put voluntary standards into place initially in 1988 for Bioethics
and Humanities. These standards were knowledge and skills-based. Even though the
standards may have been helpful in skill building and curriculum development for ethics
committees, they have not significantly impacted the quality or consistency of ethics
consultations. Thus, a task force was assembled to help determine the best way forward.
The Quality Attestation Presidential Task Force has proposed a two-part model for
evaluating ethics consultants against standards established by the American Society for
Bioethics and Humanities. A collection of written work with an oral exam allowing the
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assessment of consultants’ skills, experience, and ability to express themselves before a
group of examiners is the model being proposed and currently being implemented.105
Portfolio review is the first step in the Quality Attestation Presidential Task Force
evaluation procedures. The portfolio is used to help determine competency in a variety of
clinical settings and for a range of ethical issues. It allows for a wide variation in
bioethics knowledge, but the end result must be within parameters of the American
Society for Bioethics and Humanities core competencies. The hope is that these
portfolios will accommodate those who have learned ethics by doing and individuals who
have formal ethical education. Also included in this portfolio is a curriculum vitae with
copies of diplomas or evidence of completion of ethics training. It is expected that
candidates have at least a master’s degree in a relevant discipline. In the portfolio a
summary of Health Care Ethics Committee’s experience as well as a statement of
philosophy must be included. A sample of six consultations with which individuals were
intimately involved should also be included. Finally, three letters are required from
people who are responsible for oversight of candidates’ working environment.106 After
portfolios are reviewed and individuals are deemed competent, candidates will become
eligible for an oral examination, which will be offered annually at the American Society
for Bioethics and Humanities annual meeting.107
The area of attestation offers significant pause. If the goal of the Quality
Attestation Presidential Task Force is to establish competencies and professionalism, then
future members of the health care profession may choose not to participate. From one
who has dealt with certification processes and the development of competencies, great
care must be taken so that people are not discriminated against because of their
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geographic location, size of their institution, or frequency of their consultations. Thus,
this tedious attestation process appears to be heavily weighted in favor of large academic
settings.108
In sum, quality, and professionalism are assured with the implementation of the
process standards and competencies. Additionally, setting minimum standards through
certification and attestation will aid in the competencies of the ethics consultant moving
forward.
C. Case Analysis.
Third, a final integral part of an ethics consultation is the creation of a patient case
analysis. For clinical ethics and case analysis to be useful, one must start with as clear a
perspective as possible. Integral to case analysis are constituents features and value
judgments.
1. Constituent Features.
Medical indicators and patient preferences are factors that can cause significant
angst for healthcare providers and patients. It is crucial that these two areas be considered
to realize the overall goal of medicine: prevention, cure, and care.
Medical Indicators.
Medical indicators are facts about the patient’s condition that indicate what forms
of treatments are appropriate. Medical indicators are the facts that describe the day-to-day
work of clinical care. Beneficence and non-malfeasance are the ethical principles that
guide these activities. Beneficence is the duty to bring improvement to the health of the
patient and the non-malfeasance refer to those activities that prevent injury and reduce
risk. Both of these principles combine to help assess the benefit/burden ratio.109
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The “respect for persons principle” requires the physician to comply with the wishes of
the adult patient even if the consequences are unfavorable.110 The two ethical principles
of beneficence and non-malfeasance could support an opposite conclusion. Nonmalfeasance requires avoidance of harm while beneficence calls for maximizing benefits
and minimizing harms. Respect for persons typically requires a physician to honor the
patient’s preferences.111
In the conventional medical model,112 five questions are asked to secure the medical
indicators: (1) what is the medical problem, (2) what are the goals of treatment, (3) are
there circumstances that medical treatment would not be indicated, (4) what is the
likelihood of successful treatment and can harm be avoided, and (5) how will this patient
be benefited.113
Medicine is not abstract. Medicine deals with patients that present themselves
with health issues. For clinical ethics to be effective one must start with as clear a
perspective as possible. Patients should be playing an ever-greater role in the evolution of
the doctor-patient relationship. There is a transition from the authoritarian physician to a
model based on patient’s autonomy where patients are becoming customers, collecting
more information, and want to be more involved in decision-making that impact them.
The principle of “nothing about me without me” is becoming the more accepted
practice.114
Thus the term “patient-centered” care has become the new norm. The Institute of
Medicine has defined patient-centered care as “care that is respectful of and responsive to
individual patient preferences, needs, and values.”115 The most important aspect of
patient-centered care is the involvement of patients when the patient arrives at a
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crossroad of medical options. The key aspects of patient-centered care are respect for
patient’s values, preferences, and expressed needs. In this approach clear information,
education and alleviation of angst while involving family and friends are crucial
components.116
The comparative characteristics of the conventional medical model are providercentered, founded on the principles of beneficence and authoritarianism, and are typically
disease–oriented. In this model, treatment is the main focus, while the patient’s
perspective is often ignored. In contrast, the patient-centered model is founded on the
principle of autonomy; it is patient-oriented and is focused on the importance of the
patient and their outcomes. In this model, patient inputs are part of the decision-making
and delivery of care, thus the physician and the patient share decision-making.117
Rather than the five questions asked in the conventional medical model there are four
interactive components to the patient-centered clinical method: (1) exploring the entire
health experience: perceptions, history, and various aspects of illness experience (2)
appreciation of the whole person: proximal and distal context, (3) searching for common
ground: goals of treatment and roles of the physician and patient, and (4) enriching the
patient-physician relationship: healing and hope.118
One of the most important elements of patient-centered medicine is a full
participation of patients in decision-making.119 Shared decision-making requires a
significant change in the conventional model of the doctor-patient relationship. The
patient is required to provide the doctor with preferences about the disease process and a
well-informed patient is critical in the decision-making based on those preferences.120

144

Patient Preferences.
The fundamental principle of all morality is respect for persons and that every
person has value and dignity. The implication of this is personal autonomy, the right of
people to follow their own plan of life. Parts of that plan are the patient’s preferences and
choices that people make when facing decisions about health and medical treatment.
Reflected in these choices are the patient’s personal experience, beliefs, and values.121
In general, autonomy refers to the concept encompassing self-governance and
self-rule. Within modern health care, autonomy has arguably been used ambiguously and
inconsistently. Clarity occurs when the libertarian view of autonomy is adopted; which is
associated with freedom from constraints and freedom of non-interference.122 Autonomy
comprises the right of a person to choose alternatives for their own lives and to effect
self-determination. Also implied is the responsibility of others to not interfere with the
exercise of one’s own autonomy. Health care providers should provide the support and
promotion of autonomy. Patients have interconnectedness and interdependencies with
families, communities, and social relationships that need to be considered in the
promotion of a patient’s autonomy.123
From a Christian and Catholic perspective, autonomy is not absolute. One is
obligated to use freedom wisely. To do the right and good thing, autonomy is necessary.
The right and good thing means no self-destructive behavior, neglecting one’s medical
care, or participating in a lifestyle that would be deleterious.124 But if one chooses any of
these behaviors, the physician cannot impose duties upon the person. In contrast,
paternalistic action limits the freedom to choose, intrinsic to being human and inherently
violating the humanity of a person, a gift given by God.125
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Health care providers need to explore with their patients the values that are
important to them. It would be problematic to address concerns that are not shared by the
patient. In light of patient–centeredness, there must be a strong inclination for patients to
be allowed health-related practices that are most important to them. Health care providers
must avoid forcing patients into pre-existing institutional molds.126
A person is not autonomous when they are uninformed, deceived, manipulated, or
coerced. Each is an obstacle to the exercise of autonomy. Because someone is not
appropriately informed does not mean they do not have capacity but instead may not have
appropriate knowledge and therefore unable to exercise autonomy.127 Beneficence and
non-malfeasance are challenged when there is not appropriate informed consent.128
Informed consent is a vital part of current medical practice; it has different meanings in
varying situations. Informed consent can be used for different purposes: legal, ethical,
and administrative. Legally, informed consent is the primary source of the protection of
patient rights and a guiding ethical practice of medical care. Establishing the patient’s
right to control what can be done to one’s body dates back the earliest 20th-century.129
Additional obligations for physicians to disclose details about treatment emerged in the
1950s with a reasonable “physician” standard requiring the disclosure of information
customarily disclosed by physicians. In 1975, the American courts required disclosure to
a patient who would want to know information in a similar situation, the reasonable
“person” standard. Informed consent protects the patient against unwanted medical
intervention and safeguards autonomy and self-determination.130
Ethically, the purpose of informed consent is to ensure the treatment is respecting
patient autonomy. The key is that decision-making is shifted away from the physician-
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centered model to a patient-centered approach emphasizing that informed consent is not
an event but a process. Care must be taken to ensure patient comprehension, being
cognizant of patient age, education, intelligence, cognitive function, and angst. 131
Administratively, the informed consent document ensures that a consent process has
occurred. Stakeholders generally agree there are four basic elements for discussion
regarding informed consent: the patient has capacity, the physician has disclosed enough
detail for the patient to make an informed choice, the patient indicates understanding, and
finally the decision-maker authorizes the procedure.132
Many people are concerned that too little is left in the hands of the patient
regarding informed consent. Concerns about understanding, too little information, and
undue pressure from physicians are all valid. Thusly, patients should be helped and
supported so that they can make good and sound decisions. If needed, patients should be
confronted if their decisions are distorted or if they are not in compliance with their
values. Promoting their values and helping to maintain their concept of good increases
the respect for their autonomy.133
2. Value Judgments.
Quality of life can be difficult to define. Distinctions between quality of life are
brought to the forefront to help express value judgments of the patient. Various
contextual features that can influence the patient and physician are discussed.
Quality of Life.
Patient satisfaction reflects the principle of beneficence and respect for autonomy.
The aim of a medical intervention is to produce patient satisfaction. Quality of life is the
degree of satisfaction that the patient would experience. 134 While satisfaction is a value
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judgment, it is important to provide some empirical basis using such measures as
mobility, daily living activities, pain, social interaction, and mental acuity. Quality of life
may be defined as multi-dimensional including social roles, physical and mental health,
intellectual and social functioning, and overall well being and pain.135 The improvement
of quality of life is a fundamental goal of medical care.136 The physician responding to a
patient seeking medical attention because of their distress must respond by examining,
investigating, and together deciding which of the aims give the greatest improvement of
the patient’s quality of life. Together the patient and physician have to determine if the
quality of life is desirable, attainable, and appropriate. 137 The perspectives on quality
end-of-life care fall into the following five domains: adequate pain control, avoiding
prolonging life, maintaining control, relieving any burden, and enhancing loved ones
relationships. 138
When an ethicist speaks of quality of life it can be a designation of one pole of an
axiological line with quality of life at one end and sanctity of life at the other end. These
concepts are used to determine whether human life is to be evaluated on the basis of its
quality or if sanctity is irrelevant in decision-making about health care. At one end,
absolute sanctity of life would require any means to save human life. A person would
never be allowed to die regardless of the quality of life. A person’s life must be
prolonged even if they were unable engage in any social interaction.139 A vitalist is one
who holds the belief that physical life is the ultimate value.140 Few moralists have agreed
with this position. However, some in health care approach this end of the spectrum even
if medical intervention seems useless. At the other end of that ethical line is the argument
that human life loses value based upon the argument that the strongest and the fittest are
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the only ones to merit health care. Few moralists have adopted this extreme position nor
has health care. Sanctity of life and quality of life are both very important.141
The Roman Catholic Tradition has rejected both of these extremes. The Church has
recognized the sanctity of life, at the same time the importance of certain aspects of the
quality of life.142 In the Church’s view, life never loses its value but it does allow for the
benefits of continued living can be outweighed by the burdens of treatment. Allowing for
the time when enough is enough and patients are allowed to die comfortably, with
dignity, and where they want to die.143
Developing the empirical basis to evaluate the value judgment of quality of life
and to assess outcomes of clinical intervention has recently emerged. Evaluating quality
of life is always related to providing appropriate medical care. Six questions are relevant
to identifying and assessing how the quality of life can impact ethical dilemmas: (1) what
are the chances of returning to normal life even if treatment succeeds, (2) what are the
grounds for the judgment of quality of life for someone who cannot make such a
judgment, (3) what are the biases that might influence the providers view of quality of
life, (4) what are the ethical issues arising from enhancing a patient’s quality of life, (5)
are there any questions raised regarding changes in treatment plans about the quality of
life, and (6) are there plans of forgoing life-sustaining treatments.144
Personal evaluation about one’s quality of life is based upon the ethics of personal
autonomy. Quality of life can refer to personal satisfaction or may be referred to by an
observer’s evaluation of someone else's quality of life. Observers often judge a life to be
a poor quality while the one living the life considers it satisfactory or at least tolerable. It
is then best that the patients express their own quality of life and when persons cannot

149

make their wishes known other should be extremely cautious in applying their own
values.145
An observer may have some standard that they consider desirable and the
sufferer’s experience falls below that standard, making for a poor quality of life.
If that were the case then again the patient must make their wishes known and
observers must be cognizant of that human beings are adaptive. Quality of life also can
change with time therefore; neither patients nor providers should make major decisions
based on temporary conditions.146
Finally, patients consistently rate their quality of life much higher than do the
physicians who care for them. Physicians base their assessments on disease conditions
while patients take into account nonmedical factors, personal relationships, finances, and
social interaction.147
Contextual Features.
Medical decisions are not simply choices by two autonomous agents, the
physician and the patient, but choices within the confines of contextual considerations.
The considerations include proximal factors such as family, financial security, education,
employment, leisure, and social support. The distal factors included are community,
culture, economics, health care system, social historical factors, geography, media, and
the ecosystem.148
The assessment of the importance of all these contextual features is a crucial
ethical task. Certainly the principles of beneficence and autonomy intersect at this
juncture but the concept of justice and fairness has to be added and considered. In the
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clinical ethics environment, the most important justice related feature is fairness, the
moral characteristic that guides transactions between individuals.149
Of the four principles (beneficence/non-malfeasance, autonomy, utility and
justice), justice is the most complex because it is a virtue and a principle. As a virtue, a
trait of character, that is giving what is due each person. As a principle, rendering each
their do and the treating like cases alike.150 The complexity stems from the fact that it has
no mean. All people should possess fundamental dignity but being that humans are less
than perfect, it is next to impossible to be “too just”. Distributive, commutative, and
rectificatory are the three major elements of virtue of justice.151
With commutative justice, individual good, the patient is deserving of respect
from the physician. The physician should act on the basis of the patient's good. In the
healing process attention must be given to the patient's value system. With regard to
actions, the physician holds the patient's values “in trust”. To keep the patients needs and
goals in focus can be a significant struggle requiring intelligence to do justice.152
In honoring the patient’s autonomy, the autonomy of the physician can be
compromised as a human being with personal values and beliefs. Demands that the
physicians violate standards of care or violate a physician’s conscience in the name of
autonomy of the patient are unfair. In certain domains, a growing attitude exists that the
physician is just an instrument of the patient’s will and should leave personal morality
behind. In fact the physician and the patient are moral agents, each deserving respect and
justice requiring that neither impose their values on the other. It would be maleficent for
either to violate each other’s autonomy.153
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To ensure justice and fairness for the elderly, the following features should be
kept in mind: (1) flexibility in the doctor-patient relationship would be kept intact and
individual treatment plans would be allowed to continue, (2) all people with same
categories of illness would have equal access to care, (3) defining the limits of care for
specific conditions would require physician involvement, drawing on research and
practical experience, (4) addressing increasing health care costs with some public control,
(5) advance care-planning emphasis, and (6) increased emphasis on wellness and
prevention rather than prolongation of life, an emphasis on quality of life.154
Nowhere in medicine is there more a question of justice and fairness than in the area of
medical technology and its use and misuse as interventions with the aging and dying
patient.155 The use of medical technology does not equate to better care. It is not the
technology but the care received that determines well-being. Personal control over the
dying process is being lost.156
Responsible use of power by the physician for the good of their patients is
medical temperance. Avoiding underuse of technology and interventions with its
subsequent abandonment of patients, or the overuse of technology and interventions with
its prolongation of death, seeking the correct balance of interventions and outcomes
would be responsible use of power. The temptation exists to use technology rather than
give oneself in the healing process, a “technological fix”. The “technological fix” is
generally much easier to conceive and implement than the process of true human
interaction.157
Secular justice is practical and methodical. Others are owed their due because we
want our due in return. In this view, justice is an obligation of communal living. Thus by
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compliance we can assure happiness for all. Conversely, in light of revelation, justice is
transformed by Christian faith, having its deepest roots in love. By not doing justice we
would relapse in self-interest, turning from the love of others to the love of self. In
rendering Christian justice to others, their due is not only what is legalistically owed but
also what is expected by love. Christian justice’s first principle is charity.158
In the power of Christ’s healing, we are called to a special kind of love and
justice. The awareness God’s call changes a profession into a vocation, a fidelity to
justice transformed by charity. The Christian is called to a state of sanctity, to be perfect
"as the father is perfect," and to cooperate with God in God’s work. The Catholic
Christian is called on to help the less fortunate and expected to exercise a “preferential
option” for the poor, the sick, the troubled, the oppressed, and the outcast.159
IV. Conclusion of Chapters 2 and 3: Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious
Directives.
A. The Normativity of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health
Care Services.
To discuss the Normativity of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Care Services requires examining two related topics: the different categories of
Normative Catholic Teaching and the history of the Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Care Services.
1. Different Categories of Normative Catholic Teaching.
The Catholic Church, drawing on both faith and reason, strives to create an
integral vision of the human vocation incorporating everything that is good in human
activity. The Magisterium considers “science an invaluable service to the integral good of
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the life and dignity of every human being.”160 Additionally, the Church desires to reach
out to every human being that is suffering in mind, body or spirit bringing them comfort
as well as light and hope.161
To pursue this vision, the Catholic Tradition provides “authoritative teaching”
through four kinds of magisterial statements, as codified in Canon Law. The four levels
of authoritative teaching establish “the order of truths to which the believer adheres.”162
They are: (1) truths taught as divinely revealed, (2) definitively proposed statements on
matters closely connected with revealed truth, (3) ordinary teaching on faith and morals,
and (4) ordinary prudential teaching on disciplinary matters. To aid in clarity, these four
magisterial statements have been given the names: (1) definitive dogma, (2) definitive
doctrine, (3) non-definitive, authoritative doctrine, and (4) prudential admonitions and
provisional applications of church doctrine.163
In the first category, “divinely revealed" or definitive dogma deals with truths
contained in the word of God and which the Magisterium affirms to be divinely revealed,
requiring the faithful to give obedience of faith. Examples of this category are the articles
of the Creed, the Christological dogmas, and the Marian dogmas, the sacraments, the
Real Presence, the existence of Original Sin, the immortality of the human soul, the
inerrancy of Holy Scripture.164
The definitive doctrines are not explicitly contained in the sacred deposit of
Scripture and Tradition. They are rooted in the primary points of secondary truths which
necessarily follow either logically or historically, and which are needed to expound them
faithfully. St. John Paul II (d. 2005) explains that such truths are the result of the
Church’s “deeper understanding” of her dogmas on faith and morals. These truths are
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connected to divine revelation, illustrating the Holy Spirit’s inspiration for the Church’s
deeper understanding of the truth concerning faith and morals. Although scripture is
indispensable for morality, it does not necessarily provide concrete answers to current
issues. Scripture must be supplemented by reason, tradition, and the magisterium
otherwise it becomes a form of moral fundamentalism.165 In Catholic teaching, scripture
is not read as an independent document.166 In this regard, Church tradition helps to
interpret scripture. The more classical interpretation of this tradition is that the
magisterial authority safeguards the “deposit of faith.” These truths are to be shown the
assent of faith, but one technically distinguished as a “firm and definitive assent.”167
The third category is ordinary teaching on faith and morals that spells out Christian
doctrines. All these teachings on faith and morals are presented as true, even though they
have not been defined infallibly with a solemn judgment or proposed as definitive by the
ordinary magisterium. This category is called the “authentic magisterium.” The authority
of the “authentic magisterium” is different from Papal Infallibility. Vatican I emphasized
that infallibility belongs to Papal ex-cathedra teachings.168 This category of Church
teachings encompasses the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services.169
The fourth category for Magisterial teaching, “interventions in the prudential
order,” or prudential admonitions and provisional applications of church doctrine would
include any of the routine publications of the Holy See and Bishops in their diocese. The
key element in this category is its contingency upon circumstances of time and place. The
possibility of error at this level of teaching is stronger than any previous category. 170
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Each person must form a correct conscience based on moral norms. Conscience is
the individual capacity to discern what is good to ascertain morally what action should
occur. In Pope Francis’s exhortation, Amoris Laetitia, the Church has been called to help
form conscience by church teaching. Conscience can recognize with "a certain moral
security" what God is asking of individuals. The role of the conscience is paramount in
moral decision-making reflecting the tradition that the conscience is the final arbiter.171
The Church respects conscience as having a crucial role in moral discernment,172 as
clearly expressed in Vatican II: “deep within his conscience man discovers a law which
he must obey…his dignity lies in observing this law, and by it will be judged.”173 “It is
through his conscience that man sees and recognizes the demands of divine law. He is
bound to follow this conscience faithfully in all its activity. Therefore, he must not be
forced to act contrary to his conscience.”174 Thus, man’s informed conscience is the final
arbiter. Finally, the well-formed conscience will develop not only through knowledge of
the moral teachings but also through the development of and the practice of the Virtue of
Prudence. Prudence enables us “to discern our true good in every circumstance and to
choose the right means of achieving it.”175
In light of these categories of Church teachings, Papal Encyclicals have special
significance. A Papal Encyclical is a letter written by the Pope to address moral,
doctrinal, or disciplinary issues to the universal church. Encyclicals have become the
standard means for popes to exercise their ordinary (not infallible) teaching authority.
The Catholic faithful is morally obligated to comply unless their conscience prudentially
prevents doing so. Several points can be noted regarding papal encyclicals: (1) they carry
less authority than dogmatic pronouncements made infallibly (by the Pope ex-cathedra),
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(2) because they do not contain infallible teaching, acceptance can theoretically be
conditional (to respect prudential decisions of individual conscience), but in practice the
faithful should usually comply, and (3) the theological issues examined are not
considered to be closed.176 Many Papal Encyclicals have been used in the Ethical and
Religious Directives to formulate Church teaching: Donum Vitae, Pacem in Terris,
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, Gaudium et Spes, Humanae Vitae, and Veritatis Splendor.
In the preamble of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services, reference is made to the emergence of moral principles expressing the Church's
teaching on medical and moral matters that developed throughout the centuries. In a
statement from the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Health and Health
Care presented the theological principles that guide the churches vision of health care. In
that statement, all Catholics are called to share in the healing mission of the church, offer
encouragement, and make a full commitment to the health care ministry.177 Further, in the
General Introduction, the laity is invited to a much more intense and broader field of
ministries.178 To continue the church’s ministry of healing and compassion, by their
baptism, the laity is called to participate in the health care mission.179 With new medical
discoveries, coupled with technological developments and social change. Church leaders
in consultation with medical professionals review and judge these developments
according to the principles of right reason and revealed truth, as explained above. Hence,
the Ethical and Religious Directives represent a form of normative Church Teaching,
representing the ordinary magisterium of the Church, in this case, the United States
Bishops insofar as their teachings are consistent with universal Church teaching in the
Papal encyclicals, (as mentioned above).180
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2. History of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Heath Care
Services.
The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services have
history dating back to 1921 when the first set of medical ethical norms were compiled.
These first directives did not consider scriptural and theological teaching. A more
inclusive uniform set of directives was published in 1948 that was approved by a majority
of dioceses in the United States. With expanding medical technology and theological
clarification, subsequent versions came to fruition 1956, 1971, 1994, 2001, and our
current (5th edition) directives promulgated in 2009. The sixth edition, dealing with issues
of forming new partnerships, will likely be promulgated in 2018.181
Because of collaboration among the Bishops, Catholic health care leaders,
medical professionals, theologians and ethicists, and the Holy See, the Ethical and
Religious Directives have been the touchstone for authoritative guidance and ethical
standards in health care in the United States. These directives constitute the normative
authority of the authentic and ordinary magisterium of the Church. Moreover, these
directives developed by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops have been
recognized internationally as constituting ethical standards of behavior in health care and
as providing guidance on moral issues that face Catholic health care.182
Two issues related to potential bias can arise regarding the normativity of the
Ethical and Religious Directives. First, because they are designed for Catholic health care
in the United States, they necessarily reflect that perspective. In contrast, different
approaches to health care elsewhere in the world may have different priorities and
perspectives. Hence, the normative teachings therein may not be relevant elsewhere in
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other national jurisdictions; that is for other national Conferences of Bishops to
determine. In fact however, the United States Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Care Services have had a significant influence on the development of
other forms of health care ethical directives by different Conferences of Bishops. Second,
the United States Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services bear
the normative authority of the authentic Magisterium of United States Bishops. There is a
form of bias here insofar as the Ethical and Religious Directives intentionally do not
adopt the entire theological discussion by Catholic moralists around the topics discussed.
Those debates will continue and over time impact the continuing development of future
versions of the Ethical and Religious Directives. This point is explored further in the next
section where the normative foundation of Natural Law is discussed. The moral stances
in the Ethical and Religious Directives revolve around different interpretations of the
Natural Law. On the one hand, the conservative stance of the United States Bishops and
some Catholic ethicists typically reflects an approach that emphasizes the role of nature,
adopting a universal perspective. On the other hand, the more progressive stance of many
Catholic ethicists typically reflects a different but not contradictory approach that
emphasizes the role of persons, adopting a more historical perspective. The next section
explores these different yet compatible approaches to Natural Law in Catholic Teaching.
B. The Natural Law Approach.
Natural Law has two general approaches, the focus on Nature as Universal as
articulated by the traditional approach of the Church’s Magisterium and the second
approach, the focus on Person as Historical as argued by the progressive approach in
Catholic moral theology. These two approaches are not necessarily contradictory. In the
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analysis that follows an explanation of the traditional approach to Natural Law is
presented in a manner that can be aligned with the progressive interpretation of Natural
Law. This alignment of both interpretations of Natural Law can be especially helpful for
resolving ethical dilemmas in health care as discussed in the Ethical and Religious
Directives.
One approach is referred to as “Natural Law according to nature” and the other
approach is described as “Natural Law according to reason.” The former approach
focuses upon human nature as a physical reality, presenting a static and universal view of
the human condition based on biology. This static approach has been referred to as
physicalism. Physicalism considers “man regarding distinct faculties, each created by
God with a particular goal or purpose, defined regarding the physical stature of the
faculty.”183 This approach emphasizes the physical properties of actions. The physical act
of the structure is what determines whether a behavior is correct or not, with
intentionality secondary.184
The latter approach focuses on the human person, presenting a dynamic and
historical view of the human condition as contributors to God’s creation.185
At times the discussion of Natural Law can place these two approaches in opposition to
each other, opting for one or the other. In this scenario, the person- oriented or historical
approach to Natural Law can be construed as being in opposition to Church teaching that
adopts the nature-oriented or universal stance. Such a direct opposition to Church
teaching is not pursued in this dissertation insofar as Catholic health care accepts Church
teaching and seeks to apply it with flexibility. By doing so, Catholic health care tries to
combine the nature-oriented and person-oriented approaches to Natural Law. This is done
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by discussing how traditional teaching can be extended in new ways to emerging
technologies, looking at ways in which doctrine may be developed in a legitimate
manner. This approach is adopted in this analysis and explained in the applied chapters of
the dissertation.
However, it can be helpful to understand what the discussion of Natural Law from
the traditional perspective of Catholic teaching means. At the heart of the traditional
view, Natural Law is the “formal principle” that one should pursue what is good and
avoid what is bad. This is a principle of practical rationality, indicating it is rational to
pursue something as good and to avoid something that is bad. Nonetheless, this formal
principle does not provide practical criteria to ascertain what is good.186 In this stance that
is, there is no single criterion for goodness.187
This focus upon human goods is at the heart of traditional approach to Natural
Law. This stance indicates there are basic goods that are intrinsic aspects of human wellbeing. This interpretation provides a theoretical foundation for Church teaching.188 This
theory is based on the proposition that man sets out to secure things that he perceives to
be good for him.189 In this context moral norms and principles are practical and rational
distinct from desires and feelings.190 While human acts are influenced by feelings,
emotions, and imagination, the basis upon which people act is the rationally perceived
benefits of their actions.191 According to this theory, moral reason seeks something that
will provide a benefit regarding human well-being and fulfillment.192 At the core of this
theory is the need to respect ‘basic human goods’ as the basis for moral action.193 These
basic goods can be categorized in a manageable way.194 For example, John Finnis in his
book Natural Law and Natural Rights classifies them as life (and health), knowledge,
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play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and
religion.195
One of these basic goods that are crucial for morality is practical reasonableness
that generates moral principles to guide moral judgment and action. The requirements for
practical reasonableness help us to establish criteria and standards for moral judgment.196
The requirements of practical reasonableness include the following. The first is a
“rational plan of life.”197 One must have a structured set of purposes to which one should
commit and which guides him through life, one must look at life as a whole and make
discernments accordingly.198 Secondly, no basic human value can be left out, discounted,
or exaggerated. A reasoned plan of life should neither devalue nor overvalue any aspect
of the basic forms of human excellence.199 Thirdly, any human being can participate in
the basic human good. Just as there is a reasonable capacity for self-preference, so also
one has no reasonable cause to deny continuity, longevity, awareness, prosperity, or
creativity to anyone.200 The famed Golden Rule propagated in Jewish and Christian moral
tradition, accompanied by the moral appeal of sacred history, should be the standard to
which we show proper respect to others.201 The fourth is detachment. Changing
circumstances, relations, and opportunities impact our lives not allowing us to complete
projects, sustain relationships, or fully recognize our opportunities. Therefore, an
appropriate detachment is required to maintain a healthy balance.202 The fifth requirement
is commitment, which strikes an important balance between fanaticism and abdication.203
The sixth requirement is “relevance of consequence: efficiency, within reason.”204 This
requirement demands that good must be sought by not wasting opportunities. However,
making this requirement exclusive is irrational and thus immoral.205 The seventh
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requirement of practical reasonableness is “respect for every basic value in every act.”206
This suggests that one should never do anything that of it causes damage to or impedes
other forms of human good.207 The eighth requirement is “the requirement of the
common good.”208 This requirement holds that all basic goods are an aspect of the
common good. The common good is “a set of conditions which enables the members of a
community to attain for themselves objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the
values for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively
and negatively) in a community.”209 Following one's conscience is the ninth requirement.
This requirement is quite distinctive in that one should not do what one assesses should
not be done. In sum, practical reasonableness is not merely an apparatus to make morally
correct judgments, but also a way of personal well-being.210
Coalescing these requirements of practical reasonableness fosters morality
whereby basic human good flourishes.211 The theory of Natural Law theory is
philosophically grounded in reason, rather than theology. Nonetheless, the theory
presents a cogent foundation for Church teaching that relies on Natural Law, including
Church teaching on health care ethics.212 Natural Law theory has remained the
philosophical tradition of the Catholic Church.213 The most challenging contemporary
health care problems are addressed in Church teaching by Natural Law to urge respect for
the basic rights and the equality-in-dignity of each patient, even the most vulnerable.214
It was indicated earlier the traditional approach to Natural Law, as explained
above based on the requirements of practical reasonableness, is the basis for the focus on
nature that undergirds the teaching of the Catholic Church on morality. Now it is worth
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noting that the historical approach to Natural Law that focuses on the person need not be
in opposition to the traditional stance.
Advocates of the personal approach acknowledge the physical and biological
aspects of being human, but they assign significant weight to the personal, spiritual, and
social concerns as being crucial for a sound understanding of the common good.215 This
integral approach recognizes the historic character of morality.216 For example, Louis
Janssens argues, “Ethics is fundamentally a way of living and in its growth must keep
step with human life itself as it unfolds through history. That is precisely what we mean
when we say that it must be dynamic, like human life itself which it directs and leads.”217
In the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services where Catholic
moral theology is applied to dilemmas in health care, there appears to be alignment of
these two approaches to Natural Law. This combination of the nature-oriented and the
person-centered approaches to Natural Law is effectively expressed in the classical
principle of double effect.218 This principle seeks to avoid intending actions that are
deemed to be intrinsically disordered (reflecting the focus on nature) while permitting
these actions to occur as side effects of another permitted action (reflecting the personal
or historical approach that deals with practical circumstances). Here, a justified moral act
should never be separated from intention: provided there is no intention to perpetrate
intrinsically disordered action (that may occur as an unavoidable side-effect), those
actions can be permitted based on the good action that is intended.219 The classical
illustration is the cancerous pregnant womb: causing the death of a fetus is an
intrinsically disordered and morally forbidden action if intended; yet it is permissible as a
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side-effect (via hysterectomy) that is unavoidable and unintended to save the life of the
mother.220
This flexible approach to Natural Law that combines the nature-oriented and the
person-oriented perspective is part of a broad view of morality in Catholic teaching. The
Catholic stance combines scripture, tradition, reason, and experience, as well as the
magisterial teaching authority, as sources of moral knowledge to help answer the
question: “How ought we, who have been gifted by God, to live.”221
C. Critical Framework of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Care Services to be Used in the Applied Chapters.
In the subsequent analysis, the normative teaching of the Ethical and Religious
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services is applied to the practical chapters,
especially by considering the principle of double effect as combining the nature-oriented
and personal-oriented approaches to Natural Law. Additionally, each main section will be
evaluated as to which category it applies: A. Settled Issues in Church Teaching, B.
Controversial Issues Eligible for Using the Principle of Double Effect, or C. Issues
Requiring Doctrinal Development.
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Chapter 4. Reproductive Technology.
Reproductive technology raises fundamental questions about the normative
framework of propagation. To adequately discuss reproductive technology requires
examining four related topics: embryo and personhood, stem cell technologies, prenatal
testing, and newborn screening.
I. Embryo and Personhood.
The relation between embryo and personhood integrates prenatal status and
personhood with an accompanying ethical framework.
A. Embryo: Prenatal Status.
First, a consideration of the prenatal status of the embryo engages two
foundational issues: the meaning of essence and the problem of dualism.
1. Essence.
The embryo’s essence will be viewed from the perspective of essentialism with a
biological viewpoint. When considering the personhood perspective of the embryo’s
essence, a sentience view will be applied.
Essentialism and Biological View.
Essentialism maintains that humans are essentially persons and could not exist
without being a person at any given time.1 A person is a being with the capacity of
consciousness that is manifested in complex forms such as reasoning, self-awareness, and
intentional actions.2 One would not survive if that person were in an irreversible coma;
the organism that continues breathing is not you.3 There is implication within
essentialism that one was never a newborn.4 Another aspect of this essentialism is mind
essentialism, claiming that humans are essentially minds.5 Possessing mental life is
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necessary for identity.6 When a human being has the capacity for conscious awareness is
when they begin to exist in all ways that matter. This usually occurs mid-gestation,7
implying that we were never pre-sentient fetuses.8 In the biological view, we are either
human or animal organisms and come into being whenever the organism does. The
organism persists as long as there is biological life.9 It is easy to assume that the person
originates at conception. Because of the ability for the embryo to divide into two, forming
twins up to two weeks after conception, creates the possibility that human beings
originate at different stages.10 Cell differentiation begins at the 16-cell stage. Up to that
point there is no specialization of cells performing distinct tasks.11 They do not function
as a single, integrated organism. This view maintains that life begins between the 16-cell
stage and the two-week twinning potential time.12
Personhood and Sentience View.
The blastocyst (mammalian embryo) has personhood because of its qualities that
give rise to moral worth. The blastocysts have the potential to become a person and
therefore have the same moral value as a person.13 The first argument for moral
equivalency is because of the core biological similarity; each has a human genome.14
Even though the blastocysts are not conscious, does not have the ability to experience its
surroundings, it does not feel pain but it does have human DNA. Human developmental
stages are irrelevant to their moral worth.15 All living things have interests grounded in
biological needs. If they are damaged or killed, that would be deleterious.16
In the sentience view, all sentient beings are capable of having feelings and that
can be aided or harmed, are of direct moral concern.17 Not only humans have moral status
but also some living things have it.18 Some nonpersons have moral status because of the
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actions of moral agents affecting their quality of life thus they can be benefited or
harmed. Not all living things have moral status, they have no subjective experience and
no quality of life.19 The sentience view has some advantages. One can explain why not
only human persons but also sentient non-persons have moral status and should not be
exploited or harmed.20 It is very easy to reconcile with our intuitions about moral harms
and benefits, partly accommodating the personhood view. Holding that all beings have
moral status and that human beings have special moral status.21 The sentient view
connects well with consequentialism and with rights theories as well.22
2. Dualism.
In this section, types of dualism will be discussed as well as discussing animalism
and how animalism can give us a true account of our nature.
Types of Dualism.
Dualism has a variety of forms: they are either ontological or metaphysical. Both
of these are concerned with what really exists, while morality is concerned with how we
should act.23 All forms of metaphysical dualism commonly hold a classification of which
we are identical.24 In soul-body dualism advocated by Plato, the soul preexisted and did
not entirely become corrupted by the body and would continue to live immortally. Our
soul was our true nature and was opposed to the needs and desires of the body.25
Descartes advocated for the mind-body dualism arguing there are two substances: the
body or the mind. He concluded the true person is thinking and the body is closely
aligned. The mind and body are of different nature.26 In Lockean dualism, a person is a
thinking, intelligent being. Persons exist as separate entities from their bodies and only
come to exist when capable of reason and reflection.27 In constitutionalism, persons are
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distinct and different from their bodies. In its early stages the body is not a person. A
person is distinct from its constituting animal. Humans differ from non-human animals.
Only humans are moral agents. If a human were identical to an animal, then the manifest
discontinuity between humans and nonhuman animals would be within biology.28 In
moral dualism, personhood is a stage from which humans can come and go. Personhood
can be socially bestowed or comes at a certain time with cognitive awareness. In this
view, the human comes into being at the embryonic stage but is not worthy of moral
respect.29 All these views of dualism can be shown to be untenable.30
Animalism.
Animalism justifies that the vast majority of us (exception of twinning) began to
exist at conception.31 The human embryo is from the start distinct from its origins, mother
or father. Its growth is not directed by external forces but internally to survive and
mature.32 The embryo has genetic makeup that is characteristically human. Though
immature, it is a complete whole organism.33 At the point of conception a new and
distinct individual came into being as a complete living organism.34 Animalism is how
we experience ourselves and interact with other people and the world. We experience
ourselves as bodily beings. Animalism gives us a true account of our nature.35 By virtue
of the human entity, developing in stages at which capacities will be exercisable, human
beings develop in due course and eventually mature to be full members of their species.36
Persons are entitled to moral respect from the beginning of their existence and should not
be killed in the zygotic, embryonic, or fetal stage and should not be reduced to disposable
research material due to their moral status.37
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B. Personhood.
Second, the debate on personhood revolves around two opposing views: the
secular and religious.
1. Secular View.
In the secular view, the embryos personhood will be evaluated from the time of
fertilization with a fourteen-day viewpoint. When considering potentiality of embryos,
discussion will view the embryos as a group of human cells.
Fertilization.
At the time of fertilization, a unique genotype is established which determines its
organization and its direction. The fertilized egg, which has genetic code, will determine
all subsequent cell division.38 That genetic code is set when the zygote is formed
constituting the unique individual human.39 An individual entity is formed at the time of
fertilization with the newly constituted genome that directs multiplication of cells,
development, and differentiation.40 The same living being organizes itself into the
different stages of development: embryo, fetus, infant, child, and adult.41 The President’s
Council on Bioethics has stated several arguments that pre-embryos are persons.42 The
first argument maintains there is identity between a pre-embryo and the adult from that
particular pre-embryo. This is based on the continuity of development process. The
conclusion from the argument is personhood begins with fertilization because there is no
point during development that the organism changes from non-person to person.43 An
additional argument is from substantial identity. The argument holds that at all stages of
development the organism possesses human being characteristics and that all human
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beings deserve full respect. The pre-embryo is a human being, thus it deserves full moral
dignity.44
In the fourteen-day view, not all fertilized eggs become individual human beings.
Zygotes develop because of their interaction with other cells and environmental cues not
just the genotype. The genetic makeup of the zygote does not establish the human
individual because of potential for twinning or multiples.45 A blastocyst, being one
individual containing two sets of genes, suggests the genes alone do not determine
individual identity. More than one sperm can penetrate the egg fertilizing it but never
developing, therefore that cannot be an individual human being. Zygotes can be absorbed
or stop developing suggesting they cannot be human beings. There is evidence that 75%
to 80% of the early embryos die.46 With this rate of mortality, the acceptance that these
are all human beings becomes very problematic.47 Proponents of the fourteen-day view
hold that the zygote becomes biologically stable at about fourteen days. The cells begin
to function and twinning can no longer occur. There is the appearance of the primitive
streak, the development of specialized tissues and systems become distinct at this stage of
development as well.48 Thus this group maintains that embryonic stem cells can be
removed prior to the fourteenth day because they are not individual human beings
constituting personhood.49 Many of this group argues that certain moral consideration and
respect are due the early human embryo before day fourteen.50 The emergence of the
primitive streak represents a milestone in development. As a developing form of life, the
pre-implantation embryo deserves serious moral consideration.51
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Potentiality.
In the potentiality view, it is argued that the zygote is not an individual human
being, but a potential human being. The potentiality argument contends that even though
embryos do not possess properties now, they will potentially develop.52 If the embryo has
potential to be a person with the right to life then that right of life should be extended to
any stage that the embryo will go through.53 The argument is that one type of creature
will change and has moral properties. Those moral properties pass from the first form as
it progresses to another form. Potential is not an inherent property, but a projection on the
future state of a current entity that may or may not come to fruition.54 Proponents of this
view argue that the zygote (embryo) and the fetus deserve protection from destruction.55
The zygote, by virtue of its biological constitution, has the potential to develop into an
individual human. It maintains this potential even if the supportive environment that
surrounds it is not sufficient to maintain life.56 Moral significance is granted to the zygote
because it has the power to become an individual human being.57 To use it in research
would be wrong because that would be preventing it from realizing its potential.58 In the
group of human cells view, the early embryo is a group of cells clustered together with no
differentiated cells or tissues. There is no complexity or integrated functioning of the
cells. The inner cell mass is just a group of cells clustered together.59 Developmental
potential is assigned only to entire cells and depend on the interaction of the nucleus and
cytoplasm. Some argue totipotency is of relevance only if it is a property of a single cell
in deference to a group of cells.60 The early embryo has not developed the primitive
streak and thus is not a unique integrated individual. Maintaining that just because the
early embryo has potential to become something is significantly different than being
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something.61 Using embryos for stem cell research is no different than using any other
sort of biological material for research. The early embryo does not warrant any more
respect and rights because it has no capacity for suffering or consciousness is the
consensus have most attributed to this view.62
2. Religious View.
Catholic historical tradition and current views of religious traditions will be
engaged to shed light on the controversy of personhood of early embryos.
Catholic Tradition.
Exodus 21:22–25 are a starting point for the view of moral significance of the
early embryo in the Catholic historical tradition:
When men have a fight and hurt a pregnant woman, so that she suffers a
miscarriage, but no further injury, the guilty one shall be fined as much as
the woman’s husband demands of him, and he shall pay in the presence of
the judges. But if injury ensues, you shall give life for life, eye for eye,
tooth for tooth, and hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for
wound, stripe for stripe (Exodus 21:22-25, NAS). 63

This passage supports the protection of the embryo and fetus.64 Aristotle, the first to study
the development of the anatomy, believed that a man’s sperm reacted with a woman’s
blood in her womb causing it to develop into a living being. He maintained that the early
embryo was unformed until the soul enters and shapes that matter.65 Many key
theologians in early Catholic moral tradition viewed the embryo as not formed and not
human until it reached gender-related points. Therefore, the unformed embryo’s
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destruction did not involve killing a human being.66 Augustine followed Aristotle in
thinking that the progression of life in the womb started as a vegetative existence with an
animal soul and finally the human soul with complete moral value. He did struggle with
delayed ensoulment but chose not to delve too deeply into when this occurred67.
Augustine thought it wrong to destroy the unformed embryo because it avoided
procreation. In Augustine’s thought, it was sinful to destroy the unformed embryo but it
was even a more grave sin to destroy the later formed embryo, which amounted to killing
a human being.68 St. Thomas Aquinas did not view the destruction of the early embryo
equivalent to homicide but that ensoulment occurred at the time the embryo resembled
human form. Destruction of the embryo after the point of ensoulment was considered
homicide.69 After the Protestant Reformation, Luther did consider it reprehensible to
destroy the fetus. Calvin took more direct approach maintaining ensoulment occurred at
conception therefore life began at that point. After the scientific revolution, ensoulment at
conception was given greater credence supported by the Catholic Churches affirmation of
the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. If Mary was without sin from her conception
then ensoulment occurred at the time of conception.70
Current Views of Religious Traditions.
The current views of religious traditions will now be articulated to get a clear
picture of the view of the personhood status of the early embryo. The Roman Catholic
Tradition remains faithful to the theological and ethical conviction that the early human
embryo is a human being.71 In the Eastern Orthodox tradition, whether in situ or in vitro
zygote, affirms the sanctity of life at all stages of development.72 Protestant traditions
have varying views of the moral significance the early embryos, with the Southern
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Baptist Convention agreeing with the Roman Catholic Tradition. While others have taken
a more liberal view in adopting the fourteen-day view and are amenable to stem cell
research.73 The Talmud, the Koran, and other sacred scriptures offer little insight into the
question of personhood.74 Scholars of other traditions take opposing views with regard to
the viability and ensoulment of early embryos.75
C. Ethical Framework.
Third, an ethical framework has developed around the above discussions on the
prenatal status and human personhood. This framework revolves around theologicalbased frameworks and discussion on spirituality and humanity.
1. Theologically-based Framework.
Three competing ethical frameworks regarding stem cells will need to be
discussed in a related manner: the embryo protection and human protection along with
the future wholeness framework.
Embryo Protection and Human Protection Framework.
The bioethical principle utilized in the embryo protection ethical framework is
non-malfeasance. Ethically framing the stem cell debate as a matter of avoiding doing
harm.76 The first assumption against stem cell research from the embryo protection
framework is that the embryo, from the moment of conception, has moral status. This
applies to zygotes both in vivo and ex vivo.77 At conception our origin determines our
individuality, our dignity, and moral protectability. At the moment of conception three
things meet: the mothers egg, the father sperm, and a newly created soul.78 Ensoulment is
not physical but metaphysical. When a unique genome and a unique embryonic
individual are established then the embryo is ready for ensoulment and deserving of
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dignity.79 Secondly, to harvest the stem cell requires the destruction of an embryo thus
implying the destruction of the human person.80 The third assumption is moral status in
the laboratory. The embryo, ex vivo or in vivo, has equal moral status to any human thus
forbidding destruction.81 Human protection framework’s essence is to protect humanity
against the forces of technology. The opponents of stem cell research utilizing this
framework assume an elevated place for nature. They want nature accepted as it is with
all its vulnerabilities.82 Three pillars are utilized to uphold the human protection position:
“anti-playing God,” “wisdom of repugnance,” and “neonaturalism.” Unbridled
technological advance and “playing God” are contrary to nature.83 Genetic technoscience alienates us from belonging to nature and dehumanizes thus sounding a moral
alarm to the potential harms of unnatural intervention. The fundamental concern of the
pillar of “wisdom of repugnance” position is the potential harm. With neonaturalism,
technology threatens to denaturalize humanity. In both religious and secular there is a
threat to our humanity because of biotechnology.84
Future Wholeness Framework.
Medical benefits and the vision of what humanity can and should be is the driving
force for the future wholeness framework. What is envisioned is not only physical
healing but also abundant life, a transformed future.85 In this framework not pursuing
stem cell research, with its potential for relieving suffering and enhancement of
humanity, would be immoral.86 With the justice issue, supporters within this group agree
that universal access is a moral imperative. A central ethical issue of distributive justice is
the inability of most to access new research and therapies.87 Not only does this group
utilize the ethical principle of beneficence but also from the religious perspective of a
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response to God’s call. God’s will is affirmed by the drive for stem cell research.
Supporting science is an act of stewardship. Humans are called to be co-creators. We
have been called to be creative transformers and good stewards of the God-given talents
bestowed on us.88
2. Spirituality and Humanity.
The Spiritual Soul and Human Dignity will be discussed to further illuminate
what is at stake in stem cell research.
Spiritual Soul
The Spiritual Soul refers to the inner most essence of an individual. The soul
connotes who each of us is, a centered self. Our soul becomes immortal because of our
relationship to God. Our soul is forma substantials, a spiritual and an immaterial thing.89
The soul resides within the body but the soul itself is not a body. The soul is where our
identity resides. The soul does not come from eternity; the soul begins when the body
begins. A brand-new soul is created for each individual human. The soul lasts forever but
it has a beginning.90 The soul involves concepts of great complexity going beyond
anything that we are able to treat with adequacy or precision. The soul has a dynamic and
developing character. As one gains new insights and memories the “real person” grows
and develops; there is an unchanging component of the soul, the personal signature that
guarantees identity. A portion of unchanging dimension of the soul is the individual
genome.91 The spirit is our ability to relate with God and our fellow man. It is the
dimension that unites us with others. The spirit reminds us that we are in relationship
with others as well as being connected to something bigger than ourselves.92 Moral
personhood is necessary and sufficient only after ensoulment. Ensoulment picks out the
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moment in which the soul is first united to the body. The fetus becomes a person at the
moment when it becomes a composite of body and soul. The soul is the seat of both self
and agency.93 The question of ethics, intersecting with theology regarding stem cell
research, is determined when is the moment of metaphysical ensoulment, when the
Spiritual Soul is implanted.94
Human Dignity.
Some would argue that Human Dignity requires possession of a group of
capacities. Humans do not require a fixed number of capacities to be given dignity. They
do need some of these capacities but not all. Even those that might be disabled or with
limited capacities and might develop these in the future deserve protection and treated
with dignity.95 To further exacerbate the concern of human dignity is in the mingling of
bodily materials from differing living beings. The question is the transferring of certain
human stem cell materials to nonhuman hosts. The concern becomes the ethical issue of
stem cell studies that would create human-nonhuman chimeras that would question the
necessity of deserving Human Dignity.96
Dignity plays the role of protector. Dignity refers to our inherent value and cannot
be reduced to ones instrumental worth. Thus we are always worth more than our
possessions or functions. The person is never just a means; they are always an end. As
Kant would argue from his formula of humanity, treating people as a means to an end
rather than as an end in themselves is not acceptable. He argues that all humans must be
treated as ends in themselves and conception is responsible for the beginning of a person
thus deserving recognition.97 That intrinsic value is what makes up Human Dignity. The
question is whether dignity is intrinsic or conferred. It is both. Theologically, we believe

190

that God confers human dignity and because God has treated us with dignity we can
confer it to others.98
II. Stem Cell Technologies and In Vitro Fertilization.
The previous section on the personal or “ensouled” status of the human embryo
raises significant ethical issues for human embryonic stem cells and in vitro fertilization.
The most intense debates engage three related topics: the relevance of personhood, the
resourcing of stem cells, and in vitro fertilization used for embryo health.
A. Relevance of Personhood.
First, the relevance of personhood in the debate on stem cell technology engages
two foundational issues: the secular view and the Catholic view.
1. Secular View.
Within the secular view of personhood two topics need to be discussed: the
discord in definitions and the utilitarian view.
Discord in Definitions
A consensus on the definition of personhood has not been achieved. Various
criteria are debated in the literature for determining personhood, from physical
development to mental capacities. Some hold that human personhood is synonymous
with human DNA, which means that personhood would begin at conception. In defining
personhood, an “identity problem” exists. Comprising this term is a number of distinct
yet interrelated issues. What is it that makes me a single person persisting through time
with a single identity? Is it my body or is it my mind? At what point does one begin to be
a person, and can a fetus or severely demented individual really be described as one?
Adopting a biological-based approach is one way to approach the identity problem. In
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this approach, it is asserted that one persists through time as a single human individual
due to the singularity of one's human body. Even if an individual may be said to be a
different person over time, one’s biological identity is what is most important.99
Utilitarian View.
At the utilitarian end of the spectrum, personhood would begin only with one’s
ability to value one’s own life. Many philosophers have ascribed to a performance theory
to when personhood begins. Personhood can be described as when the fetus possesses a
serious right to life only if it can possess the concept of self and the person must be able
to recognize themselves as that entity over time. Some argue that an unborn child cannot
have a desire for the continuation of life as a thinking being because the unborn does not
know what life is therefore cannot desire life or its continuation. The unborn has no
concept of past or future. There is no consensus on the definition of personhood and
various criteria are utilized for determining personhood such as rationality, autonomy,
and self-consciousness.100
2. Catholic View.
Beginning of life and the protection of life need to be discussed from the Catholic
view.
Beginning of Life.
Semantic issues, biological issues, and philosophical and theological issues are
taken into consideration to answer the question: When does life begin? Some argue that a
human embryo may be considered a human being but yet not a human person. But in the
classical meaning of person: the person is not simply a conscious being, but one with the
power of abstract thought, concrete objects, and capable of feelings. The human person
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has the ability to have abstract thoughts and possesses free will; these transcend the
capabilities of any physical system and can only be explained by recognizing that the
human mind is spiritual in nature. Thus it follows that the soul of the human person gives
life, and is not merely an organizing principle. Assuming a material biological
explanation of the human organism, eliminating intelligence and free moral decisions
would be self-contradictory.101 Delayed hominization theory of St. Thomas Aquinas was
based on limited understanding of embryology by Aristotle. With advances in
embryology, the Church is more confident that delayed hominization is scientifically
obsolete.102
Protection of Life.
Human life from the moment of conception must be respected and protected.
Every innocent being has an inviolable right to life. Because the fertilized egg (zygote) is
a human person, we have a moral obligation to protect it. The Church takes a
conservative stance in protecting potential human persons even though there may be
uncertainty about when personhood begins. Official teaching states that every human life
should be treated as having an inalienable right to life and be defended in its integrity
from the moment of conception. Because the zygote is spiritual entails being created by
God. From the moment of conception, life must be protected as a spiritual being.103
B. Resourcing Stem Cells.
Second, the debate on personhood clarifies when stem cells can be resourced. In
the debate on resourcing stem cells, two primary sources should be considered:
embryonic and adult stem cells.
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1. Embryonic Stem Cells.
Two subjects need to be discussed: moral status and ethical dilemmas to engage
embryonic stem cells.
Moral Status.
The ethical debate on the beginning of human life and moral value raises serious
and basic questions concerning the moral status of embryos. The analysis considers
whether embryonic stem cell research even if it involves destruction of embryos offers
potential benefits of new medical treatments. The argument is that a moral middle ground
is needed between opposite positions; the goal is to find technical ways to reap the
benefits of embryonic stem cell research without destroying the human embryo. Moral
value exists in the zygote itself. Moral obligation to alleviate suffering is brought to light
arguing that embryonic stem cell research is a moral enterprise.104 It is necessary to
recognize the practical need for developing a reasonable policy that finds a morally
correct and consistent position in dealing with human embryonic stem cell research
therapy.105
Ethical Dilemmas.
The use of embryonic stem cells is an ethical dilemma facing America today.
Increasing technology allows the ability to work with human gametes enabling us to
experiment on developing human life from the moment of conception. The current debate
is between the use of embryo stem cells to research possible treatments or cures for
various diseases versus the defense of the personhood of the embryo. This debate can be
defined in four ethical frameworks. The consequentialist ethical framework looks at the
greatest good in a situation. Then the deontological framework looks for a guiding rule
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that can be applied in all cases. The relativist recognizes that value can change depending
on time and place. And finally, the virtue ethicist focuses on the personal character that is
shaped by moral actions. Stem cells are obtained because of the desire to help people
with no evil intent. Policies need to be refined to give guidance for future research and
therapy.106
2. Adult Stem Cells.
Adult stem cells need to be discussed in light of telomeres and differential
potential.
Telomeres.
In the 1980s small bits of DNA that serve as protective coverings at the end of our
chromosomes were discovered, these are called telomeres. Our chromosomes are kept
from unraveling by these caps. When these telomeres are healthy, cells remain healthy.
The telomeres get shorter each time the cells divide and when they reach a critically short
length these cells lose their ability to divide and eventually die. By adding telomerase, an
enzyme, some cells can virtually be “immortalized.” The only cells that benefit from this
therapy are ones that divide but not all cells in the body divide. Embryonic stem cells are
undifferentiated resulting in the ability to develop into very specialized cells often used
for the control of certain diseases.107 Efforts are now underway to reverse adult stem cells
back to their original state called “induced pluripotency” which could eliminate the need
for the utilization of highly contentious embryonic stem cells.108
Differentiation Potential.
Cells that self-renew and can give several differentiated cell types such as muscle,
heart, and brain cells are defined as stem cells. Because of the increased interest in
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regenerative medicine even more emphasis is being placed on the differentiation potential
for a variety of tissue types, specifically tissue-specific adult stem cells. The adult stem
cell resides in any given tissue that maintains and repairs the tissue by producing the cell
types that make up that given tissue. Adult stem cells are found in bone marrow, skeletal
and cardiac muscle, dental pulp, skin, liver, prostate, mammary glands, testicles, ovaries,
and in several areas of eyes and ears. Adult stem cells have been well characterized and
isolated to high purity from their tissue, and thus have demonstrated at the single cell
level to be capable of giving rise to progeny of different cell types.109
C. In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Health.
Third, the connection between the personhood debate and resourcing stem cells
raises significant implications for the use of in vitro fertilization for embryo health.
Hence, it is necessary to engage each point separately: in vitro fertilization and embryo
health.
1. In Vitro Fertilization.
The history of in vitro fertilization and the Catholic view need to be engaged to
help clarify differing points of view.
Historical View of In Vitro Fertilization.
Today assisted reproductive technology is available throughout most of the world.
The refinements of technology and clinical practice have allowed in vitro fertilization to
evolve into a medical procedure readily available. But it was not until 1978, with the
birth of the first child, that was the culmination of decades of scientific research. Prior to
that time, women considered infertile were without option other than adoption. In 1978,
laparoscopic retrieval of a woman's single egg was achieved then fertilized in the
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laboratory and transferred back into the uterus which resulted in the first live birth from
in vitro fertilization. Further refinements of this pioneering effort have continued. The
success of in vitro fertilization has unleashed a barrage of unprecedented social, ethical,
and legal concerns. Debates regarding the donor anonymity, financial compensation for
donor participation, the need for registry of births, third-party reproduction, and age
limitations of recipients continue to stir controversy. 110
Reproductive biotechnology has developed the traditional understanding of
biology. In vitro fertilization has dramatically expanded the scale and scope becoming a
platform for a myriad of human and animal applications. In vitro fertilization technology
and the model of reproduction that relies upon it are commonsensical. In vitro
fertilization has become a new norm in family life by establishing a new method of
sexual reproduction and a powerful new window into the mechanisms of biological
development. Because of in vitro fertilization, a new kind of biological kinship now
exists with technology. In vitro fertilization is playing a leading role in the establishment
of new technologies, remaking life as a normal, familiar, and even naturalized part human
reproduction.111
Catholic View.
As part of one’s baptismal and marriage vocation, we are called to cooperate with
God in the creation of new humanity. Catholic teaching prohibits in vitro fertilization,
stating that a child has a right to be conceived in the marital embrace of his parents.
Human intercourse has two components, the unitive and procreative. In vitro fertilization
separates these components making the procreative its only goal. Man on his own
initiative cannot separate the two meanings of the conjugal act: the unitive meaning in the
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procreative meaning. In vitro fertilization makes the child a commodity and makes the
laboratory, doctors, and technicians part of the conception process. The Catholic Church
views children as a gift from God not a right. Different reasons support the Church’s
opposition to in vitro fertilization include: the compromise that the procedure brings
against the marriage act, the possibility of the exploitation of women, and the rights of
the future fetus to be born from natural marital intimacy.112
The desire to have a child still is not sufficient to allow the use of any means. For
the good of the family in the child, the child ought to be born of an action, which is itself,
an expression of love between a man and a woman. The “divine design” of sexual
intercourse should not be tampered with. Catholic teaching explains that procreation apart
from intimate sexual lovemaking should not occur nor should we have intimate sexual
lovemaking apart from a context of responsibility for procreation. The danger is that we
will over technologize the procreative process. In vitro fertilization can pose the problem
of positive eugenics-preferential breeding superior genotypes. Another area of concern is
the loss of fertilized ova. The problem of embryo loss raises the evaluative question of
how we are to assess human life at the embryo stage.113
2. Embryo Health.
The discussion of embryo health has two components that require discussion:
regulation and again the Catholic view.
Regulation.
To help minimize errors, governments have instituted regulations of the in vitro
fertilization industry and significant progress has been made in accreditation of in vitro
fertilization labs as well. National and international professional societies have made
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significant progress in the promotion of quality management, risk management, and
safety. Quality systems implementation still has meaningful work to accomplish before
industry understands and appreciates the need for standards. Many in vitro fertilization
practitioners lack formal training and the clinics lack quality management. With the
growth of this field, research and clinical practice, “corporatization” has transpired. In
this process a loss of quality of care can occur because of the profit motive. Quality
processes and systems cannot be applied in isolation; they must be integrated into the
goal of “best practice.” Because of the preponderance of staff coming from academia and
research, the concepts of process and systems management are often unfamiliar, even
alien.114
One of the most controversial recent developments of in vitro fertilization is using
it to select certain genetic in embryos and, consequently, children. After sperm and eggs
are removed from the donors, sperm is allowed to fertilize eggs; the resulting embryo can
have one cell safely removed for genetic testing of their DNA. Preimplantation genetic
screening allows couples to prevent implanting an embryo with any of undesirable
genetic maladies. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis can also be used to select gender,
hair color, and eye color, as well as complexion of an embryo. Preimplantation genetic
diagnosis as also been approved to create “savior siblings”. These could be children
utilized to combat varying diseases in siblings or even potentially others. There is a
striking lack of uniformity in laws and regulations surrounding in vitro fertilization. State
laws vary and few federal laws exist. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine
has created guidelines to ensure safety tests are performed on donated material but
additional requirements for donors differ from state to state.115
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Catholic View.
The Church does not condemn persons created by technical procedures. Those
born following in vitro fertilization possess dignity and are made in God’s image and
likeness. Of the over 400,000 in vitro fertilization babies born annually, the concern is for
the human beings created in the laboratory that will die before given a chance to live. It is
estimated that only one in six embryos created following in vitro fertilization will make it
to birth. Some estimates are as high as 30 embryos are created for every child born by in
vitro fertilization. In vitro fertilization treats the new human being as little more than a
cluster of cells to be graded, selected, and discarded. The loss of life is ignored and
accepted by the in vitro fertilization industry. These failures and fatalities are not even
recognized for what they are by most physicians who perform in vitro fertilization. Loss
of life has become a normal and standardized aspect of the procedure. Additionally, there
is significant concern for the thousands, possibly millions of human embryos who are
frozen. What will be the outcome and disposition of these cryopreserved embryos?116
III. Prenatal Testing.
The above discussion on the personal status of the embryo and its relevance for
stem cell technology connects with the ethical debate on prenatal testing as a crucial
aspect of the ethics of reproductive technology. To discuss prenatal testing requires
examining two related topics: the availability of testing and interventions and what may
be in store for tomorrow’s children.
A. Availability of Testing and Interventions.
First, the availability of testing and interventions raises two issues: options for
prenatal testing and prenatal genetic interventions.
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1. Options for Prenatal Testing.
The options for prenatal testing will be viewed from the non-invasive prenatal
testing, the prenatal microarray analysis, and the expanded carrier screening as well.
Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing.
The genetics revolution has deluged parents with information to give greater
insight into the potentiality of their children. Before discussing non-invasive prenatal
testing, the definition of testing and screening need to be clarified. Testing is considered
diagnostic while screening is either to screen pregnant women for specific disorders or to
assess the likelihood that a fetus may manifest specific diagnosed conditions.117 Because
of the identifying circulating fetal DNA, a paradigm shift occurred in the practice of
prenatal screening/diagnosis and the understanding of the fetomaternal relationship.
Without being influenced by previous pregnancies, the circulating fetal DNA gives a
genetic snapshot of the present pregnancy.118 Non-invasive prenatal testing,
commercially available in 2012, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology
concluded that non-invasive prenatal testing should be offered to patients who may be
high risk for fetal aneuploidy (abnormal number of chromosomes). The American
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology stated that only after informed patient choice and
not part of a routine prenatal lab assessment that non-invasive prenatal testing be
performed.119 Fear exists that non-invasive prenatal testing will move from uncommon to
routine and that it is a modern-day cover-up for eugenics.120 Being that non-invasive
prenatal testing is easy and safe and can be performed early in pregnancy, there is fear
that informed consent may become much more difficult.121 Testing and selective abortion
will become normalized. There is fear that there will be a trend towards accepting and
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utilizing testing for minor abnormalities and nonmedical traits.122 Additional fears are
that new genomic technologies will allow for broader ranges of abnormalities thus
causing the number of selective abortions to increase dramatically. By enlarging the
scope of non-invasive prenatal testing, informed consent will be more difficult and
challenge the notion of non-invasive prenatal testing serving reproductive autonomy.123
Unsolicited knowledge of traits found by non-invasive prenatal testing would be
considered an invasion of the autonomy of future children potentially revealing
information about abnormalities including late onset diseases.124 Non-invasive prenatal
testing should only be offered with education, informed consent, and with counseling
provided by a certified genetic counselor.125 In prenatal microarray analysis, a molecularbased technique, a sample of DNA is compared to normal genome to determine
abnormalities. Not only as a prenatal diagnostic test, this technology has been used for
children with delayed development, autism disorders, and other anomalies.126 Microarray
analysis can detect genomic abnormalities that are 100 times smaller than those identified
by karyotyping, the routine test used in the past. Microarray testing has a higher
sensitivity to detect chromosome deletions, duplications, and unbalanced rearrangements.
It also offers a shorter turnaround time because the DNA isolation procedures can be
automated.127 One of the disadvantages of the microarrays is its inability to detect
balanced chromosome rearrangements and that design of the array is crucial.128 In the
prenatal setting, microarray analysis has been highly debated and thus primarily used in
pregnancies that are of high risk.129 Like non-invasive prenatal testing, microarray
analysis raises many ethical questions. Informed consent along with a detailed discussion
about the varying degrees of severity, purpose of the testing, and other conditions that
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may be brought to light are essential. Pre-and post genetic counseling is highly
recommended.130
Expanded Carrier Screening.
Expanded carrier screening has been available and utilized for the last ten years.
Because of next-generation sequencing methods, the screening is shifting from ancestry
based to one that screens many disorders.131 The benefit of expanded carrier screening is
in the decreasing of inherited genetic diseases. Practice guidelines for screening continues
to be directed at high risk population groups such as Jewish women being screened for
Tay-Sachs disease and African-American women for sickle cell disease.132 Additional
screens have been put in place for cystic fibrosis and spinal muscular atrophy that are
recommended for women of non-Hispanic European American decent.133 Concerns exist
about the interpretations, lack of guidelines, and applicability.134 It is essential that the
informed consent be secured from patients considering expanded carrier screening.
Multiple challenges occur in securing those consents because the screening can include
multi-disease screenings thus truly informed consent can be difficult to achieve.135 The
ethical principles of prenatal testing and screening have to be considered. Questions arise
to whom should these principles be directed: the pregnant patient, the fetus or the
couple.136
2. Prenatal Genetic Interventions.
In the field of reprogenetics, we have the ability to create certain kinds of human
beings. In this section, we will consider prenatal genetic diagnosis, prenatal genetic
therapy, and prenatal genetic enhancement.
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Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis.
The testing of fetuses, embryos before implantation, and the gametes are included
in prenatal genetic diagnosis. Thus far prenatal genetic diagnosis has mostly been used
for negative selection: targeting genetic diseases. Moral objections to prenatal genetic
diagnosis focuses on that negative selection. The three most salient arguments against
prenatal genetic diagnosis are: (1) loss of support argument, (2) expressivist objection,
and (3) disabilities are just differences thesis.137
With the first objection, because of the widespread use of prenatal genetic
diagnosis, the number of persons with disabilities will be diminished. The concern is the
likely reduction of the financial, logistical, and social support to the disabled would be a
consequence. Using prenatal genetic diagnosis for negative selection becomes morally
troubling and possibly even morally indefensible. In the second objection, the
expressivist, the messaging about the value of disabled persons and their contribution to
society comes into question. In the third argument, prenatal genetic diagnosis is used to
implement unjust discrimination and reinforces the prejudiced against the disabled, all
morally disconcerting.138
Prenatal Genetic Therapy.
Prenatal genetic therapy is considered experimental and only a future prospect
unlike prenatal genetic diagnosis, a clinical reality. With the completion of the Human
Genome Project, accelerated advancement has occurred in all areas of reprogenetics.
Three types of prenatal genetic testing exist, therapy on gametes prior to fertilization, on
embryos before implantation, and the third type would be therapies on fetuses by
injecting genetic material. To avoid transferring to later generations, the insertion of
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genetic material will be into only differentiated somatic cells.139 Many feel that prenatal
genetic testing is identity affecting. By affecting identity, the individual is eliminated and
someone else is created, potentially questioning the substantial moral status of that
individual. Another ethical issue regarding prenatal genetic testing is the effect on
inheritability to resultant generations.140 Additionally, there is the freedom argument that
can be understood in three different ways: (1) prenatal genetic testing prevents those
altered from making free choices related to the modified trait, (2) the range of behavior
and life plans can be altered, and finally (3) freedom from unrealistic parental
expectations and demands.141
Prenatal Genetic Enhancement.
Prenatal genetic enhancement poses considerable doubt when considering the best
interest of the child-to-be, attitudes of those impacted, and concerns about the effects on
society.142 Objections to biomedical enhancement, particularly for perspective children
have been vehement. The ills include diminishment of authenticity, widespread social
stratification and inequity, threat human nature and dignity, hubristic rejection of ‘the
given’, and potentially undermine the autonomy of the individual.143 It is impossible to
obtain informed consent from the child-to-be; the best interest standard can be the
appropriate decision-making guide. But many doubt that prenatal genetic enhancement
can ever be in the best interest of the child-to-be.144 Additionally, doubts about an open
future of the child produced with enhanced traits and the safety of prenatal genetic
enhancement warrant pause. There is appropriate concern that parents are imposing their
will on the child by enhancing their traits thus violating the child’s best interest.145
Imprecise vectors that can deposit desired genes leaving detrimental genes in place cause
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much angst as to what may happen within the patient's body.146 The unanticipated and
unintended consequences are of moral and ethical concern.147
B. Tomorrow’s Children.
Second, the availability of prenatal testing has significant implications for
tomorrow’s children. Here two issues must be addressed: the selection of characteristics
and savior babies.
1. Selection of Characteristics.
Selecting children with specific disabilities and selecting for a specific sex need to
be discussed.
Disabilities.
Two questions are raised when discussing the correctness of selecting a child for a
specific disability, the using of selective reproduction techniques for selection and under
what circumstances do concerns for the welfare of the children provide reasons to
practice selective reproduction.148 There are cases of what is termed wrongful life or life
not worth living. These would be situations where quality of life is so difficult that they
would be better off not existing. Normally cases where life is full of pain and indignity
would qualify149. From a bioethical position, it would be wrong to create a child with that
level of quality of life. In most cases though selecting for a disability would not fall into
this category because of a potential positive quality-of-life that could be achieved by that
resultant child.150
Sex Selection.
Sex selection is a bioethical example of parental choice that is technically
achievable and easily delivered. Sex selection can raise the issue of sex or gender
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discrimination.151 If sex selection would reflect a discrimination against women and
systematically reinforce that bias, this could constitute a moral and legal injustice to be
prevented.152 Bioethics, public policy, and law intersect on the topic of sex selection.
Opinions regarding sex selection range from one extreme, saying it is always wrong and
should be banned to the opposite end of the scale to those who prefer a free market.153
Even though a portion of sexual selection would be driven by sexist beliefs and attitudes
this is not enough to justify prohibition. Reproductive liberty could be deleteriously
impacted.154
2. Savior Babies.
Instrumentalization and commodification of savior babies need to be discussed in
this section.
Instrumentalization.
Instrumentalization (treating a child as a means to an end) can manifest itself for
other people’s well-being or satisfaction of other’s desires. A savior baby (sibling) being
selected so that an existing one might live is an example, although other examples do
exist such as benefiting the parent’s health or parent’s preferences.155 Savior sibling is
used to describe a baby that is created using in vitro fertilization that has been screened
during that process to serve as a donor match for a child that already exists and is sick in
some way.156 There are three compelling arguments in the anti-savior sibling controversy.
First being, savior babies would be wrongfully instrumentalized, treated as mere means.
This stems from Emmanuel Kant’s famous dictum “Never use people as a means but
always treat them as an end.”157 Second, savior selection would have a negative effect on
the moral climate and society. Claiming that society would become less fair and equal
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and lead to the development of a genetic underclass. Also potentially leading to the
acceptance of customized conception and designer babies.158 Finally, concerns about the
welfare of the savior sibling and the fundamental issues relating to the welfare of that
child. Two harms are most concerning: the physical harm directly caused by the prenatal
genetic diagnosis and the psychological harm created by being a means to an end.159
Commodification.
Commodification has three essential characteristics: (1) it has a price, which a
seller is willing to receive, and the buyer is willing to pay, (2) they are fungible,
interchangeable with other goods, and (3) their value is instrumental not intrinsic.160 In
the normative sense, commodification is a social practice which one gives rights over to
the thing in question that are bought and sold. There is no moral judgment just a matter of
fact that certain things are being treated as commodities.161 Commodification has two
forms: complete modification (commodification with no restrictions) and incomplete
commodification (commodification with restrictions).162 These distinctions allow us to
focus on the moral basis for treating these body parts as commodities. In the libertarian
political thought, bodies and body parts may be bought, sold, and rented.163
Commodification in the moral sense is to disapprove and point out the unique kind of
wrong: the wrong of commodification. Wrongful commodities are things that are treated
as commodities but are really fungible or have instrumental value. When
commodification is cited in nonmonetary context one is actually appealing to
instrumentalization and treating things as fungible.164
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IV. Newborn Genetic Screening.
Closely related to the ethical debate on prenatal screening is the debate on
newborn screening, which requires examining two related topics: screening programs and
screening consequences.
A. Screening Programs.
First, to understand screening programs it is important to engage two pivotal
issues: the national research framework and the future of genetic screening.
1. National Research Framework.
The current overview of genetic screening and the challenge of research for
newborn screening will be engaged.
Overview.
To begin an overview of genetic screening we start in the 1960s when a simple
blood test to detect a genetic metabolic disorder, phenylketonuria, and a genetic disorder
that can lead to mental retardation was developed.165 To treat phenylketonuria, a special
diet begun early in life can reduce the major symptoms.166 States over time introduced
this test and made it mandatory. Some states began to expand newborn screening to other
tests for other disorders.167 In spite of federal funding, newborn screening is primarily a
state public health activity; thus states have made different decisions about the content of
their screening, treatment protocol, follow-up, and the cost to newborns families.168 The
goal of screening is improve the health of the child and appropriate only for medical
conditions that have effective treatments.169 This consensus has now come under pressure
with the calling for broadening the focus to diseases with no current treatment as well as
to the families for screening for untreatable genetic disorders. The implication here is
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identifying parental carrier status of genetic disorders that might later impact
reproductive decisions.170 A salient issue has been the fairness and the inequity of cost.
While one of the most controversial issues is that compulsory screening and its practice
of being performed without explicit consent. Many questions are left unanswered such as
the right to refuse, the right to confidentiality and privacy, the right to information, and
even methods of delivery. These and others make developing sound ethical policy a
significant challenge for screening programs.171 Finally, an issue of overarching
importance in the discussion of newborn screening is that of race, ethnicity, and social
economic status. Included in that discussion is the important question of targeting
particular groups or the screening of all newborns.172
Challenges of Research.
Many barriers exist creating challenges of research. Especially in establishing
value of prenatal genetic screening programs. One of the basic questions is whether
morbidity and/or mortality are reduced as a result of screening. State health programs
typically are underfunded thus evaluation of established programs become problematic.
Although diseases can be detected in affected children and that interventions can be
lifesaving, the benefits of population screening programs remain uncertain with regard to
the long-term benefits.173 Exacerbating the challenges of research with human bio
specimens gives rise to several ethical issues such as informed consent, privacy and
confidentiality, ethical reviews of research proposals, access to the results, and any other
benefits gleaned from that research.174 The obtaining of informed consent from
participants in research does satisfy the ethical principle of respect and honors the
individual. By obtaining informed consent there is acknowledgment that autonomous
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decisions regarding one's body have been discussed and determined, reflecting
transparency.175
2. Future of Genetic Screening.
Movements toward expanding newborn screening and the whole gene sequencing
will impact that potential need to be engaged in this section.
Expanding Newborn Screening.
Newborn genetic screening was been born out of state run politics. State
legislatures were lobbied when advocates felt the medical community was not moving
rapidly enough in expanding newborn screening.176 Over time advocates have remained
involved bringing pressure on states to add other disorders to the screening panel
conceivably to avert serious disabilities and even death.177 In 1968, Wilson and Jungner
published criteria for newborn screening: (1) the condition should be an important health
problem, (2) treatment for the disease needs to exist, (3) diagnostic and treatment
facilities should be available, (4) an asymptomatic stage should be recognizable, (5)
suitable testing must exist, (6) the population must accept the test, (7) an understanding of
the development of disease, (8) an agreeable policy on who should be treated, (9) costs
should be balanced in relation to medical care expenditure, and finally (10) it should be a
continuous process project.178 Gradually the focus changed with the advent of new
technology, tandem mass spectrometry.179 Tandem mass spectrometry with its capability
to measure potentially hundreds of metabolites at one time allows for early intervention
in previously unknown disorders, dramatically improving health.180 Thus there was
pressure to add numerous tests to newborn screening panel. The American College of
Medical Genetics recommended a core of 29 conditions for newborn screening. In
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addition, 25 additional conditions “secondary targets” were recommended. Because of
the inability to meet the Wilson/Jungner criteria analysis relied on expert opinion and
resulted in considerable debate.181 False-negatives, false-positives, over-diagnosis,
findings of uncertain significance, and incidental findings all contribute to that debate.182
With the history of the technological imperative, even with its unintended consequences,
screening marches on.
Whole-Genome Sequencing.
Now the prospect of whole-genome sequencing offers the potential integration
with newborn screening programs. Whole-genome sequencing can deliver useful
information about poorly understood diseases and improve the prognosis of and treatment
options for patients.183 It will inevitably lead to all kinds of unsought information as well.
Questions of responsible use of such testing, meaningful informed consent, and the value
and disposition of the information obtained will entail complex consideration.184 These
population based genetic screens have both individual and collective implications, thus
the balance of risk and benefits has to be considered not only from the perspective of
individuals and families, but also from that of the target population and of society as a
whole. As newborn screening programs enter the genomic era, they must focus on
addressing issues of equality, access, and education that have plagued the new born
screening programs since its inception.185
B. Screening Consequences.
Second, programs for newborn screening inevitably create concern about
screening consequences. To discuss concerns about screening consequences, there are
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two areas of consideration, an overview of the problem and a consideration of disease
ontologies
1. Overview.
In this section, the origins and successes of newborn genetic screening needs to be
engaged.
Origins.
The origins of newborn genetic screening are normally ascribed to the work of
Robert Guthrie.186 After the birth of his own child with mental retardation and a niece
with phenylketonuria he became involved with an organization that fights discrimination
against children with mental retardation.187 Phenylketonuria is a genetic condition
whereby an enzyme is deficient that is needed to break down the amino acid
phenylalanine that can build up in the body and cause mental retardation. An
experimental form of phenylketonuria treatment was a restrictive diet.188 Guthrie
developed a bacterial inhibition assay that could diagnose phenylketonuria using neonatal
blood. This discovery could identify affected children and could be used as a screening
method. It could discover affected children before the onset of irreversible symptoms. A
simple method was developed taking blood collected from a heel stick of the child prior
to hospital discharge, then sent to a lab to be easily analyzed. If the levels were elevated
then the infant’s physician was notified and the results were given to the family.189 A
pilot study was federally funded in 1962 to screen 400,000 infants in 29 states for
phenylketonuria. Most states continued the screening after the completion of the study.190
Later in the 70s, the federal government supported screening for genetic diseases and
provided limited funding. Five component guidelines were identified for newborn
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screening, including the screening itself, follow-up, diagnosis, therapy, and evaluation.191
Since phenylketonuria screening began, various tests have been added and screening has
remained largely a state responsibility. Because of that autonomy, each state has chosen
the screening targets, payments, education, and follow-up. This variability of screening
has left a patchwork of coverage in the United States.192
Successes.
The successes of phenylketonuria universal screening has allowed universal
screening to become a cornerstone public health initiative requiring collaboration of
health care professionals and an advanced infrastructure including laboratories, hospitals,
clinical centers, and families.193 Because of issues not always being addressed before
implementation, critics maintain it is essential that scientific uncertainties be worked
before developing the health care infrastructure and investing in newborn screening.194
As a result, three points have been established in evaluating the historical consensus
regarding population screening: (1) population screening is only permissible if it
addresses an important health problem and there is an accepted treatment available, (2)
mandatory genetic screening should be avoided if possible but bioethical issues such as
informed consent, confidentiality, autonomy, knowledge, well-being, and equity must be
addressed, and (3) technological innovation should not be the driver in the expansion of
newborn screening but the focus should be on an infrastructure that provides follow-ups,
treatments, and health services.195 Phenylketonuria screening has largely been a success
story that celebrates the marriage of patient advocacy with concerned health care
professionals to promote screening.196 In preventive medicine few things have been done
that have been as successful as newborn screening.197
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2. Disease Ontologies.
In this section, a case will be made showing how disease ontology can be
understood through newborn screening. The understanding of medium-chain acylcoenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency will be discussed pre-screening and postscreening to exemplify the value of newborn screening.
Pre-Screening.
In the pre-screening stage of medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase
deficiency, understanding of this condition was very limited.198 The prospect of death
was generally the manifestation.199 It was suggested that sudden infant death syndrome
might be as a result of undiagnosed medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase
deficiency. What was known was that medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase
deficiency was caused by mutations in the medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A
dehydrogenase deficiency gene causing an enzymatic deficiency. 200 This deficiency can
impact the metabolism of certain fatty acids that accumulate in the blood manifesting
themselves as lethargy, hypoglycemia, liver damage, and possible brain damage.201 The
usual manifestation of medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency is
when a primary metabolic crisis caused a prolonged period of fasting such as may occur
during an illness. As a result of that primary crisis the secondary trigger would be
required for medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency to manifest itself.
When this episode occurred mortality rate was about 25% while others suffered
significant neurological impairments or developmental delays.202 Most thought mediumchain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency was a result of a founder effect most
commonly seen in non-Hispanic white populations of northwestern European descent.
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The only treatment was a low-fat diet and avoidance of fasting especially when the
patient becomes ill and stopped eating. The disease would manifest itself most often
before age six but could possibly remain a possibility as an adult.203 With confirmation
through biochemical testing, an abnormality was discovered that had a common genetic
profile. By DNA sequencing, the case was made for large-scale newborn screening.204
Post-Screening.
Post-screening of newborns has shown several medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A
dehydrogenase deficiency variants that were previously unknown. Additionally, mediumchain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency has been broken down into carrier like,
intermediate, and severe by correlating 75 genetic mutations many of which had never
been documented.205 After screening, it was determined that instead of 80% to 90% of the
medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency patients had a particular
mutation that only 50% actually possessed it. This mutation, along with other mutations,
was thought to be unique to northern Europeans. Subsequently, it has been found these
mutations are twice as prevalent throughout the world.206 The saliency of ethnicity in
genetics is now becoming more apparent because of this screening.207 As a result of
screening, treatment regimens have been adjusted to allow for changes in frequency of
feeding.208 Also revealed, the severity of cases has been found to be milder then
previously assumed. Geneticists have found more and different diseases. Diseases have
split into variants while others have disappeared and now are being redefined as oddities
with no clinical implications. Geneticists because of newborn screening have a better
understanding of diseases like medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency
and have adjusted treatment regimens accordingly.209 The knowledge gap has been closed
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by more information sharing by discussions, assessment, diagnostic testing, and
appropriate management.210
This chapter has considered major issues in reproductive technology that have
significant applications for the Catholic ethical tradition. Catholic teaching engages each
of them in the dynamic manner to develop its moral doctrine when appropriate. This is
based on emerging science, but also to indicate clearly where there appears to be
wrongdoing from individual and social perspectives. The next chapter continues this
analysis of engaging the Catholic tradition with breakthroughs in science and medicine
by examining emerging issues in regenerative technology.
V. Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious Directives.
Natural Law has two general approaches, as described in the conclusion to
Chapter 3. The first approach focuses on the universal aspects of human nature. This
approach is typically associated with the settled Catholic teaching on morality. The
second approach focuses on the person, presenting a dynamic and historical view of the
human condition as contributors to God’s creation.211 This approach is typically
associated with using the Principle of Double Effect to apply traditional Church teaching
in a flexible manner to changing circumstances. Arising from these two approaches to
Natural Law, a third approach has emerged combining the nature-oriented and personoriented approaches to new dilemmas regarding emerging technologies that may require
doctrinal development in Catholic teaching.
In the conclusion of each applied chapter, (Chapter 4, 5, and 6), a critique based
on the Ethical and Religious Directives is presented regarding the main topics in each
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chapter. The critique adopts the above approaches to identify three distinct categories as
follows.
Category A deals with settled issues in Church Teaching reflecting the Nature
Approach to Natural Law.
Category B deals with controversial issues eligible for using the Principle of
Double Effect reflecting the Personal Approach to Natural Law.
Category C deals with issues requiring doctrinal development in Catholic teaching
to address new dilemmas regarding emerging technologies.
The following analysis applies this threefold critique to the topics discussed in
this chapter on reproductive technology. Each main section is discussed in turn.
Section I. Embryo and Personhood.
This section discussed the status of the embryo regarding its personhood. From
the perspective of the threefold critique, recognizing the status of the human embryo with
personhood is settled teaching (Category A).
Authoritative guidance is offered in Part Four of the Ethical and Religious
Directives, Issues in Care for the Beginning of Life. At the moment of fertilization, the
respect due all persons is to be accorded the human embryo.212 The Church’s Catechism
also teaches that from the first moment of its existence the embryo must be guaranteed
unconditional respect.213
Section II. Stem Cells Technologies and In Vitro Fertilization.
This section discussed the prohibition of embryonic stem cell research that
destroys embryos. This is settled Catholic teaching (Category A).
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Utilization of embryonic stem cells has been hotly debated and problematic for all
sides of the debate regarding sourcing and using embryonic stem cells for medical
purposes. Determining when personhood and ensoulment occur has complicated the
debate.214 In harvesting these cells presently the human embryo is destroyed raising two
ethical questions: one of consent and one as to ending human life by destroying the
embryo.215 As is indicated by Directive # 39 and Directive #51:
Those techniques of assisted conception that respect the unitive and
procreative meanings of sexual intercourse and do not involve the
destruction of human embryos, or their deliberate generation in such
numbers that it is clearly envisaged that all cannot implant and some are
simply being used to maximize the chances of others implanting, may be
used as therapies for infertility. (Directive #39)

Nontherapeutic experiments on a living embryo or fetus are not permitted,
even with the consent of the parents. Therapeutic experiments are
permitted for a proportionate reason with the free and informed consent of
the parents or, if the father cannot be contacted, at least of the mother.
Medical research that will not harm the life or physical integrity of an
unborn child is permitted with parental consent. (Directive #51)

With the question of ending human life, it can be appropriately argued that
harvesting stem cells by means that kills the organism with rational nature are morally
illicit. If pluripotent cells could be procured by altered nuclear transfer, altered nuclear
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transfer oocyte assisted reprograming, or from human embryos themselves that were not
harmed or destroyed, then these methods could be considered potentially licit.216
There is an imperative to find a better way to procure cells that can be utilized to
positively impact medical science and not destroy human life. If there were a potential
breakthrough in securing these beneficial cells, then that may raise the possibility of a
need for a doctrinal development of the traditional Church teaching, but as of now
embryonic stem cell research is prohibited as settled teaching (Category A).
The second main topic in this section dealt with in vitro fertilization - the
prohibition of this technology is also settled teaching (Category A).
Human Dignity is the galvanizing force for the Church’s concern for the sanctity
of life and comparably for the dignity of marriage. The Church cannot endorse any
medical practice that compromises this teaching.217 The Church upholds the sanctity of
life “from the moment of conception until death.”218 Included in this teaching is the
prohibition of in vitro fertilization as addressed in Directive #41.
Homologous artificial fertilization (that is, any technique used to achieve
conception using the gametes of the two spouses joined in marriage) is
prohibited when it separates procreation from the marital act in its unitive
significance (e.g., any technique used to achieve extracorporeal
conception). (Directive #41)

However considered from another perspective, in vitro fertilization could
become related to Category B, permissible using the Principle of Double Effect,
insofar as the original prohibition of in vitro fertilization related to the context of
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marital fertility (using the nature approach to Natural Law). In a different context,
that is the health of the embryo, the principle of double effect could be applied to
address an embryo’s health rather than marital fertility.219
Section III. Prenatal Testing.
In this section, pivotal ethical dilemmas aligned these technologies relate to
various forms of prenatal testing and screening.
First, this section discussed prenatal genetic testing. This is permissible as settled
Catholic teaching (Category A).
Prenatal diagnosis of the unborn utilizing non-invasive prenatal screening and
appropriate use of expanded carrier screening can certainly be ethically problematic, but
Catholics cannot assume that prenatal genetic testing is automatically immoral.220 The
Congregation for Doctrine of Faith has stated: “if prenatal diagnosis respects the life and
integrity of the embryo and the human fetus and is directed toward safeguarding or
healing that individual, then it is appropriate.”221
Second, this section also discussed prenatal genetic therapy. This is controversial
but may be permissible using the principle of double effect (Category B).
In Dignatis Personae, the Church directly addressed gene therapy:
“For a moral evaluation the following distinctions need to be kept in mind. Procedures
used on somatic cells for strictly therapeutic purposes are in principle morally licit.”222
Additionally, this is addressed in Directive #51.
Nontherapeutic experiments on a living embryo or fetus are not permitted,
even with the consent of the parents. Therapeutic experiments are
permitted for a proportionate reason with the free and informed consent of
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the parents or, if the father cannot be contacted, at least of the mother.
Medical research that will not harm the life or physical integrity of an
unborn child is permitted with parental consent. (Directive #51)

The allowing therapeutic experimentation is an indication that the Church
is keeping pace with technological breakthroughs while maintaining the dignity of
the human person.
Third, this section also discussed prenatal genetic enhancement. This topic likely
requires (depending on the what the enhancement involves) doctrinal development
(Category C).
Genetic enhancement is quite different from gene therapy. Genetic modifications
risk germ cells transmission to potential offspring. The ethical critique of this topic can
be described as follows: “In the present state of research, it is not morally permissible to
act in a way that may cause possible harm to the resulting progeny… The question of
using genetic engineering for purposes of medical treatment also calls for
consideration.”223
Fourth, this section also discussed the impact of a variety of reproductive
technologies that will shape tomorrow’s children. Generally, these technologies that
involve sex selection or commodification are ethically controversial and would need
doctrinal development to permit them (Category C).
For example, prenatal genetic diagnosis can be used to acquire an embryo that the
genetically matches a sibling who has a malady needing a transplant (the so-called savior
sibling debate). In this case, prenatal genetic diagnosis is used to screen for certain
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genetic traits and against genetic defects. The chosen embryos are implanted and brought
to term with the express purpose of becoming a tissue donor for their older sibling, while
other embryos are discarded. Here prenatal genetic diagnosis is used to create human
beings in a manner of selective reproduction that is very problematic for Catholic
teaching.224
In contrast, prenatal diagnosis of the unborn utilizing non-invasive prenatal
screening and appropriate use of expanded carrier screening can be ethically problematic
but not automatically immoral.225 The Congregation for Doctrine of Faith has stated: “if
prenatal diagnosis respects the life and integrity of the embryo and the human fetus and is
directed toward safeguarding or healing that individual, then it is appropriate.”226
The next and last major section addresses newborn genetic screening.
Section IV. Newborn Genetic Screening.
In this section, the pivotal ethical dilemma relates to newborn genetic screening.
This is permissible when used simply for screening purposes. However, this is not
permissible for illicit purposes such as screening for abortion or enhancement (Category
A).
Genetic testing and newborn screening provide information. The ethical issue
arises regarding what is done with the information. If the information is used to
discriminate, then it is morally illicit.227 If these are done to learn more about the fetus
and help the parents and doctors prepare for any complications, then they would not be
morally problematic. Using these tests to come to an acceptance of a child with a
disability would be considered licit.228
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In sum, the threefold ethical critique based on the Ethical Religious Directives has
been applied to the topics discussed in the main sections of the chapter. This threefold
critique is applied at the end of the next two applied chapters.
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Chapter 5. Regenerative Technology.
Regenerative technology raises fundamental questions about the normative
framework of genetics. To adequately discuss regenerative technology requires
examining four related topics: genetic enhancement, germline genetic modification,
mitochondrial DNA, and gene editing with clustered-interspaced short palindromic
repeats (CRISPR).
I. Genetic Enhancement.
To discuss the ethics of genetic enhancement, the pivotal ethical topics are
organized into two categories: influences on human progress (here the ethical discussion
examines human development and human nature) and influences on future generations
(here the ethical discussions examines identity and perfection).
A. Human Progress.
First, a consideration of the significance of genetic enhancement for human
progress engages two foundational issues: human development and human nature.
1. Human Development.
The concept of human development in this context raises two related ethical
dilemmas to deal with ethical dilemma and historical enhancements.
Ethical Dilemmas.
First, discourse on well-being revolves around the meaning of good. A basic
benefit perceived in any genetic alteration deals with personal goods, the advantages for
the individual that arise from being genetically altered.1 This is called a Personal Goods
Assumption that focuses on the risks that could harm the individual or society.2 Another
form of this basic benefit is called the Market Goods Assumption for which genetic
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alterations would be market driven.3 In these approaches, the key focus is eliminating any
social harm that could arise from the enhancements.4 Secondly, human development
focuses on enhancing personal well-being:5 cognitive capabilities, the extension of life,
decreasing morbidity and disability, and advancing the immune system all could be
benefits of genetic alterations.6
Historical Enhancements.
There is no doubt that the well-being of society has benefitted from historical
enhancements such as literacy, the agrarian revolution, computer technology, and health
care.7 However, there are significant reasons to be cautious about genetic alterations that
seek to achieve these human developments.8 This caution arises out of respect for human
nature.
2. Human Nature and the Precautionary Principle.
The concept of human nature raises significant ethical problems that are discussed
in terms of the metaphor of playing God and the ethical principle of precaution.
Common Characteristics.
The metaphor of playing God deals with the legitimacy of humans interfering
with human nature. Human nature can be described as a set of characteristics common to
human beings, delineating the core difference between humans and other creatures.9 The
metaphor of playing God highlights the consequences of germline genetic modification
as a major ethical concern,10 focusing on what are specifically human characteristics,11
and highlighting the significance of our genetic makeup as a barometer for biological
limits.12 The metaphor suggests that with germline genetic modification humanity may be
usurping God’s design.13
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Precautionary Principle.
In light of this concern of humanity over-reaching its legitimate moral authority,
there is an ethical responsibility to honor what is referred to as the precautionary
principle. The precautionary principle specifically focuses on risk reduction in any
germline genetic modification.14 This principle places the burden of proof on those
engaging in germline genetic modification to justify change to individuals, society, or the
species.15 They should prove that the changes would not cause unacceptable harm.16 That
is, the principle encourages the use of risk reduction principles.17 Some critics of using
this principle argue that precaution can lead to paralysis,18 focusing too much on potential
calamity without sufficient consideration of benefit.19 Moreover, critics claim that for
practical reasons the principle is unworkable.20
B. Future Generations.
Second, the impact of germline genetic modification on human progress raises the
question of influencing future generations focusing upon the significance of identity and
perfection.
1. Identity.
The concept of moral identity raises two critical issues: enhancements that are
supernormal and enhancements that deal with disease avoidance.21 Enhancements would
be for individuals and as well as species.22
Supernormal Enhancements.
In particular, risks to biological development and their psychological impact are
especially important.23 Three moral arguments against supernormal enhancement emerge:
the goals of medicine and enhancement are incompatible, the Positional Goods Argument
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(giving one person an advantage over another), and the argument that enhancement
generates inequality,24 especially insofar as benefits of enhancement typically will accrue
to individuals.25 The issue of authenticity is especially significant for discussions of
identity,26 not least because of the link with character.27 In addition to the obvious
concerns about accumulated long-term effects, 28 the meaning of an individual’s moral
status is central to the ethical debate on identity.29
Disease Avoidance Enhancements.
In addition to addressing enhancements that are supernormal, the debate over
identity also deals with enhancements related to disease avoidance based on the resulting
impact on human traits.30 Here the ethical debate revolves around therapy (healing a
pathology), functionality (improving the human functioning), and transhumanism
(changing human nature).31 While advancement in therapy would be generally
welcomed,32 transhumanism elicits much concern in part because of the ambiguous
meaning of a projected superiority among some humans,33 and in part because of the
point made previously about the moral status of human individuals.34 In this regard, one
response from transhumanism advocates is ethically disconcerting: that future
generations have no moral claim or rights in current considerations because they do not
exist now.35 Not surprisingly, this discourse on identity raises the issue of seeking
perfection.
2. Perfection.
The concept of seeking perfection via genetic enhancement raises two critical
issues: stewardship and naturalism versus transhumanism.
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Stewardship.
Engaging the debate on stewardship in the context of enhancement is
challenging.36 Typically, we make moral assumptions such as the obligation of nonmalfeasance to future generations.37 Stewardship entails an obligation about many interrelated issues: the use of natural resources, culture and technology, preservation of the
environment, natural resources, and oversight of the human gene pool.38 Hence,
stewardship obligations inevitably extend to future generations, both in a personal
manner (impacting humanity) and in an impersonal manner (impacting the
environment).39 Additionally, the debate on seeking perfection via genetic enhancements
involves justice, regarding human capabilities and the human life span.40 Our current
obligations towards future generations must be construed as a crucial matter of justice, 41
especially from the perspective of respecting human dignity.42
Naturalism versus Transhumanism.
The quest for perfection is not new to the human species. The core debate is over
the distinction between naturalism and transhumanism. Naturalism can be construed as a
legitimate form of human progress from the perspective of natural immanence and from
the perspective of natural defects. The first point that clarifies the meaning of naturalism
has to do with its relation to the concept of immanence. 43 This refers to an inherent
dynamic within the human condition that considers human dignity to flourish by leaving
human nature alone.44 This means that the inner dynamism (immanence) of nature must
be respected.45 The second point that clarifies the meaning of naturalism is the capacity to
improve on human defects. The dignity inherent in Naturalism does not prevent
overcoming human defects.46 One of the greatest difficulties for human nature is facing
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up to it inherent defects.47 Naturalism permits using technologies for prevention and
treatment to overcome these inherent defects.48
In contrast, transhumanism seeks radical alterations of the human capacity to
overcome human limitations. As mentioned previously, respecting the inner dynamism of
nature to realize our human potential can change human nature.49 However,
transhumanism seeks to overcome all human limitations, disease, and frailties.50 The
hallmarks of transhumanism include enhancing appearance, increasing the capacities of
human senses, advancing intelligence, increasing lifespan and alleviating the
vulnerabilities of harm.51 Additionally pursuing the excessive desires and wants of
humanity,52 all through enhancing the human capacity.53 Transhumanism typically is
associated with what is called post-humanity, emphasizing the radical change in a new
form of humanity.54 Inevitably, the agenda of transhumanism will have a significant
impact on the idea of what is good,55 correlating it with radical improvements of the
human capacity.56 Transhumanism contends that an improved world with superior human
conditions can be achieved by not only enhancing the human capacity but also by
radically overcoming human limitations.57 In other words, human life in its current form
is construed to be in the early phase of development,58 with major achievements in
human development to be achieved.59
Critics fear that the main consequences of transhumanism will lead to different
reality of humanity called post-human.60 The consequence exposes a dramatic inequality
between current humanity and post-humanity.61 The new being that is free from disease.62
As a result, the argument against Transhumanism is that, in addition to compromising the
meaning of human dignity, progress would be better targeted towards diminishing current
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problems in humanity such as violent aggression.63 A critical platform to advance the
debate on enhancement and transhumanism is the technologies that are emerging with
regard to germline modification, as discussed in the next major section.
II. Germline Genetic Modification.
The ethical debate on genetic enhancement in general leads to the more specific
focus on genetic germline modification that requires examining two related perspectives,
the religious and secular perspectives.
A. Religious Perspectives.
First, two mainstream religious perspectives of germline genetic modifications are
represented in the views of the Roman Catholic Church and traditional Protestant
Christianity.
1. Roman Catholicism.
The Roman Catholic views of germline genetic modification can be evaluated by
what is permissible and prohibited.
Permissible.
The possibilities for germline modification will occur often in the context of
prenatal diagnosis. The morality of prenatal diagnosis is permissible as long as there is
adequate informed consent of the parents and appropriate precautions are taken to protect
life and integrity of the embryo and mother. Additionally, the embryo and the mother
should not be subjected to undue risk.64 These conditions contain the core elements
involved in research ethics.65 Catholic theology is compatible with science, not in
conflict with it. Where conflict exists science and theology must be reconsidered and
evaluated.66
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Two theological points need to be stressed. First, God as creator has imbued
human beings with intelligence to share in his creative power. God, in giving humans that
intelligence, expects humanity to improve the universe he has given us. Second, God has
given us the mandate to be co-workers and exercise real creativity. We are not to be mere
workers who execute his demands but true participants in bringing the world to
completion. Catholic theology can constructively engage the evolutionary process. 67 In
this context, modifying human genetics is directly tied to the person’s good.68 The
Roman Catholic faith sets ethical limits to what humans can achieve, emphasizing that
knowledge has consequences and thus may be problematic.69 In other words, there are
ethical limits for the action of human beings in pursuit of that knowledge.70
Prohibited.
Three components delineate a moral framework for prohibited areas regarding
prenatal germline modification. First, because embryos are living human beings, any
experimentation that is not therapeutic is illicit. Second, every individual human body has
dignity thus it is not allowed to engage in cloning. And thirdly, personal dignity must be
maintained, hence attempting to alter human chromosomes or genetic inheritance must
not be allowed.71 The central point in the Catholic Tradition is that human dignity must
be protected.72 Many other concerns must be addressed when discussing prenatal
germline modification, such as privacy, justice, harm, long-term impact, and respect for
the disabled.73 From the Catholic perspective to be considered morally licit, germline
genetic modification, even with a therapeutic goal, has disproportionate risks. These
include significant loss of embryos and the potential for mishaps.74

243

2. Protestant Christianity.
Within traditional Protestant Christianity there are constraints and positive results
in responding to questions regarding germline modification.
Permissible.
First, despite the constraints of traditional Protestant Christianity on germline
genetic modification, there can be positive perspectives too. There is agreement that
human nature was not created in its present form.75 For example, germline modification
can have a legitimate therapeutic goal or provide a possibility of restoring the human
body.76 Yet, while it can be permissible in general to implement curative medical
interventions aimed at curing human disease, germline modifications go beyond this goal
by impacting future generations.77 One interesting possibility for germline modification is
when it is adopted to increase resistance to deadly disease that impacts the human
species.78 Those diseases could be diagnosed and appropriate therapy implemented to
forestall or even eliminate them.79 In this scenario, it appears potentially acceptable
insofar as it seeks to alleviate human suffering of current and future generations.80
These Catholic and Protestant perspectives share a sense of the paradox that
science presents for religion. The theology of St. Paul in the Christian Scriptures
identifies the paradox when he speaks of the “old self” being put to death and the “new
self” coming into existence without the disappearance of the old body.81 This paradox of
transformation and improvement is nothing new for Christians.82 Since the early
Christian Church there has been virtually no dispute about the need for human
improvement.83 Rather, the debates have centered on how far humanity can be
improved,84 considering whether it is possible for us to improve ourselves or whether our
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improvement is a result of grace.85 The core Christian understandings of dignity and
justice have guided engagement with technology and progress.86 This sense of paradox
between the “old self” and the “new self” that we should seek applies much more broadly
than to technology, encompassing natural disasters and violence etc.87 Also, the
theologian Thomas Aquinas highlighted this paradox between the old and new,
explaining that by the gift of grace human capacities be extended beyond their natural
capability.88 He understood human nature as being divided into first nature and second
nature. The first nature is the part of us that we share with all mankind. Something we
have little control over. Second nature varies and encapsulates various cultures as
context-dependent. In this context, we can understand technology as enabling our natures
to change, develop and improve.89
Prohibited.
Second, germline genetic modification has a number of constraints placed upon
it.90 Protestant Christianity is replete with cautionary tales limiting the embrace of acts
that seem to defy natural limits.91 Germline genetic modification cannot be used if it
becomes a distraction from the primary goal of humans: union with God.92 The use of
germline modification cannot be used even if it is to benefit one’s children through
technology.93 The alteration of human character as male and female is especially
unacceptable.94 Also, germline genetic modification is especially prohibited when it
involves destroying embryos.95 Furthermore, the view of the moral significance of early
embryos by Protestantism has created different opinions about their moral status as
persons.96
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B. Secular Perspectives.
Second, the secular debate on germline genetic modification revolves around
discussions on justice and the common good, and also implications for risk and safety.
1. Justice and Common Good.
Germline genetic modification raises significant concerns about social concerns
and long- term impact.
Social Concerns.
Justice addresses social concerns related to germline modification.97 If germline
genetic modification could make medical and technological modifications to solve
potential problems, those modifications could be justified.98 But justice would require
these solutions and improvements be made widely available.99 Each must be given their
due is the essence of justice.100 There are different approaches to the discourse on justice,
such as distributive, commutative, and rectificatory justice.101 These stand separate from
market pressures that can exacerbate the existing inequalities of society.102 Across these
different approaches to justice, a variety of strategies are adopted, such as the prohibition
of innovations that would exacerbate injustices, the creation of innovations that would
alleviate existing injustices, and the diffusion of innovations to avert unjust advantages.
103

Whatever approach to justice, or strategy to implement justice is adopted, they require

that all of society should participate because of their communal impact.104 The common
good must prevail when addressing new genetic technologies. Equitable distribution of
benefits is crucial for the common good,105 and having solidarity with those most
marginalized is indispensable.106 The principle of solidarity describes social cohesion,
respecting human rights and a communal commitment to order and responsibility.107 This
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notion of solidarity must pertain to individual, communities, and internationally.108
Furthermore, the common good inevitably deals with global society,109 especially when
dealing with breakthroughs in germline genetic modification. Above all, there must be
robust moral pressure against genetic advantages for only the wealthy.110
Long-term Impact.
The implications that germline genetic modifications have for justice and the
common good highlight the long-term impact upon society in general. Germline genetic
modification is fundamentally different from other genetic technology insofar as it will
have a long-term impact. The potential for good and evil is great.111 When medical and
scientific communities tout genetic modification as a revolutionary tool to cure or
eliminate disease or disabilities some may hear a paternalistic song that strikes fear and
concern. A single-track focus on the so-called “technological imperative” can be
disconcerting for many.112 For example, human reproductive cloning would be highly
controversial.113 The embryo can become a means to an end when there is cloning of
another human being.114 A crucial question discussed earlier is whether this technology
will exacerbate the injustices that already exist.115 Insofar as the human system is a
product of evolution, we must proceed extremely cautiously to avoid unpredictable
consequences.116 Future generations have to be given consideration; our social
obligations are extensive.117
To address these long-term impacts that affect our common interests, regulation
of germline genetic modification is indispensable. Because the genome is common
property to all human beings, there is common heritage.118 Germline modification should
be regulated by international conventions on human rights. With regard to mobility and
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migration, the whole species is at risk.119 Minimum standards need to be provided to
protect present and future generations. In consideration of common interest, transnational
guidelines would have to support human dignity.120 These regulations must especially
focus upon avoiding harm.121 The recommendations of The President’s Council on
Bioethics on Reproduction and Responsibility would command the respect and assent of
most people. These recommendations include the need for the following: federal studies
regarding the effects of these technologies, studies on the impact on health and wellbeing of women, studies on the use of reproductive genetic technologies and their effects
on the children born utilizing these technologies, and strengthening the Fertility Clinic
Success Rate and Certification Act.122 Additionally, we must augment the oversight of
societies and professional organizations, increase enforcement, and develop new ethical
boundaries.123 Finally, we need to implement legislation that would achieve the
following: prohibit transferring embryos to nonhuman species, prohibit producing
human-nonhuman embryos, prohibit the transfer of embryos for any purpose other than
producing children, prohibit buying and selling embryos, and prevent the issuance of
patents on human embryos or fetuses.124 Citizen participation is paramount and would
add to the social good in developing regulations of germline genetic modification
technology.125 An interdisciplinary approach is needed because of the complex
interaction between genetics and ethics.126
However, in addition to the issue of justice and the common that focus upon the
long-term impact on society, the extraordinary implications of germline modification for
enhancement require close scrutiny of issues concerning risk and safety.127
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2. Risks and Safety.
The risks involved in germline genetic modification raise two related ethical
concerns: differing approaches and human-nonhuman chimera.
Differing Approaches.
The most dangerous aspects in genetic enhancement are the unintentional results
that affect the germline. Being restricted to a limited scale can diminish risks.128
Containment of genetic modification is easier in mammals than it has proven to be in the
modification of plants.129 In some cases, risks of unintentional genetic modification can
be mitigated depending upon the genetic alteration.130 However, unintentional genetic
modification may not be reversible and may radically change the biology of what has
been modified.131 Different approaches to the risk reduction of unintentional germline
modification are discussed in the literature, including total prohibition, implementing a
risk reducing principle, or using cautionary heuristics.132
A cost-benefit calculation is a valuable tool in the debate over risk,133 providing a
way to articulate the considerations that need to be made in the evaluation of
enhancements.134 It has become increasingly helpful to apply principals of economic
evaluation to effectively compare and analyze costs and outcomes of these genetic
technologies.135 Cost-benefit calculation can be used to help determine magnitude and
probability in the identification of risk.136 Only by determining the moral acceptability,
affordability, and effectiveness of risk-reduction measures, can there be an evaluation of
acceptable risk.137 The ultimate goal is the reduction of risk to acceptable levels, even
though eliminating them totally is not feasible. Evaluating the cost includes the benefits
that would be lost and the costs we bear in trying to mitigate risk.138
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Related to risk is the ethical concern of safety. The technology of germline
genetic engineering makes safety a critical concern with regard to procreation. Germline
engineering should pose no more risk than the ordinary process of conception and natural
birth. Experiments in animals must assure the techniques implemented in humans do not
cause any more problems than would a natural birth.139 There must be a reasonable
expectation that the human embryo would have a better chance of being free from the
treated disease.140 Also, at the time of implantation measures to minimize the dangers to
the mother need to be resolved.141 Hence, before embarking on germline engineering,
long-term experience with somatic cell gene therapy needs to occur.142 The support of
women’s reproductive rights are ethically relevant because of the significant
consequences that could occur with process of genetically modified embryos.143 The
main focus must be upon safety to avoid untested and harmful therapies that could
potentially compromise the mother.144 In general, respect for individual and familial
autonomy as well as reproductive rights of individuals and couples need to be kept in
balance.145 However, more specifically, the safety of the mother must be protected,
especially regarding drugs and protocols used to stimulate ovulation and egg retrieval.146
Human-Nonhuman Chimera.
The religious and secular concerns of germline genetic modification can be
illustrated in the discussion over the creation of and experiments on human-nonhuman
chimeras. Core ethical concerns are shared in both religious and secular critiques. These
can be categorized as concerns about the biological development of embryos for the
purpose of creating chimeras.147 This technology raises serious concerns regarding the
moral status of those embryos, all of which are eventually destroyed.148 Respect for the

250

moral status of embryos cannot be foregone even for the noble cause of investigating the
potential for disease crossing species barriers.149 In addition, animal welfare and animal
rights need to be considered in the enterprise of creating these chimeras.150 It can be
argued that all living things have interests predicated in biology and to circumvent those
interests is morally wrong.151 In this regard, there needs to be a middle ground regarding
care for and utilization of animals in research, most especially in cross-species
experiments.152 These are fundamental concerns that need to be explored in depth.153 By
combining human and nonhuman tissue, the potential to hinder both from fulfilling their
purpose would be wrong.154
Above all, the denigration of human dignity would result from creating humannonhuman chimera;155 the concept of human dignity is crucial for evaluating the morality
of these new genetic technologies.156 The dignity of personhood is widely recognized as
an individual of rational nature: whether that definition could pertain to chimeras is of
crucial concern.157 To natural law theorists (such as adopted in religious traditions like
Catholicism), the order of nature has a standardizing force, thereby making it morally
wrong to alter a human being’s nature (such as embryo development),158 including its
basic functioning and capacities.159
The previous sections on genetic enhancement and germline genetic modification
delineate the ethical landscape for evaluating new genetic technologies that will impact
future generations. Two recent technologies have emerged that are now considered in
further detail: mitochondrial DNA technology and gene editing technology with CRISPR.

251

III. Mitochondrial DNA.
The previous sections on genetic enhancement, and germline genetic modification
delineate the ethical landscape for evaluating new genetic technologies that will impact
future generations. Two recent technologies have emerged that are now considered in
further detail: mitochondrial DNA and gene editing technology with CRISPR.
To discuss the ethics of mitochondrial DNA, the pivotal ethical topics require
examining two related topics: the science of mitochondrial DNA and the ethical, social,
and policy considerations.
A. Science of Mitochondrial DNA.
First, to understand the ethical debate on mitochondrial DNA, a discussion must
address human reproduction as well as mitochondrial DNA biology and the
mitochondrial DNA diseases and research.
1. Human Reproduction and Mitochondrial DNA Biology.
Basic fundamentals of human reproduction and mitochondrial DNA science need
to be discussed.
Reproduction Basics.
Some fundamental concepts of human reproduction are the foundational cells
involved in human reproduction are gametes. Fusion of an egg and a sperm cell creating a
zygote is the first step in human reproduction.160 At this early stage, the zygote is made
up of both male and female pronuclei. The first replication of the pronuclear genetic
material occurs prior to the nuclear membrane dissolving. The two-cell embryo is formed
after the male and female genetic materials are fused forming the two-cell embryo each
cell having equal complements of genetic and cytoplasmic material.161 Two distinct cells
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(somatic and germline cells) are derived from the embryo. Somatic cells form all the cell
and tissue types while germline cells develop into either male spermatozoa or female
oocytes. Germline cells make up the germ cell lineages.162
Mitochondrial Science.
Mitochondria are in nearly all cell types. The general role is in regulating cellular
energy. The role includes production of cellular energy, regulating cellular metabolism,
and assisting in subordination of programed cell death.163 Mitochondria were once freeswimming bacteria that took up residence in another cell. They were very efficient at
harvesting energy by burning oxygen.164 The mitochondria are constantly swimming
within cells in the body retaining their own genome; these are the vestiges of years of
their evolution.165 The mitochondria’s primary function is in the production of the
majority of energy needed to fuel cellular processes. They are often referred to as the
powerhouse cells. Mitochondria are critically important by providing energy
requirements for muscle and brain cells, users of high-energy demands. The mitochondria
serve as regulators of many cellular metabolic functions and help maintain proper
intercellular balance.166 Mitochondria also contain the ability to convert fats, proteins,
and carbohydrates into intermediates that directly impact the respiratory chain.
Mitochondria have their own genome containing mitochondrial DNA that in turn
has some commonalities with nuclear DNA but differ in many ways.167 They differ in
their genome structure, mitochondrial are circular while the nuclear are linear. The
mitochondrial has over 100,000 copies of the genome in each mature cell, while the
nuclear has only two. In the number of DNA base pairs, mitochondrial has over 16,000
while nuclear has over three billion.168 Another unique feature of mitochondrial genetics
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is each cell, tissue, and person contains more than one mitochondrial DNA. While it is
agreed-upon that mitochondrial DNA is essential in cellular energy production, it is
generally agreed that nuclear DNA’s predominant function is in the characteristics of
anatomy, physiology, and personality. In humans, mitochondrial DNA is inherited solely
from the mother and only females pass their mitochondrial DNA to offspring both male
and female. However, male mitochondrial DNA does not pass on to future generations.
169

2. Mitochondrial DNA Diseases and Research.
Mitochondrial maladies and various techniques of research of mitochondrial DNA
will be discussed in this section.
Mitochondrial Maladies.
The diseases of mitochondrial DNA are very similar, manifesting themselves in
the respiratory chain activity. Because of reduced cellular energy production they
manifest themselves in the organs of the highest energy demand. To date, there is no
approved treatment or cure only supportive and palliative care. These resultant diseases
are because of the defects in nuclear DNA or mitochondrial DNA.170 Because of dual
genomic control the respiratory chain diseases are result of nuclear DNA or
mitochondrial DNA mutations.171 Some of the maternally inherited mitochondrial DNA
diseases are Leigh syndrome; mitochondrial encephalomyopathy, lactic acidosis, and
stroke-like episodes; myoclonic epilepsy with ragged-red fibers; neuropathy, ataxia, and
retinitis pigmentosa; maternally inherited diabetes and deafness; maternally inherited
Leigh syndrome; and Leber hereditary optic neuropathy.172 These diseases range from
very mild to severely debilitating or fatal. Their onset can be in early life or manifest
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themselves in adulthood. Generally the mitochondrial diseases tend to have later onset
and milder symptoms compared to nuclear DNA diseases that typically are earlier in life
and often more severe.173 It is estimated that 1 in 5000 people have a pathogenic
mitochondrial mutation.174 Further extrapolation estimates that 778 children are born per
year in the US from women at risk of transmitting mitochondrial DNA disease.175
Treatment of the diseases is very difficult, because of (1) the heterogeneity and (2) the
lack of success of delivering treatments into the mitochondria.176
Various Techniques
Research of mitochondrial DNA diseases has led to gene editing of somatic cells
and while having great promise also has had limited success in humans.177 By using an
investigational technique, heteroplasmy shift, which selectively targets and degrades
pathogenic mitochondrial DNA mutations has seemed to offer efficacy in animal studies
but has not yet been utilized in humans.178 The real advantage with this technique, it
would not require the use of genetic material from a second woman.179 Another powerful
technique is preimplantation genetic diagnosis, even though it has had limited studies it
does show significant potential. Its limitation is that the technique involves selection of
an embryo with the least amount of detectable heteroplasmy but does not eliminate the
risk of transmitting the disease to offspring.180
To date, none of these options give prospective mothers peace of mind that their
children may not develop mitochondrial DNA diseases.181 Mitochondrial replacement
techniques are being investigated for their benefits. Two of these techniques are maternal
spindle transfer and pro-nuclear transfer. Both of these techniques involve the
restructuring of the oocyte by replacing the mutated mitochondrial DNA with a donors
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nonpathogenic mitochondrial DNA.182 There is an important difference between these
two techniques. Maternal spindle transfer entails removal of the nuclear DNA from the
mother’s oocyte, which is then infused with a donor’s nonpathogenic mitochondrial DNA
oocyte. The newly reconstructed oocyte is then fertilized and cultured in vitro to the
blastocyst stage.183 The combined embryo would then be tested for abnormalities,
heteroplasmy levels, and sex selection.184 With pro-nuclear transfer, the nuclear DNA is
transferred between fertilized oocytes prior to fusion of the pronuclei. The pronuclei of
the male and female are removed from the zygote and fused to the enucleated zygote of
the sperm providers’ sperm and an oocyte of provided by an unintended mother. Again,
the newly constructed oocyte would be cultured to blastocyst stage, and then would
undergo genetic testing.185
A third technique, polar body transfer, has been proposed but there has been only
limited investigation regarding its ability to prevent mitochondrial DNA disease
transmission; hence it was not included in the Institute of Medicine’s Report. Similarly
other methods of preventing the transmission of mitochondrial diseases that are not under
United States Food and Drug Administration consideration (cytoplasm transfer, somatic
cell nuclear transfer, and embryo cell nuclear transfer, and germinal vesicle transfer) were
not included in the Institute of Medicine’s Report.186
B. Ethical, Social, and Policy Considerations.
Second, an understanding of the science of mitochondrial DNA sets the stage for
addressing ethical, social, and policy considerations. These considerations are in large
part addressed in discussions of unintended consequences and the recommendations of
the Institute of Medicine.
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1. Unintended Consequences
Heteroplasmy, mitochondrial DNA bottleneck, and mitochondrial evolution will
be discussed in evaluating unknowns and predicting impact.
Evaluating Unknowns
Three unique considerations have to be made in mitochondrial genetics to
effectively evaluate unknowns and unintended consequences in research. They are
heteroplasmy, mitochondrial DNA bottleneck, and mitochondrial evolutionary theory.187
Because of these complexities there is an unpredictable nature about mitochondrial
genetics that make the ability to predict preclinical studies with certainty and safety very
difficult.188
Heteroplasmy is a state where more than one type of mitochondrial DNA
genotype is contained in a cell, tissue, or individual. When a threshold effect occurs, cells
containing mutations display dysfunction only when a certain level mitochondrial DNA
transmission is reached.189 Heteroplasmy levels can fluctuate at different rates because of
the shifts in proportion of pathogenic mitochondrial DNA transmission. The pathogenic
mitochondrial DNA molecules can be distributed unequally into daughter cells shifting
heteroplasmy levels.190 Mitochondrial DNA bottleneck can occur during oocyte
development. Then only a fraction of the original pool of the mitochondrial DNA
molecules is divided into daughter oocytes.191 Because of this bottleneck, the number of
mitochondrial DNA molecules can be reduced from nearly 100,000 to as few as 10.192
Predicting Impact
Rapid changes in the level of mitochondrial DNA mutations can occur from one
generation to the next thus impacting the mitochondrial DNA evolution. All these factors
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add to the complexity of determining risks.193 Potential incompatibility of artificially
combined nuclear and mitochondrial genomes are of major concern.194 Studies have
shown that certain genome backgrounds are often only compatible with each other and
incompatible pairings are often selected unknowingly.195 Another problem is the
mitochondrial DNA could accumulate mutations that could have a negative impact on
males and a positive impact on females.196 A potential uncertainty is inadvertent physical
damage to the reconstructed oocyte or zygote.197 The complexity of mitochondrial
genetics makes predicting behavior of the mitochondrial DNA challenging and filled with
uncertainty. Thus predicting the efficacy and safety because of uncertainties and
unknowns is challenging. To assess the benefit and risk a thorough understanding of the
unknowns is paramount.198
2. Institute of Medicine Recommendations.
In this section, impact considerations and criteria for expansion will be delineated.
Impact Considerations.
The Institute of Medicine’s Report concluded that with adherence to sets of
conditions, the clinical investigation of mitochondrial replacement techniques should be
allowed to move forward. The following ethical, social, and policy recommendations
were made in the Institute of Medicine’s Report that has significant ethical implications
for discussions about the ethics of germline modification upon which this essay is
focused.
Mitochondrial replacement techniques should be considered if the following
conditions are met: (1) safety must be established and risks to all parties must be
minimized, especially to future children; (2) the likelihood of success must be evident;
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(3) investigations must be limited to women who are risk of transmitting severe
mitochondrial DNA diseases; (4) risk should be minimized to alleviate adverse health for
pregnant mother and fetus; (5) investigators and centers have to have demonstrated
expertise for this technology; (6) investigations should be limited to male embryos for
intrauterine transfer; and (7) every possible risk of mitochondrial DNA-nuclear DNA
incompatibility needs to be mitigated.199
Ethical standards developed by the United States National Academies of Science,
Engineering, and Medicine, the United States National Institute of Health, and the
International Society for Stem Cell Research must be adhered to with regard to human
embryos. Nonviable embryos must not be used in the preclinical research.200 Also,
clinical investigations must follow these principles and practices: (1) the future wellbeing as a result of mitochondrial replacement techniques must be given priority in
balancing benefits and risks; (2) standardization of protocols must be of highest priority
to the minimize the number of variables and accommodate pooling of information; (3)
data from all research must be incorporated to improve the quality of assessment; and (4)
long-term studies regarding psychological and social effects on children born as a result
of mitochondrial replacement techniques have to be collected.201
Criteria for Expansion.
If success in transferring male embryos is demonstrated then consideration should
be given to include the transfer of female embryos if: safety and efficacy using male
cohorts has to be demonstrated, regardless of the time to collect this evidence; animal
research has had to demonstrate intergenerational safety and efficacy; and there is a
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predicated consistency of decisions that are compatible with public and scientific
deliberations.202
Due to the unusual aspects of mitochondrial replacement techniques research,
special attention must be given to communicating to research participants. Participants
who provide gametes, the informed consent process must include: (1) the procedures
anticipated in any ethical, social, and policy considerations; (2) appropriate
compensation; (3) management of unused eggs; (4) the embryos; and (5) provisions for
contact of those who provided gametes and children born as a result. For the parents, the
informed consent process must include: (1) focus on the health and well-being of children
born of the research protocol; (2) alternative means of begetting children that avoid
transmittal of mitochondrial DNA disease; (3) discussion of restrictions on access to
embryos created; (4) incorporating prenatal genetic testing; (5) the insistence on longterm follow-up regarding any child born as a result of these protocols; and (6)
maintaining patient privacy. For the children born, assent and eventual consent must be
gleaned for monitoring and research procedures.203
The United States Food and Drug Administration’s review, approval, and
subsequent marketing of mitochondrial replacement techniques must incorporate the
following elements: (1) transparency that maximizes public sharing of information; (2)
public engagement through the involvement of relevant stakeholders; (3) partnership with
other regulatory authorities in aiding the assessment of benefits and risks; (4)
maximization of data quality through cross-referencing and pooling; (5) circumscribed
use by limiting the use of the technology to individuals and settings for which it is
approved; and (6) long-term follow-up with periodic review must be a requirement.204
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IV. Gene Editing with Clustered-Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR).
Closely related to the mitochondrial DNA ethical discussion is the debate on
CRISPR. This is gene editing technique targeting and modifying DNA. The pivotal
ethical discussions on CRISPR address two related topics, the science of genome editing
and the ethical, social, and religious concerns.
A. Science of Gene Editing with CRISPR.
First, to appreciate the science of genome editing with CRISPR requires
understanding of its history and its methodology.
1. History.
An historical overview of CRISPR from its original roots to current status will be
discussed.
Historical Overview.
The history of CRISPR has its original roots in the new era for biology with the
development of recombinant DNA technology in 1970s. The manipulation of DNA
molecules was first accomplished thus gaining the ability to study and develop genes.
The genes were harnessed to develop novel medicine and biotechnology.205 Genome
engineering is very broad term referring to the process of making specific modifications
to the genome. Innovative techniques have been developed for altering genetic
sequences.206 Early gene therapy trials were very successful in the curing of 17 children
with severe immunodeficiencies.207 Unfortunately, four children died of leukemia-like
symptoms attributed to gene delivery, inserting into an unpredictable location within the
chromosome. Misplaced insertion can occur in the human genome that regulates cell
growth and division resulting in uncontrolled growth of cells.208 In another gene therapy
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trial, a patient died as a result of an immunological response of the material used to
deliver the corrected gene. In both these cases, the role of the delivery method
contributed significantly to the adverse outcomes.209 CRISPR itself was discovered in
Japan where they were the first to observe clustered-interspaced short palindromic
repeats in the DNA of bacteria in 1987.210 In an attempt to study a protein-encoding gene
in Escherichia coli, researchers observed short, repeating, palindromic DNA sequences
separated by short, nonrepeating, spacer DNA sequences.211
Current Status
Current development began in 2010 when the intricate detail of the mechanism
where bacteria are infected by other microorganisms, called bacteriophages or phages
were explained by two research groups of the University of California Berkeley and
Umea University in Sweden.212 The CRISPR system recognizes specific patterns of DNA
from the foreign invaders and decapitates them by cutting the invaders DNA into pieces.
The way that the bacteria targets specific DNA and cleaves it gave scientists a hint of its
potential in other applications.213 In 2013, two research groups from Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and Harvard University successfully modified this basic
mechanism and turned it into a powerful tool that can now cut human genomic DNA at
any desired location.214 For example, in Summer 2016, China pioneered the first human
CRISPR clinical trials.215
2. Methodology.
Tools for genome editing and the potential for CRISPR technology will be
engaged in this section.
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Tools for Genome Editing.
The methodology for genome editing was by targeted molecular machines. These
machines have been used as tools for many years.216 Researchers have developed many
innovative techniques for altering genes since the first modifications were made.
Recently, breakthroughs using Zinc finger nucleases and transcriptional activator-like
effector nucleases have significantly reduced cost and complexity in targeting changes in
living cells but CRISPR is by far the easiest to use. 217 Experts believe these advances
could have wide-ranging clinical applications with the potential to prevent or cure a
variety of diseases.218 The newest of the gene editing technology is CRISPR. It was
adapted from an immune system found in prokaryotes.219 It has been established that
bacteria have evolved with a defense mechanism against viruses. When bacteria
encounter an invading source of DNA, segments of the foreign DNA can be copied and
incorporated into their genome as spacers between the short DNA repeats in CRISPR.220
With a piece of the invading DNA it can be copied into the host genome, which serves as
a genomic memory of invading pathogens. These spacers enhance the bacteria’s immune
response by providing a template for RNA molecules to quickly identify and target the
same DNA sequence in the event of future viral infections.221 If the RNA molecules
recognize the incoming sequence of foreign DNA, they guide the CRISPR complex to
that sequence. At that point the bacteria’s Cas proteins, which are specialized for cutting
DNA, splice and disable the invading gene.222 The CRISPR system is unique from other
technologies requiring no protein engineering, only synthesis. The simplicity of this
technology drastically reduces the time for conducting genome experiments.223
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Potential.
Since the first recorded use of CRISPR technology in January 2013, it has shown
significant progress in demonstrating therapeutic potential.224 Because of the simplicity
and affordability of the system it makes itself accessible to researchers. In recent in vivo
studies in primate embryos, it has shown compelling progress that will expedite rapid
advancement toward clinical trials.225 This technology has shown great promise in several
monogenetic disorders such as sickle cell, cystic fibrosis, and even showing potential in
the prevention of coronary heart disease.226 Additionally, researchers have explored many
different applications including genetically modified crops, eradicating viruses, screening
for cancer genes, and genome engineering.227
B. Ethical, Social, and Religious Concerns.
Second, the concerns about CRISPR technology need to be discussed from the
perspective of social and ethical dimensions as well as from the religious perspective.
1. Ethical and Social Concerns.
In this section, the concerns about CRISPR technology’s impact will be discussed
from the perspective of social and ethical dimensions and possible regulation of the
technology.
Impact.
The concerns regarding the social and ethical implications of CRISPR
“reprogramming DNA” have similar concerns to those of genetic manipulation. Most
notable of the concerns are passing on to subsequent generations deleterious impacts to
the human genome.228 Clinical trials of CRISPR gene editing system have not been
implemented on the human somatic genes but it has been used to create genetically
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engineered mosquitoes. These genetically engineered mosquitoes are no longer capable
of transmitting malaria thus possibly eliminating the disease. To increase the efficiency
and improved targeting, significant work remains to prove safety and efficiency.229 Two
applications, both alluded to, that are most concerning about the CRISPR applications are
the edits of human reproductive tissue and the generation of and release in the wild of
transgenic organisms that are capable of continuing these edits.230 Any edits made would
be made without consent of the any individual who carries them in the editing of the
genomes of other species is fraught with concern regarding irreversible ecological
alterations. CRISPR needs three things to work: DNA encoding the genome cutting
enzyme, DNA encoding the guide RNA, and DNA that serves as a repairable template.231
Gene editing for targeting somatic genes is imminent for application in embryos and
gametes but the technology is most likely useful in treating monogenic diseases rather
than polygenic ones. Before this technology can be utilized for germline modification,
significant knowledge needs to be gained regarding human genetic interaction and the
interplay between diseases.232
Regulations.
Regulation of this technology is looming because of the potential for exploitation
in non-therapeutic uses, off target modifications, and embryonic screening.233 Because of
the potential of permanent changes in the human genome, changes from intellect to
physical qualities, there has been growing support for a ban on germline modification for
reproductive purposes.234 Due to the lack of societal consensus and safety concerns it
would be irresponsible to try to produce human pregnancy from the modified germ cells
or embryos.235 This takes on new urgency especially in light of Chinese work in
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nonviable human embryos using the CRISPR technology.236 Three phases of regulation
are being proposed: preclinical research, clinical trials, and post approval distribution. To
ensure safety and ethical guidelines, financial and regulatory checkpoints would be
developed.237 Prior to research a complete internal review board approval would be
mandatory. Transitioning from research, the clinical to commercialization, government
agencies such as United States Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines
Agency would ensure safety, and quality. Sufficient guidelines would need to be in
place.238
2. Religious Issues.
Discussed in this section are some of the religious concerns such as dignity and
the unitive procreative connection.
Dignity.
The dignity imputed to human beings is the major religious concern in the context
of genetically editing the human genome with the CRISPR technology. With human
genome editing a distinction must be made between editing for therapeutic purposes and
enhancement to augment human capacities. The intervention must be effective and
reasonably safe. The benefit must outweigh any possible risks.239 The effort to alter the
germline therapeutically could be acceptable if respect for human dignity offspring is
maintained.240
Unitive and Procreative Connection.
Also, the unitive and procreative aspects of the marital act must be maintained.241
In the Catholic Church’s Apostolic Exhortation “Familiaris Consortio,” it is stated that
the conjugal act is a sign and language. If the internal commitment to conjugal love is
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revoked, the act itself is counterfeited and lacks moral dignity.242 In principle, the
Catholic Church supports research insofar as God has entrusted nature to our
stewardship. This research within reasonable limits is permissible especially when it has
the potential for saving human lives.243
The ethics of enhancement via germline genetic modification delineates the
general ethical landscape for assessing specific technologies that emerge, such as
mitochondrial DNA and CRISPR techniques. First, the pivotal ethical issues related to
genetic enhancement are influencing human progress that includes human development
and human nature. Additionally, in a discussion of influencing future generations, moral
identity and perfection must be included. Second, the pivotal ethical issues related to
germline genetic modification dealt with concerns that engage religious and secular
discourse. Roman Catholicism and traditional Protestant Christianity’s concerns were
explored. The major secular concerns, justice, common good, risk and safety (with
human-nonhuman chimeras being an illustration of the debate), have been considered.
Then two emerging technologies were examined to illustrate how the general
ethical argument on germline enhancement can be applied to particular techniques:
mitochondrial DNA technology and gene editing technology with CRISPR. To discuss
the ethics of mitochondrial DNA technology, the pivotal ethical topics were organized
into two categories, the science of mitochondrial DNA and the accompanying ethical,
social, and policy considerations: the discussion of mitochondrial DNA science
considered human reproduction and the biology of mitochondrial DNA as well as the
diseases and research potential of mitochondrial DNA; the ethical, social, and policy
considerations focused upon unintended consequences and the expert recommendations
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of the Institute of Medicine. To discuss CRISPR gene editing technique that modifies
DNA, the pivotal ethical topics were organized into two categories, the science of
genome editing and the accompanying ethical, social, and religious concerns: the science
of CRISPR was explained from the perspectives of its history and methodology; and the
ethical and social concerns were connected with religious concerns about clusteredinterspaced short palindromic repeats technology.
This chapter has explored the ethical debates on the emerging regenerative
technologies. The next chapter moves to address technological issues that arise at the end
of life.
V. Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious Directives.
As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, the Catholic Tradition’s use of Natural Law
has two general approaches. The first approach focuses on the universal aspect of human
nature. This approach is typically associated with the settled Catholic teaching on
morality. The second approach focuses on the person, presenting a dynamic and historical
view of the human condition as contributors to God’s creation.244 This approach is
typically associated with the Principle of Double Effect to apply traditional Church
teaching in a flexible manner to changing circumstances. Arising from these two
approaches to Natural Law, a third approach has emerged combining the nature-oriented
and person-oriented approaches to new dilemmas regarding emerging technologies that
may require doctrinal development in Catholic teaching.
In the conclusion of each applied chapter, a critique based on the Ethical and
Religious Directives is presented regarding the main topics of the chapter. The critique
adopts the above approaches to identify three distinct categories as follows. Category A
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deals with settled issues in Church Teaching reflecting the Nature Approach to Natural
Law. Category B deals with the controversial issues eligible for using the Principle of
Double Effect reflecting the Personal Approach to Natural Law. Category C deals with
issues requiring doctrinal development in Catholic teaching to address new dilemmas
regarding emerging technologies.
The following analysis applies this threefold critique to the topics discussed in
this chapter on regenerative technology. Each main section is discussed in turn.
Section I. Genetic Enhancement.
This section discussed ethical meaning of human nature and this is settled
Catholic teaching in a manner that opposes genetic enhancement (Category A). Catholic
teaching opposes genetic enhancement based on the nature approach to Natural Law.
This argument resists the so-called temptation to seek perfection.245
The manipulation of the human genome is not new to Catholic teaching. Whether
it is Francis Galton’s concept of biometry or Gregor Mendel’s study of the gene, the
Church has been in dialogue to garner the good of genomic science and avoiding any
harm.246 Notably, the Catholic Church led opposition to eugenic efforts in the United
States during the early 1900s. In spite of the history of eugenics, there is renewed interest
in new technologies that could impact the human species in a eugenics manner.247
Another topic in this section dealt specifically with genetic interventions that deal
with disease. There is settled Catholic teaching that permits any medical intervention
(including genetic intervention) to overcome disease in individual patients (Category A).
However, a crucial distinction must be made between therapeutic genetic changes
and genetic enhancement. Therapeutic changes are ones that aid a person to return to
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“normal functioning” status.248 Here, increasing our health could lead to increased
longevity. The goal here is not perfection but overcoming disease that contributes to
fulfilling human capacity.249
Another topic in this section deals with supernormal enhancements to seek
perfection, especially occurring via genetic manipulation of the germline. This is
forbidden now, and would require doctrinal development to examine future species
related genetic enhancements (Category C). The reason for this Catholic stance is that
germline genetic enhancement would be deleterious to humanity because of the unknown
factors being passed on to future generations and the potential abuse of the most
vulnerable in our societies.250 Manipulation for enhancement could promote a eugenic
mentality. This enhancement could attach social stigma to people who lack certain
qualities while giving advantages to others who enjoy qualities that are appreciated by
certain cultures. Impact upon the common good would be expected because of the
favoring the will of some over the freedom of others.251
Section II. Germline Genetic Modification.
Continuing this theme of genetic enhancement, the section discussed germline
genetic modification as being prohibited in Catholic teaching. Future developments here
would require doctrinal development (Category C).
Two perspectives contribute to this Catholic prohibition of genetic modification.
First, the embryo has inherent dignity; hence any genetic experimentation that is not
therapeutic is illicit. Second, every individual human being has dignity; hence any
germline genetic modification that could compromise this dignity is not allowed. That is,
personal dignity must be maintained hence attempting to alter genetic inheritance is
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forbidden.252 Within the Catholic Tradition, the main objective when considering
germline genetic modification is the protection of human dignity of individuals and the
species.253
In this section, human-nonhuman chimeras were also discussed. These are
forbidden and future technologies arising from them would require doctrinal development
in Catholic teaching (Category C).
The basic ethical concern here deals with the ethical status of a chimera. Because
of unique human dignity, moral limits need to be discussed. With a potential benefit to
humanity, the Catholic Church in principle does not object to the respectful use of
animals in research. However, research in human/animal chimeras raises significant
ethical and legal concerns around the compromise of the human embryo and the resulting
ethical status of a human/animal chimera for research purposes (even if the chimera is
destroyed after the development of primitive streak as required by regulation).254
Although, the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith has not addressed the
creation of chimeras that can be used for ‘hybrid cloning’ directly, the basic issue of
identity makes the research morally and ethically unacceptable.255
Section III. Mitochondrial DNA.
This section discussed mitochondria (the structures within cells that convert the
energy from food into a form that cells can use). Mitochondrial DNA diseases have no
cure, and are progressive and often life-threatening.256 The basic concern with
mitochondrial DNA transplants to avoid transmitting disease is that the technology
involves a third parent’s DNA. This is construed in Catholic teaching as compromising
the unitive/procreative bond of marriage and is forbidden; to accept any new technologies
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based on this to the would require doctrinal development in Catholic teaching (Category
C).
These types of intervention and mitochondrial DNA transplants are ethically
problematic and are addressed in the Ethical and Religious Directives when Directives
#50 and #51 discuss prenatal diagnosis and non-therapeutic experiments.257
Prenatal diagnosis is permitted when the procedure does not threaten the
life or physical integrity of the unborn child or the mother and does not
subject them to disproportionate risks; when the diagnosis can provide
information to guide preventative care for the mother or pre- or postnatal
care for the child; and when the parents, or at least the mother, give free
and informed consent. Prenatal diagnosis is not permitted when
undertaken with the intention of aborting an unborn child with a serious
defect. (Directive #50)

Nontherapeutic experiments on a living embryo or fetus are not permitted,
even with the consent of the parents. Therapeutic experiments are
permitted for a proportionate reason with the free and informed consent of
the parents or, if the father cannot be contacted, at least of the mother.
Medical research that will not harm the life or physical integrity of an
unborn child is permitted with parental consent. (Directive #51)

The complicated nature of mitochondrial genetics makes anticipating
behavior of the mitochondrial DNA filled with uncertainty. Thus predicting the
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efficacy and safety is challenging. To assess the benefit and risk, a thorough
understanding of the unknowns is paramount before any technology is
implemented.258
Section IV. Gene Editing with CRISPR.
This section discussed gene editing with CRISPR. This fast developing
technology could be permissible in Catholic teaching when applied to somatic cell (not
germline) therapies using the Principle of Double Effect (Category B).
Studies have shown that it may be possible to delete or disable genes in an
embryo that may be carrying life-limiting abnormalities.259 Many consider CRISPR
research as experimental and not therapeutic, arguing that a moratorium is needed.260
There are multiple moral quandaries created by this technology, which has been endorsed
by the Institute of Medicine.261
Furthermore, the distinction between therapy and enhancement is being
recalibrated by some as a distinction between therapy and non-therapy. Based on burdenbenefit analysis using the Principle of Double Effect, CRISPR technology could be
justified to overcome disease in individual patients. However, Catholic teaching requires
that we need “reasonable boundaries to distinguish genetic interventions that preserve
and promote human dignity from those that may endanger and marginalize it.”262
Germline genetic modifications that impact the germline or inheritable change at
the level of the egg or sperm that could be passed to future generations is currently
problematic in Catholic teaching. Procedures used at the somatic cell level for therapeutic
purposes can be morally licit. The moral evaluation of the germline cell therapy is
different. The risks connected to any genetic manipulation are considerable and yet not
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fully controllable. Currently, Catholic teaching holds that it is not morally permissible to
act in any way that could cause harm to the resulting progeny. The Church refers to this
manipulation as “the human genetic patrimony.”263 That is, to the extent that CRISPR
technology could change the human germline (as typically will occur with embryos) it is
forbidden, and approval of developments of this technology would require doctrinal
development in Catholic teaching (Category C).
In sum, the threefold ethical critique based on the Ethical and Religious
Directives has been applied to the topics discussed in the main sections of the chapter.
This threefold critique is applied at the end of the next applied chapter.
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Chapter 6. On Death and Dying.
Throughout history, the attitudes of death and dying have transformed gradually,
shifting focus from the dying and their families to the role of the physician and the health
care team. As a result, the dying process has become rife with ethical dilemmas. To
adequately discuss death and dying requires examining three related topics: changing
attitudes to death and dying, the meaning of medical futility, and the withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment.
I. Changing Attitudes towards Death and Dying.
Death is the final journey all must take. To discuss the changing attitudes towards
death and dying, two areas elicit attention, the contemporary characteristics of death and
dying and related philosophical approaches.
A. Characteristics.
First, contemporary characteristics of death and dying can be revealed in
discussions about the locus of control and about accompanying rituals.
1. Locus of Control
Throughout history, the locus of control (the sense of authority over a situation or
experience) gradually shifts from the dying and his family to a physician and health care
team. To adequately engage the locus of control, a tame death and prolonging life must
be discussed.
Tame Death
Death is a final journey all must take. Like an unwanted visitor, death is
sometimes a kind act of nature. At other times, death is not kind when it is the result of
violence. Even though death can be one of the most painful encounters one can
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experience, all remain morbidly curious about it. Society had moved from the time when
individuals were able to listen to their inner voices about impending death accordingly
death was not a struggle, and people usually passed away without fear. Death was a part
of life. Aries refers to this perspective as “tamed death,” or one that comes with natural
warning signs.1 A long lingering death was very unusual. People typically died of disease
with rapid onset and a quick end. People were usually forewarned, and that forewarning
came through natural signs and inner convictions.2
Unfortunately, the current mandate is one in which individuals (including family
members and doctors) make every effort to prolong the death process under the guise of
prolonging life. No longer do individuals allow themselves to hear the voice of death, to
acknowledge the voice of death, nor to accept the voice of death. Every conceivable tool,
technological advancement, and chemical medication to prolong life is provided. In
reality, death is merely being postponed. This change in attitude towards death over the
millennia is unfortunate and deplorable. This dissertation examines various health care
philosophical tenets and their loci of control: physician-centered paternalism and
beneficence as well as autonomy, which are patient-centered. Additionally, the moral
tradition of the sanctity of life within a historical context of changing attitudes towards
death and dying will be discussed.
Prolonging Life.
Before the 12th century, there was a familiar resignation that all would die. At that
point, things began to change: the awareness of self and death took on a new meaning:
“one’s own death.”3 Subtly over time, death became very personal and was viewed as a
natural event. By the 1800s, the locus of control shifted from the dying person to the
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survivors of the dying. Now the survivors of the dead found it difficult to deal with the
death of another person. Death of self was not as feared as much as a death of another.4
By the 1900s, a different sentiment emerged about death: it must be avoided at all
cost. In the midst of a happy life, there was no room for death because life is always
happy or should always seem so. This pall of death and the sadness associated with it was
viewed as unacceptable to family members and the greater society as a whole.5
The locus of control shifted once again in the 1930s to the 1950s to physicians
and the health care team. Once considered a shelter for the poor, the hospital became the
place for everyone to receive care that could no longer be provided at home. The
technology of the day, even rudimentary devices, was available only in hospitals and they
logically became the place where one would struggle against death. In this period, if one
died in the hospital, the physician failed in healing rather than death being seen as a part
of nature. Death became a technical phenomenon.6 For centuries, death was the
jurisdiction of the dying individual and his survivors. Only recently and still somewhat
today, the locus of control is the physician and the hospital team, who are the masters of
death.
2. Rituals.
The locus of control of death regarding the use of medical technology needs to be
situated within a broader context that respects rituals around death. To appreciate these
rituals it can help to be attentive to the history and evolution of rituals around death.
Historical Overview.
As the locus of control shifted over the centuries, so too did the rituals of death.
The death occurred typically in bed. The pre-death rituals were organized by and presided
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over by the dying person himself. Everyone knew the protocol. Ceremonially, simplicity
of the rituals of dying was accepted and carried out.7 The “tamed death” came to an end
due to a combination of both cultural and religious changes and the rise of scientific
medicine. In the 1700s, life expectancy had begun to shift and the view of death as well.
By the 1800s, the rituals of mourning and loved ones being taken away became known as
a communal evil. At that time, death became a more segregated personal event. By the
late 1900s, death was taken out of the hands of families and put in the hands of doctors
and medical institutions. This marked the beginning of the ‘big lie’ or the hiding of
imminent death. Most believed that technology could change nature giving birth to the
belief that death had been eliminated. Technology had replaced nature and the
elimination of death. A resigned acceptance of death was lost in favor of the medical
management of death.8
Evolution.
Other noticeable changes were the custom of mourning and the purpose of a will.
From the end of the Middle Ages to the 1700s, mourning took on a double purpose. It
served as a period of sorrow out of respect for the family who experienced the death of a
loved one. However, mourning allowed for the dissipation of grief.9 Once when too much
emotion was displayed by mourners and viewed as mental instability or bad manners,
grief soon became more reserved. Outward signs and customs for death likewise evolved
over the centuries. The wearing of dark clothes by family members and mourners gave
way to daily attire; no one dressed any differently because of the death of a family
member. Another notable change was that children used to be allowed around the
deathbed, in full participation with the dying process. Now, children are kept from the
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dying process. Death has been moved to the closet where sex used to be. Death has
become taboo.10
Another change in dying rituals was the wishes expressed by the dying to be
considered after burial. Before the 1700s, death was a concern only to the person
threatened. Only a legal document for the disposal of property was a concern for family
members. 11 After the 1700s, a will became a document that laid out religious services
and the legacy the dying wanted to pass on. This document for five centuries was merely
a means by which each person could express his thoughts, his faith, and his attachments
to possessions and God. Decisions were centered on how to assure the salvation of his
soul and the disposition of his body.12
B. Philosophical Approaches.
Second, the changing characteristics of dying over time have been accompanied
by different philosophical tenets about death. Throughout history, as attitudes and
customs towards death and dying changed, two philosophical approaches emerged to
guide the dying process, one being physician-centered, the other being patient-centered
care.
1. Physician-Centered.
For the philosophical approach that is physician-centered, two interrelated issues
are important: the meaning of the Hippocratic tradition and the role of paternalism and
beneficence.
Hippocratic Tradition.
The Hippocratic Oath, one of the best-known Greek texts, is one tradition that is
still practiced today. With the advent of this oath in 5 BCE, physicians promise to act for
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the good and to keep patients from harm. This oath requires physicians to use their skills
not as they would prefer but for human benefit. In that pursuit, they are charged to “do no
harm.” Physicians are also expected to improve their knowledge and skills, increase their
competence, and to care about their patients or to be “troubled by another’s trouble.” The
physician has a responsibility to aid and care for a patient even if no cure is available.13
The Hippocratic tradition is also one of the basic tenants of both Eastern and Western
medicine. Physicians must always treat a person in need. The Hindu code asserts that all
people are to be treated as if they were relatives. The Chinese code emphasizes all are to
be treated equally.14
Early on during the Hippocratic tradition, medicine was viewed as a “moral
enterprise.”15 Physicians were expected to swear to the god's certain loyalties. The
Hippocratic Oath also binds the physician to his teacher and the greater community of
physicians with specific responsibilities laid out in a code of proper behavior. Part of this
code is to demonstrate the beneficial nature of any moral enterprise, the use of medical
skills for human benefit. The Hippocratic tradition takes a strong stand against abortion,
euthanasia, and suicide. This stance was an opinion of a small segment of Greek
philosophy, rather than the prevailing view of most Greeks. Despite this opinion, no
disgrace was attached to suicide. Likewise, Greek or Roman law did not protect the
unborn child either because these societies, which were pre-Judeo-Christian, did not hold
the view that eternal punishment awaited for those who ended their lives or the lives of
the unborn.
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Paternalism and Beneficence.
Throughout history, the physician lived in a world that made multiple claims on
him: demands of his family as well as the state. All expected his loyalty.16 The church too
made claims on the physician; life was to be respected. The church would demand
absolute honesty by the physician toward a dying patient who needed to be told
everything so that he could prepare himself appropriately and get his house in order.17
Along with these expectations, paternalism became the norm in the early 20th century. In
this philosophy, the physician always knows best.18 With medical paternalism, a
physician ignores the patient’s viewpoint and assumes that any disease can be cured. The
greatest failure of paternalism is the assumption that medical good is the highest good.
An example might be when a physician fails to appreciate the personal values of the
patient, which might result in a lengthy treatment regimen that ignores the patient’s
values. Until modern times, the physician was not looked upon as failing if he were not
successful in keeping someone alive. Death was inevitable and thus tolerated by the
community and accepted without agonizing fear. Because death hit every age group, it
was a routine part of life. People took death calmly, and it had a public character to it.
There was no secrecy, no trying to hide it. Death took place amid a circle of family,
friends, and children.19 Because of medical management of death, people now live longer
lives but have worse health, experience longer illnesses but slower death, are faced with
longer aging and increased dementia.20 The distorted view, that all diseases are curable
and that the sanctity of life can best be maintained through medical science and
technology used aggressively against death, is commonplace.21
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Beginning with the Greeks, paternalism was not as dubious ethically as it is today.
The United States culture has grown in the area of individual rights. Medical treatment of
old depended heavily upon faith in the physician more so than on therapies or any
technology. The social status of a physician, which could lend itself to irresponsible use
of power and feelings of superiority, were just some of the problems with paternalism.22
Paternalism evolved into beneficence. Beneficence means, “do no harm,” which
resembles passive non-malfeasance. Prevention of harm follows closely. To further move
down the order of the beneficence would be to interpret the physician’s duty as binding
even if it causes discomfort, risk, or pain to the patient. The physician must act in the
patient’s interest even if it costs to comfort, power, prestige, or fiscal benefit to the
physician.23
2. Patient-Centered.
For the philosophical approach that is patient-centered, the focus is on patient
autonomy and the accompanying conflict that can arise.
Autonomy.
The tidal wave of changes happened in medical ethics starting in 1965, most
crucially, the shift from physician to the patient in decision-making. The dignity of the
human person is where the model autonomy is grounded. This shift in the locus of control
also promoted an unprecedented expansion of medical technology. Similarly, the
economic considerations changed as to how physicians viewed their patients.24 With the
expansion of political democracy, the general improvement of education and the
increasing moral pluralism in our society have been major forces in the significant
growth of autonomy. While paternalism may be appropriate in some situations (such as
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treating children or treating patients who are incapable of making autonomous decisions),
autonomy is a better option. In emergency rooms, where uncertain prognosis may be the
norm, to forgo autonomy, however, may be appropriate at times. These situations would
all fall into the “variability context” and require careful assessment in each case.25
Conflicts.
In general medicine, medical technologies history is a confluence of three
distinctive historical streams: biological research, clinical practice, and the healthcare
industry.26 With the development of the microscope, the germ theory of disease was
finally accepted. This led the way for the development of vaccines, public sanitation
improvement, and aseptic surgery became a norm. More than any other tool, the
microscope may have contributed the most to medical science.27 With the discovery of xrays, the ability to see inside the body, which previously had only been a dream, spawned
additional tools for mapping and even repairing internal organs.28 Radioactivity properly
harnessed became a powerful diagnostic and therapeutic tool that has led to positron
emission tomography scanners, the Gamma Knife, and protein accelerators.29 Harnessing
sound waves were the precursor to the development of stethoscope and the blood
pressure monitor. Ultrasound first developed detecting icebergs, and enemy submarines
detect flaws in the human body that became clinically useful and an extremely valuable
diagnostic tool.30 With the ability of physicians to repair, replace, and assist failing
organs, the need for accurate record keeping and analysis of data became apparent and
thus the standard of care. Additionally implanted devices have evolved with the
development of integrated circuits and microprocessors and the transition from analog to
digital electronics has offered significant benefit.31 The Internet is now offering
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unprecedented access to medical information and treatment options. Health care has
embraced the wireless age and telemedicine is now in its infancy with the use of cellular
telephone technology that will conceivably change health care forever.32
Medical technology has worked wonders although modern medicine is far from
perfect. Success often breeds complacency, and potentially an overreliance on medical
technology can have a very deleterious impact on the relationship between physician and
patient.33
Additionally, a conflict has been exacerbated by medical technology, which
revolves around the ubiquitous computer.34 High-tech medicine is now moving to the
next level because of enhancement of communications. Physicians have immediate
access to medical records, digital scans, x-rays, medical resonance imaging, a whole
plethora of needed information.35 The operating skills of surgeons can be enhanced by
video cameras, robotic surgery, and even speech recognition.36 Some advocates say that
the most exciting changes that have happened in healthcare are now the interaction with
patients and physicians.37 Physicians are now being able to expand their portfolio of
diagnostic tests and therapies by providing these services to patients in the comfort of
their own home. Phone lines or cell signals can be used to monitor, reconfigure, or update
medical devices along with medical emergencies that can be reported and responded to
immediately.38
Unprecedented access to information about medical conditions and treatments are
now available through Internet resources.39 People need access to information to aid in
their quest to be good informed consumers of health care and its delivery.40 Telemedicine
has expanded from accessing expert physicians consulting with doctors in rural and
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developing areas. The progression of telemedicine medicine now includes radiology
services with a remote interpretation of scans and the utilization of robotic tools used by
the surgeon. Additionally, telemedicine is now being utilized to more easily communicate
and aid the physicians, hospitals, and pharmacies to better manage the patient’s medical
condition.41 Smart phone applications have been developed to track patient’s medical
care, read blood samples and transmit results, remotely monitoring patients in critical
care intensive care units, and aiding physicians themselves to be better informed of
current technological advances.42 Ultimately, consumers will be able to effectively
monitor their health in consultation with their physician detecting potential problems.
Concerns still exist regarding the personal relationship being deleteriously impacted
between physician and patient.43
II. Medical Futility.
The discussion above on changing attitudes on death and dying offer insight into
the ethical debate surrounding medical futility. The discussion over medical futility is
fraught with controversy. To discuss medical futility requires examining two related
topics: the debate about the meaning of futility and the goals of medicine.
A. Futility Polemic.
First, to clarify the meaning of medical futility, the ethical debate revolves around
the definition of futility and the definition of rationing.
1. Defining Futility.
The definition of medical futility can be clarified by considering the purpose of
treatment and by looking at an example of a futility policy, specifically the Texas
Advance Directives Act.
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Purpose of Treatment.
The concept of medical futility is an ancient concept dating back to the time of
Hippocrates (d. 375 BCE) when he stated that physicians should not treat those who are
overmastered by their disease. Hippocrates realized that in many cases medicine is
powerless. Medical futility is a clinical action serving no useful purpose in attaining a
goal in the care of a patient. Scholar Griffin Trotter maintains medical futility occurs
when: (1) there is a goal, (2) achieving this goal has an action and activity, and (3)
achieving that goal will fail with virtual certainty. For the physician to discuss futility
with patients and family, three concepts are essential for the discussion. First, treatments
that are ineffective or harmful to patients are not obligatory. Second, physicians must
engage in dialogue concerning futile treatments. Thirdly, physicians must convey concern
even if there is no cure. Providing ongoing care for patients is never futile.44
Futility Policy-Texas Advance Directives Act.
On September 1, 1999, the Texas Advance Directives Act became law regulating
end-of-life futility. Several provisions are included in this law: addressing the living will,
terminal and irreversible illnesses, and witnessing requirements. To take advantage of the
law and to create a legal safe haven for institutions and physician, certain provisions must
be followed: (1) families must be given written information about hospital policy, (2)
families are to be given 48 hours notice and be invited to become involved in ethics
consultation process, (3) the family must be provided a written report of the findings of
the ethics review process, (4) if the consultation process fails to resolve the issue, the
hospital in concert with family will try to arrange transfer of the patient to another
physician and institution willing to give treatment that is being refused by the current
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team, (5) after 10 days, if no providers can be found, the hospital and physician may
withhold or withdraw the treatment determined to be futile, (6) the party who disagrees
may appeal and ask a court to grant an extension only if there is a likelihood of finding a
willing provider, and (7) if no extension is granted, then the futile treatment can be
withdrawn with immunity from civil or criminal prosecution. This is a regulation that
mandates the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if deemed futile even if it is against
patient and family wishes. In theses cases, it needs to be critically reviewed from the
perspective of the Catholic Tradition.45 The Texas Advance Directives Act raises
questions from the Catholic perspective of medical futility in light of the observance of
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. Directives #57,
#58, and #60 address the withholding of medically appropriate treatment, artificial
nutrition and hydration, and the prohibition of euthanasia.
A person may forgo extraordinary or disproportionate means of preserving
life. Disproportionate means are those that in the patient’s judgment do not
offer a reasonable hope of benefit or entail an excessive burden, or impose
excessive expense on the family or the community. (Directive #57)

In principle, there is an obligation to provide patients with food and water,
including medically assisted nutrition and hydration for those who cannot
take food orally. This obligation extends to patients in chronic and
presumably irreversible conditions (e.g., the “persistent vegetative state”)
who can reasonably be expected to live indefinitely if given such care they
cannot reasonably be expected to prolong life or when they would be
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“excessively burdensome for the patient or [would] cause significant
physical discomfort, instance, as a patient draws close to inevitable death
from an underlying progressive and fatal condition, certain measures to
provide nutrition and hydration may become excessively burdensome and
therefore not obligatory in light of their very limited ability to prolong life
or provide comfort. (Directive #58)

Euthanasia is an action or omission that of itself or by intention causes
death in order to alleviate suffering. Catholic health care institutions may
never condone or participate in euthanasia or assisted suicide in any way.
Dying patients who request euthanasia should receive loving care,
psychological and spiritual support, and appropriate remedies for pain and
other symptoms so that they can live with dignity until the time of natural
death. (Directive #60)

Tradition teaches that individuals must preserve life, but not by all means. If
measures cause a grave burden for oneself or another, then the use of extraordinary
efforts should be avoided. Directive #57 morally justifies the patient’s decision to refuse
treatment, but it does not authorize a patient to request a treatment that is either ordinary
or extraordinary. Additionally, Catholic Tradition supports the physician’s ability to
conscientiously object or to offer treatment. Directive #58 establishes that medically
assisted nutrition and hydration is not an absolute necessity if their administration would
be harmful to the patient. Therefore, this directive would not be applicable in futile cases.
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Directive #60, the forbidding of euthanasia, has to be viewed regarding the intent.
Withholding treatment from futile patients is not to end their life. The intent is to remove
inappropriate and harmful medical treatments and thus to relieve suffering.46
The main concern of the Texas Advance Directives Act from the Catholic
perspective is that this law could enable physicians to bypass communicating with
families making decisions about end-of-life. Consequently, physicians might go directly
to the review committee without any meaningful interaction with family. Granted this
could occur, but the data support otherwise. Catholic health care facilities should and
often do support use of Texas Advance Directives Act as a model. The law allows the
physicians to practice according to their conscience and the law seeks the good of the
patient by preventing a prolonged process. The law also tends to improve the quality of
end-of-life care in the most difficult circumstances by improving communications
between family and staff.47 Texas is one of only two states with a specific timetable for
terminating a patient’s life-sustaining treatment. The technology involved in such
treatments can be inhumane by causing significant pain and suffering to patients. When
patients reach this point, they typically suffer from multiple organ failure and
continuation of patient care is imprudent. Additionally, life-sustaining treatment can be
very disturbing and distressing to physicians and healthcare providers when witnessing
patients’ unnecessary suffering.48
2. Rationing.
The definition of rationing needs to be separated from futility because they are
very different ethical concepts. Defining and the purpose of rationing will be engaged.
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Defining Rationing.
Futility at times is confused with rationing, but they are very different ethical
concepts. Futility deals with continuing a treatment that has no benefit; rationing deals
with withholding a treatment that does have a benefit. This does not mean that rationing
is wrong: it can be justified especially from a policy perspective.
Rationing of health care is limiting the availability of beneficial health care. In the
United States, few restrictions exist on the use of health care technology regardless of
cost or clinical effectiveness. Rationing care by eligibility for insurance coverage is
where ethical issues emerge. Health care resources are both explicitly or implicitly
rationed and thus limiting access to beneficial health care services. The key question is
not whether health care is rationed but how, by whom, and to what degree. Additionally
balancing autonomy, beneficence, and distributive justice can create ethical dilemmas.
The “rule of rescue” is accomplished in medical care when providing services to the most
needy or the most identifiable. Therapeutic services are often given priority over
preventive services regardless of goals or cost-effectiveness.49
Purpose of Rationing.
The basic purpose of rationing to have a policy that fosters stewardship limited
resources and health care. Health care in the United States accounts for the largest
percentage of gross domestic product of any other industrialized nation on earth. Only by
rationing or setting limits can health care costs be kept from spiraling out of control.
These costs are unsustainable for this country as long as there is an increasing demand for
expensive technology, fueled by new research discoveries, patient demands for curative
therapies, and the tremendous profits that are gleaned from health care. People have
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difficulty comprehending the arguments that exist for curtailing health care; arguments
are emotionally charged when talking about human pain and suffering. Even though
many private insurance companies, Medicare, and Medicaid have placed many
restrictions on the ability of doctors to prescribe, operate, and implement, the physician
retains significant leverage over what gets offered to the patient. When combining this
system with the traditional fee-for-service system, a significant increase in costs occurs.50
Hence, rationing can be justified from a policy perspective as a function of stewardship
of limited resources in health care. This is where rationing and futility achieve similar
goals in this sense. Just as rationing from a policy perspective seeks to steward the
resources of health care, similarly futility emphasizes the need to withdraw ineffective
treatment not only out of respect for the patient but also to steward limited health care
resources.51
B. Compassionate Goals of Medicine and Health Care.
Second, the debate on medical futility connects the meaning of futility with the
goals of medicine. To understand the goals of medicine when facing situations of medical
futility, two issues must be addressed: the meaning of compassionate succor and how to
deal with end-of-life dilemmas.
1. Compassionate Succor.
The meaning of compassionate succor refers to situations that deal with the
prevention of disease and prevention of untimely death. Both will be brought to light.
Prevention of Disease.
Compassion is manifest in the prevention of disease as a goal of medicine. The
prevention of disease has three core medical values. First, it is better to avoid disease
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when possible. A physician’s duty is to help patients stay well. Some contend that the
physician who helps the patient remain healthy does them as great a service as caring for
them after their disease has occurred. Secondly, there can be a beneficial economic
consequence by helping to reduce chronic disease and offering cost-effective health care
as well as alleviating dependence on technology. Thirdly, the public at large as well as
the medical community needs to be aware that preventive health care has significant
benefits and needs additional emphasis.52
Society has to begin to develop true compassion. Instead of succumbing to the
temptation of self-preservation, humans cannot turn away from the suffering of their
fellow man or the suffering children. True compassion must be developed to the point
that it promotes the very willingness to help.53 Ultimately, these facts cannot be ignored:
death can only be postponed and the disease itself cannot be overcome. Disease
prevention cannot be an absolute priority over other goals of medicine. Illness and death
will eventually impact everyone.54
Compassion is also indispensable for the alleviation of pain and suffering as a
goal of medicine. One of the ancient duties of the physician has always been the relief of
pain and suffering. Pain and suffering are not experienced in the same way. Pain often
refers to physical distress: throbbing, piercing or burning, whereas suffering usually has a
psychological aspect such as fear, dread, or anxiety. Pain, the unrelenting kind, can be a
source of suffering but does not always lead to it. Conversely, suffering does not always
involve pain.55 Compassion must always be part of the professional duty of physicians
because of their self-image held by the public. Without a doubt, compassion as a duty lies
in the connection to other duties (e.g., fiduciary responsibility to the patients, the duty of
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due care, and the duty to maintain confidentiality). All of these duties have a powerful
relationship to compassion.56
The suffering that comes with a disease can be understood and responded to;
additionally, it can cause fear, despair, anxiety, futility and even helplessness. These
feelings need to be responded to by the physician with compassion. The compassionate
physician will put the patient's interest first. Two key elements of compassion include:
(1) the capability and eagerness to join deeply enough to gain insight into the experience
of an individual suffering; and (2) a virtue personified by the eagerness to ease the
person's suffering, or at the very least, to be the medium to help the patient lives through
the pain.57
In the fiduciary responsibility, a patient’s interest is linked to compassion in two
ways. First, a physician is best able to interpret where the patient’s interests lie. There is
important evidence gleaned. A compassionate physician, one who feels the patient’s
suffering, is best at relieving that suffering. Secondly, alleviation of suffering is usually
the patient’s main interest. Because compassion means the desire to alleviate suffering,
the compassionate physician will facilitate putting the patient’s interest first.58 A
compassionate physician also must provide due care. The physician is required to
maintain a reasonable range of professional skills and to use them appropriately. Patients
have so many varied needs, and there are so many medical specialties having different
and evolving standards, the duties of care can vary. The truly compassionate physician
will more likely act with due care as circumstances evolve.59
In addition to due care, confidentiality is required of the compassionate physician.
He encounters a vulnerable patient who may reveal sources of a patient’s suffering,
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secrets about an undisclosed lifestyle, guilt, emptiness, and even rejection. The
compassionate physician will see this duty of confidentiality as a protection of the
vulnerable.60 These duties have a much better chance of fulfillment when a physician
brings compassion into the patient encounter. Without compassion, the physician is
unlikely to provide the same level of care and much less likely to protect the patient’s
vulnerability. A transformation has occurred away from the compassionate doctor-patient
relationship. This transformation has been a very complex process.61
Medicine has been profoundly affected by the embracing of science. Science uses
methods that are value free. First, a hierarchy of values in medicine has existed: the
patient is first, the doctor must do no harm, and the patient’s good is paramount. Science
deals in generalities, not specifics.62 Secondly, technology has impacted the character of
the physician. Science and technology have mistakenly been construed to be the same
about the thinking and behavior of the physician. Thirdly, a new model of a physician has
emerged that is academically minded and differs from the physician’s role of the past.
There has been a general mistrust of science resulting in a redefinition of patient-hood.
The patient has become so knowledgeable that the physician can no longer advance the
idea that he is the sole owner of medical knowledge.63
The outcome of this new model could be an avoidance of pain and suffering in the
patient. Pushing acknowledgment out of the physician's conscious awareness has
occurred when emotional expression by the patient has been distressing, disconsolate,
fearful or even despairing. When the physician’s presence is called for, he still may avoid
direct contact by employing excuses. Avoiding unpleasantness can be described as
normal; but actually, it may suggest the physician’s emotional issues.64 Helplessness and
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role inadequacy are other reasons that a physician may avoid pain and suffering. Studies
have suggested that the health of the physician may be compromised if he does not
acknowledge his own emotions. As a result, the quality of medical care can be
compromised. When patients feel abandoned or rejected by the physician, the call “to do
no harm” and to benefit patients can be ignored. When patients are avoided, the physician
misses opportunities to appreciate the patient's experience and may not adequately
address symptoms.65
Prevention of Untimely Death.
Another goal of medicine is the prevention of premature death for which
compassion is central. Many challenges are going to be encountered if medicine chooses
to move toward compassion. The essential challenges are that of mindfulness and selfawareness of the physician. Tremendous opportunities exist for medical education to
establish a foundation for the physician’s well-being and quality care of the patient.66 An
important goal of medicine has always been the struggle against death. Medicine’s duty
to accept death as the destiny of all humans must remain in healthy tension. In medicine
today, its first aim should be to reduce premature death. The secondary purpose is proper
care for those whose death is not premature. These people too can benefit from medical
treatment.67 A premature death is one that occurs without a person having an opportunity
to experience a complete human lifecycle. Death may be premature if it could have been
prolonged without great torment to the individual or society. The extension of life for its
sake should not be an appropriate medical goal.68
Finally, compassion is indispensable in attaining a central goal of medicine: the
support for a peaceful death. A peaceful death is one with diminished pain and suffering
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yet the patient never feels like he has not been abandoned nor has not received an
appropriate end of life care. A death such as this can never be guaranteed by medicine,
but medicine can avoid treating death as medical failure. To help facilitate a peaceful
death, a physician must act compassionately at every opportunity.69 A peaceful death
should be provided by medical treatment that is appropriate. Today in medicine, death is
often treated as the supreme enemy. In its effort to banish death, however, medicine has
come to believe it has the power to change, to control, and to eradicate a disease.
Medicine has dissolved the line between human power and nature's power. Initially,
death was understood as a natural event, something that happens to everyone and
everything. Death had been experienced as evil; not a moral evil, but an evil of religion or
something in the abstract. As medicine’s effectiveness changed, the view of death has
taken on a moral dimension and fatalism has been eliminated. But with this moral view
comes a moral obligation to use every means possible to ward off death.70
Under the moral view, if the patient dies the physician has failed. The more
control over death that medicine has exercised, the more the demand on morality has
increased. The metamorphosis of death from a biological evil to a moral evil has
occurred. The tension has now been created between what one can do medically and what
one ought to do morally. The emphasis has been placed on medical advocacy rather than
what is morally correct.71 In this transformation of death, one of the by-products that have
been lost is compassion. The behavior of a kind and caring physician is desirable because
that attitude not only reveals consideration for the patient, but also an authentic attitude of
compassion that fosters trust in the patient which is rarely found. The caring and
compassionate physician who manifests the recognition of suffering and the desire to

309

help is often missing. Compassion does not cost extra time or resources but offers
confidence that can improve the patient’s well-being.72
As medical technology advances, the line between living and dying is hard to
determine. Medicine has changed the focus from death being a biological fact to focusing
on the single-mindedness of the causes of death. Society and medicine have come to
accept that human agency has replaced the power of nature. A fusion of technology and
the sanctity of life have created tremendous pressure against the acknowledgment of
death.73 An overwhelming temptation exists to take control over life and death; this is a
result of technology. More options in health care do not mean better health care.
Compassion comprehends the dignity of the sick and honors that patients are full
participants in their healing, partnering patients and physicians, especially at the end of
life when technology gives all tremendous power. Often technology substitutes for
compassionate care. Compassion can be defined as neither under treatment nor
overtreatment.74
The Human Genome Sciences Chief Executive Officer, William Haseltine (b.
1944) articulates the epitome of the attitude of death avoidance: “Death is nothing but a
series of preventable diseases.” Cures would be the result of finding the genetic source of
disease. This, in fact, has not proved to be the case. Nevertheless there is an optimistic
push to continue in that vein. Countering that way of thinking is the palliative movement,
trying to bring the “tame death” back into reality.75 “Tame death” is the concept coined
by the French scientist Phillipe Aries (d. 1984) referencing the acceptance of death as
part of nature.76
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Technologies have extended dying but have not cured diseases as promised. The
use of technology has been driven by overpowering incentives that include fee-forservice medicine, excessive medical training in the use of technology, the fear of
litigation, patient demands, and consumer advertising. All of these incentives cause
physicians to be even less compassionate.77 Medical technology is one of the greatest
enemies of a good death. The myth of the utopian concept against mortality has spilled
over into the culture expecting medical miracles. The public has been duped, expecting
that life should not end.78 Physicians who have been taught to push patients not to give up
have exacerbated hope in technology. A moral obligation “to push on” regardless of the
potential for positive outcomes has become an accepted norm.79
An illustration of this phenomenon: An elderly female patient with multiple
comorbidities on ventilator support as well as extensive medical interventions was
unconscious and deemed unable to make her own decisions. She did have medical power
of attorney but no advance directives. After a significant conversation with the niece, the
surrogate decided to withdraw life-sustaining therapies. She advised the critical care
physician of her intent to withdraw. The physician went to the unconscious patient and
shook her and said: “You don't want to die, do you? You can't give up!” Not only was
this behavior unprofessional, but also revealed his lack of compassion. Although this was
blatantly unprofessional, it has been observed that often the exact opposite situation
occurs. The patient or his surrogate demands all treatment possible regardless of its
benefit, even to the point of medical futility. In those cases, the compassionate physician
faces a significant dilemma.
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Society and the physicians exhibit compassion in different ways while pursuing
the goals of medicine. Preventing disease and suffering while fostering a peaceful death
are explained. Compassion must be given a greater prominence in society and health
care. A greater concern for one’s fellow man is paramount. Society needs to change so
the patient and physician can have compassionate, healthy discussions without the
pressure from society to do everything and where doing nothing does not seem morally
wrong. Humans must realize their obligation to take better care of themselves and take
responsibility for their health care.
To this end, health care is now moving more into the community with less
emphasis on bricks and mortar. The idea of preventive health is being promulgated by the
health care industry. With the advancement of technology, there are virtual emergency
departments with real-time diagnosis, cause, treatment, and prognosis all being done in
the patient's home. The goal is to improve the community’s health and to alleviate the
need for hospitalization. Ultimately, these changes will have a significant impact on
distributive justice, limited resources, and the common good of all. Additionally,
compassion needs to be reinserted into the physician’s capacity to serve his fellow man.
Medical schools and medical training must be reinvigorated with compassion for the
patient. In this systematic change in the delivery of health care, compassion needs to be
recognized not only as an additional benefit but also as a crucial duty of all physicians.
2. End-of-Life Dilemmas.
The end-of-life dilemmas raise ethical issues about balancing criteria of burden
versus benefit and about the sanctity of life. Both will be discussed.
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Balancing Criteria.
Modern medicine has postponed the natural course of dying. Patients are now
subjected to prolonged lives and acute complications thus forced to make decisions about
how vigorously to treat and when it is morally permissible to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining measures. The most judicious in helping to resolve these moral difficulties is
to develop a combination of subjective and objective criteria. Striking a balance between
three criteria: effectiveness, benefit, and the burden are the moral calculation being used.
Effectiveness estimates the capacity to alter the disease or symptom positively. Benefit
refers to what is valuable to the patient centering on the patient's assessment of his own
goals. Burden refers to the physical, emotional, fiscal, or social cost imposed on the
patient. If the assessment of these criteria is favorable to the treatment then it is morally
justifiable; when it is unfavorable, then it is not morally justifiable. Clinically these
criteria give some clarification to what is ordinary and what is extraordinary. 80 Finally, a
fundamental distinction needs to be highlighted between ordinary and extraordinary
means in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. The
distinction refers to the use of the prepositions “and” highlighted in the Ethical and
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services quotation above. Patients must
use means that are ordinary. This means when there is both a benefit and no excessive
burden or expense. In contrast, patients have no obligation to use means that are
extraordinary (this means when there is either no benefit or an excessive burden or
expense). In other words, there is a much lower ethical bar to establish treatments as
being extraordinary and hence morally optional.
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Sanctity of Life.
A major moral tradition in healthcare is the sanctity of life. The term has a
relatively modern usage. The concept of the preservation of life is as old as life itself.
When used in a restrictive sense, it connotes the dominion of God. In a universal sense, it
emphasizes stewardship to help determine obligations faced regarding health care and
other quandaries. When the sanctity of life is used as stewardship, then stewardship
becomes a task rather than a boundary line.81 Respect for life and sanctity of life can be
used interchangeably. In the biological sense, both respect the existence of a living
human organism for human individuality and the personhood.82
Historically, there seems to be a reverence for life, making the deliberate killing
of another person a punishable offense. Aversion to murder in all societies is the most
universal of all moral attitudes. Abortion, euthanasia, and suicide have not shared that
commonality. In Greek and Roman society, there was some disapproval of abortions and
even some legal prohibition.83 Some Greek philosophers even looked at abortion, as a
way to control population and it was essential for a well-ordered community. The JudeoChristian tradition significantly impacted the evolution of the belief that abortion and
suicide were morally wrong. Most people in the West regard life as something sacred and
hold that no one can dispose of it whether by murder, abortion, or suicide. The reason
that killing is forbidden is based on Divine prerogative and divine rights.84
The term “sanctity of life” has become an all-encompassing term to include all
life regardless of quality, even to prolong dying. Invoking the term “sanctity of life” may
be going too far when it is used in the argument against abortion. The term can be an all-
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inclusive term with no limitations. The use of this term can be problematic because there
are times when an abortion may be morally allowed.85
When the universality of the term “sanctity of life” is used it gains a very positive
orientation rather than emphasizing the things one cannot do. At that point, the sanctity of
life can help guard against the erosion of the respect for life; even in protecting gravely ill
patients who are vulnerable.86 Sustaining life reflects the doctrine of the sanctity of life.
But to what limits are we to prolong life? Roman Catholic ethics prohibits the termination
of life intentionally, but it does permit withdrawing futile treatments to let patients die.
Given that life can be prolonged by medical intervention there is a temptation to consider
that it should be continued at all cost. However, the Catholic Traditions doctrine on the
sanctity of life is so robust as to respect life by withdrawing futile life-sustaining
treatment. Naturally, there are both philosophical and practical uncertainties about went
to withdraw futile treatment to let a patient die. The traditional doctrine about the sanctity
of life is consistent with the view that there is an important distinction between ordinary
and extraordinary means of preserving life.87
III. Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment.
Related to the above discussion regarding attitudes to death and medical futility,
is the ethical debate around the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. This discussion
requires consideration of two related topics: artificial nutrition and hydration and the
relief of suffering at the end-of-life.
A. Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration.
First, assisted nutrition and hydration is especially significant as a medical
intervention at end-of-life and for patients in a persistent vegetative state.
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1. Role at End-of-Life.
In this section, the end-of-life ethical debate on medically assisted nutrition and
hydration revolve around clarifying its medical purpose and how these encounter cultural
pressures.
Medical Purpose.
Two main reasons are cited for using technology to initiate assisted nutrition: to
improve fatigue and to avoid “starving to death.” Sometimes clinicians and families
believe the reason the patient is weak is that they are not eating. No evidence exists that
supports assisted nutrition improves energy level or survival except patients who are for
mechanical reasons not able to eat. The data suggest that an increased risk of aspiration
and other complications-infection, obstruction, edema, and pneumonia are more likely to
occur when patients are supported with assisted nutrition. Often the conversation around
nutrition and hydration has to do with the patient and family’s acceptance of dying than it
does about intervention. Assisted nutrition and hydration is now a medical therapy rather
than providing sustenance. All stakeholders (physicians, patients, and caregivers) need to
understand what the likely outcome is in each situation. In prolonging life, medically
assisted nutrition and hydration can be invaluable. At the end of one’s life, its usefulness
comes into question. The decision to administer medically assisted nutrition and
hydration has to be individualized in light of the goals of care of the patient.88
Cultural Pressures.
Family members often feel helpless in the face of disease progression. Their
common concern is, “Will our loved one endure more pain and suffering without food
and fluids?” Studies have shown that feelings of hunger are absent from patients who are
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nearing end-of-life. Thirst can be a major discomfort, but there seems to be no correlation
between the intake of actual fluid and the sensation of thirst. Dehydration may have
benefits at the end-of-life by aiding in the release of endorphins that offer natural pain
control as the body shuts down. Releasing endorphins can also aid in the improved
quality of life due to the elevation the patient’s mood. If fluids are increased, there may
be increased urinary output and thus the need for a urinary catheter. Food and fluids also
increase gastrointestinal activity potentially causing the patient discomfort due to
abdominal distention, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. With the addition of fluids, an
increase of oral and airway secretions will develop allowing for potential aspiration
pneumonia, coughing, congestion, and or difficulty in breathing.89 Two main reasons are
cited for using technology to initiate artificial nutrition: to improve fatigue and to avoid
“starving to death.” Sometimes clinicians and families believe the reason the patient is
weak is that they are not eating. No evidence exists that supports medically assisted
nutrition and hydration improving energy level or survival except patients who for
mechanical reasons are not able to eat. The data suggest that an increased risk of
aspiration and other complications (infection, obstruction, edema, and pneumonia) are
likely to occur.90 Often the conversation around nutrition and hydration has more to do
with the patient and families’ acceptance of dying than it does about intervention.91
Assisted nutrition and hydration is now a medical therapy rather than providing
sustenance. All stakeholders (physicians, patients, and caregivers) need to understand
what the outcome is in each situation. In prolonging life for some, medically assisted
nutrition and hydration can be invaluable; but to relieve pain and to suffer at life’s end, its
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usefulness comes into question.92 The decision to administer medically assisted nutrition
and hydration has to be individualized in light of the goals of care of the patient.93
The Catholic Church addresses medically assisted nutrition and hydration in
Directive #58 of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services.
“Certain measures to provide nutrition and hydration may become excessively
burdensome and therefore not obligatory in light of their very limited ability to prolong
life or provide comfort.”94 The issue of medically assisted artificial nutrition and
hydration, however, is being co-opted by the right-to-life and sanctity-of-life arguments
with no consideration of the data that supports withholding medically assisted artificial
nutrition hydration. The medical data is not given credence. Potential pain and suffering
and the prolongation of death that are not ordinary.
2. Persistent Vegetative State Patients.
Medically assisted nutrition and hydration is used for patients in a persistent
vegetative state. The ethical debate here needs to have a clear definition and moral
direction.
Definition.
The persistent vegetative state is a clinical condition of complete unawareness of
self and the environment, accompanied by sleep-wake cycles, with either complete or
partial preservation of the brain and brainstem function. Patients in a persistent vegetative
state show no evidence of sustained, reproducible, purposeful, voluntary behavioral
responses to visual, auditory, tactile, or noxious stimuli. Persistent vegetative state
patients show no evidence of language comprehension or expression, have bowel and
bladder incontinence, and have variably preserved cranial nerve and spinal reflexes. A
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vegetative state is present one month after acute traumatic or non-traumatic brain injury
or lasting for at least one month in patients with degenerative or metabolic disorders or
developmental malformations. The recovery of consciousness is unlikely after 12 months
period.95
Moral Direction.
In the papal allocution March 20, 2004, the Pope John Paul II (d. 2005) stated that
hydration and nutrition are a morally ordinary treatment for persistent vegetative state
patients and that foregoing would be considered “euthanasia by omission.” Even though
this allocution has been judged by some theologians not to be consistent with the balance
of Catholic teaching on forgoing treatment, it was a papal address given much attention
and thus has led to significant debate about persistent vegetative state patients. One of the
impacts of the allocution has been the rewriting Directive #58.
In principle, there is an obligation to provide patients with food and water,
including medically assisted nutrition and hydration for those who cannot
take food orally. This obligation extends to patients in chronic and
presumably irreversible conditions (e.g., the “persistent vegetative state”)
who can reasonably be expected to live indefinitely if given such care they
cannot reasonably be expected to prolong life or when they would be
“excessively burdensome for the patient or [would] cause significant
physical discomfort, instance, as a patient draws close to inevitable death
from an underlying progressive and fatal condition, certain measures to
provide nutrition and hydration may become excessively burdensome and
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therefore not obligatory in light of their very limited ability to prolong life
or provide comfort. (Directive #58)96

An extensive survey of relevant medical literature dealing with this issue and different
positions taken by moral theologians has been conducted. In the review of the theological
opinions, there was not found persuasive rationale by some theologians that since persons
in persistent vegetative state conditions can no longer pursue the spiritual goal of life,
feeding them artificially would be considered futile. Medically, life expectancy usually
ranges from only two to five years thus arguing persistent vegetative state patients are in
a terminal condition.97 The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services implement the teaching of the Papal Allocution: “in principle, there is an
obligation to provide patients with food and water, including medically assisted hydration
and nutrition” even for patients in the “persistent vegetative state.” However, there is a
crucial qualification of this “in principle” doctrine when applied to specific cases in
which the “obligation” becomes “morally optional.” The Bishops explain: “medically
assisted hydration and nutrition become morally optional when they cannot reasonably be
expected to prolong life or when they would be excessively burdensome for the patient.”
The Bishops further clarify, “certain measures to provide nutrition and hydration may
become excessively burdensome and therefore not obligatory.” 98
B. Relief of Suffering.
Second, the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is designed to address the
relief of suffering at the end of life. This raises specific ethical concerns regarding
palliative care and assisted suicide.
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1. Palliative Care.
In addressing palliative care, two interrelated concepts need consideration, care at
end-of-life and palliative sedation.
Care at End-of-Life.
The fear of killing patients by excessive use of medications, particularly opioids,
spurred the debate about palliative care. It received its initial place as a viable service to
health care from the time when the pain was often badly managed, and health care
professionals were poorly trained. Palliative care has broadened its scope of service to
include all acute patients, not just end-of-life. In caring for the dying, it has been
determined that there was a need to address both pain and suffering to accomplish a
good death. Not all patients come to acceptance of a good death, thus a source of
suffering. Careful management of this group of dying patients is what palliative care is
called to do. Both doctors and families sometimes find it difficult to accept that a patient
is dying, because of the difficulty of determining a clear line between living and dying.
Person-centered, family-oriented, and evidence-based care at the end-of-life is the
ultimate goal of palliative care.99 Palliative care provides relief from pain and other
symptoms and supports quality of life while focusing on the patient and families.
Palliative care should be introduced early in the course of an illness and can be provided
throughout the continuum of care whether in home, hospital, nursing home or assisted
living facilities. Palliative care is care provided by an interdisciplinary team. These
palliative care teams include physicians, specialty advanced practice nurses, registered
nurses, social workers, and chaplains.100
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To enhance palliative care’s progress, two important deficiencies exist that need
addressing. First, clinicians caring for the patients have deficiencies in their knowledge
of caring for people with serious illnesses and nearing end-of-life. Secondly, shortages
of palliative care specialist exist, and thus the caring for end-of-life patients often falls to
the primary care physicians who have limited skills in this specialized area of health
care. Palliative care training and education need to be implemented in medical and
nursing schools and encouraged in undergraduate and graduate programs, as well as
emphasized in continuing education.101
Patients near the end-of-life often have multiple transitions; these transitions can
cause medication errors, poor care planning, lack of coordination of care, and the
expertise and continuity of care become even more critical. Often patients are so
confused and overwhelmed that they struggle with meeting basic needs. Thus, the
follow-up care and medication lapses are not outside the norm. Programs to reduce
readmission rates and improve primary care have been initiated. Palliative care
programs, often in clinics or homes, provide an umbrella that encompasses a spectrum
of approaches for bringing care to people with serious illnesses.102
Quality of life improvement for both patient and family is a palliative goal.
Palliative care provides pain control as well as providing relief from other distressing
symptoms; and in doing so, intends to neither prolong life nor hasten death. Palliative
integrates psychosocial and spiritual aspects and offers a support system for families and
patients with one of its goals being that patients can live as actively as possible until
death. Palliative care uses a team approach to address the needs of patients and
families.103
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Twelve key core components have been proposed for the care the patients at the
end-of-life. These core components require flexibility and individual tailoring.
Management of pain and emotional distress, counseling, family support, frequent
assessment, access to coordinated care are just some of the major components that can
bring better care to the patient that is nearing death.104 Palliative care affirms life by
supporting the patient and their families’ goals including their hopes for life
prolongation, as well as their hopes for peace and dignity throughout the disease
process, the dying process, and to death.105
Performing the skills and applying the knowledge of palliative care initially can
be learned and replicated. What is more important is the need to go deeper into the
culture of Catholic health care ministry. The Catholic Church has been relatively quiet
and lacks leadership in palliative care although the Pope recently spoke out about its
value and needed for expansion. In his speech to the Pontifical Academy for Life, he
shared the view that “palliative care expresses the typically human attitude of caring for
each other especially for those who are suffering.”106
The Church has taken a more active role in advocating for palliative care because
it exemplifies the best of what the Catholic faith has consistently believed and
emphasized about one’s relationship to God and each other and the meaning and
purpose of one’s existence. When one reaches out to heal and care for the sick, the poor,
the vulnerable, and the dying, one touches God. Fundamental features of the gospel
distinguish Catholic health care: (1) Jesus’ healing ministry is incarnational. When one
cares for others, one is reaching out to Christ himself, (2) Jesus’ healing ministry is the
work of evangelization. The healing ministry of Jesus brings about the “Reign of God”
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restoring people to their communities, (3) Jesus’ healing ministry is the work of
compassion. Compassion means, “to suffer with” but it is much more than that: it goes
beyond sympathy or pity. Compassion is a call to action: to serve the marginalized, the
most vulnerable, the forgotten or abandoned, or those suffering. Compassion is an
antidote to despair felt by people who believe they have no control or have been
abandoned or left to languish, (4) Jesus’ healing ministry is the work of restoration of a
person to the relationship with God, to their families, to their loved ones, and to their
communities. When one offers comfort even when there is no cure, one is ultimately
restoring people to their community. Therefore, palliative care is a genuine hallmark of
Catholic health care.107
Palliative Sedation.
Symptom control (pain, dyspnea or shortness of breath, restlessness, and
nausea/vomiting) is one of the cardinal reasons for a good death not being achieved.
When symptoms are not controlled, patients often request an alternative means of dying.
Physicians often hesitate to give dying patients adequate symptom control for fear that
high doses of medication can suppress breathing and cause death. Inadequate training of
physicians in symptom control has led to this fear. Causing death by overmedicating is
based on false assumptions. Even oncologists, who deal with patients’ most in need of
symptom control, have insufficient knowledge in the appropriate medical use of analgesic
drugs. Large doses of morphine may well cause death if given to a healthy person who is
not in pain and has not received morphine before the administration. If administered for
pain, the patients’ pain receptors will take up such drugs first. Patients whom regularly
receive morphine for pain quickly build up resistance to the side effects. Because of this
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resistance, patients can tolerate higher doses that would normally be fatal to a healthy
person. Additionally, tolerance is built up to the side effects far more quickly than to the
analgesic effects. Physicians, therefore, should not hesitate to increase dosages to
accomplish pain relief. The dosage needed to relieve pain for patients who are awake and
in pain is one that is adequate to relieve the pain. That dosage can be administered
without reservation. The risk of increasing the dose to a point where it would cause death
is virtually zero.108
Palliative sedation has been approved and endorsed by the American Medical
Association, the American Nurses Association, the American Academy of Pain
Medicine, and the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine.109 These
organizations agree that rarely is it necessary to sedate patients to the point of sleep to
accomplish symptom control. Sedation for the control of intractable suffering in an
imminently dying patient is humane, appropriate, and medically acceptable. Patients will
not die from the sedation; but it can make the suffering bearable, allowing time for
medical teams to reassess patients’ further needs. Sedatives can be withdrawn, and
patients will be brought back to consciousness to assess symptom control. If symptoms
are not controlled, patients can be returned to a sleep state where alternative modalities
can be utilized.110 Palliative Sedation Therapy is the use of specific sedative medications
to relieve intractable suffering from refractory symptoms. Refractory symptoms are
symptoms that physicians determine cannot safely be relieved by other interventions.
Such symptoms requiring sedation include (in descending order of frequency) delirium
(55%-65%), dyspnea (26%-27%), pain (14%-18%), and vomiting (4%).111 The relief of
refractory pain can be accomplished by the reduction in patients’ consciousness. The

325

medications used include benzodiazepines, phenobarbital, or propofol. Opioids such as
morphine should not be used for Palliative Sedation Therapy because even in high doses,
sedation may not be accomplished. Relief of refractory symptoms is the goal. Therefore,
care must be taken in choosing doses of sedatives to reduce patients’ level of
consciousness. Sedation can vary, but initially, the doses should allow for patients’ ability
to communicate.112
Palliative sedation should not be entered into without serious consideration.
Ample conversations with the physician, the interdisciplinary team, the patient, and the
family need to occur before beginning palliative sedation. These conversations can aid in
helping to assuage the concern and answering the questions of right time, right
circumstances, and correct intentions.113 Families often are dubious initially about
Palliative Sedation Therapy. Research has revealed that families overwhelmingly (88%)
agree that palliative sedation helped to decrease symptom distress. Families disagree,
however, that palliative sedation was not dignified and that no meaning was found in
being with sedated patients. The families in the research believe that palliative sedation is
beneficial, yet they needed to be reassured that no alternative solutions were available.
Families need clear explanations and ample time to say good-bye.114
Varying degrees of unconsciousness in dying patients can occur with palliative
sedation. Due to the concerns about sedation and the inadvertent hastening of death, there
may be a need to establish ethical justification using the principle of double effect. 115 The
principle of double effect helps to answer the question: Can it be right to have an action
that may have two or more effects: some which are good, the intended; and some that are
bad, but not intended? The principle of double effect is justified when all the following
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conditions are met: (1) the action cannot be morally wrong, (2) the bad effect must not
cause the good, (3) the intention must not be for the bad effect, and (4) the bad must not
outweigh the good.116
In evaluating the sedation of patients with intractable symptoms at the end-of-life
is by definition a good action and could be considered a moral obligation by the principle
of double effect conditions. To the second condition, the distinction between means and
the effects, patients do not have to suffer until the end-of-life. The third criterion
regarding intent is to relieve patients’ intractable symptoms rather than to hasten death.
The final condition questions proportionality. Symptom relief at the end of life does
justify the action of palliative sedation. Studies have shown that once intractable
symptoms are relieved, patients may live longer. Furthermore, many health care
professionals agree that palliative sedation is ethically justifiable. Providing relief, not
hastening death, by targeting symptoms while minimizing the potential harm is the
goal.117
2. Assisted Suicide.
Assisted suicide raises issues related to symptom control and patient autonomy.
These, in turn, will be engaged.
Symptom Control.
Physician-assisted suicide can be of real interest to people as they near death
because of their fears of an inability of medical technology to control symptoms. The
predominant reason for requesting physician-assisted suicide is symptom control. The
most common argument in favor of physician-assisted suicide is that death offers the only
means of attaining comfort or dignity for the patient in extreme duress. Advocates for
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Physician-assisted suicide supplement their argument with data showing that inadequate
symptom control is the main reason to request physician-assisted suicide. With physician
assistance, expertise is provided to increase the likelihood of a successful suicide attempt.
It is argued that with a physician-assisted suicide; such assistance prevents a greater harm
than it causes. Advocates for physician-assisted suicide also argue that the immediate
death is preferable to suffering from pain.118
Paradoxes have surfaced in the argument about physician-assisted suicide. The
first paradox is the result of the polemic relationship between autonomy and the principle
of beneficence, the relief of suffering. Both autonomy and beneficence are the two major
justifications for euthanasia. Physician-assisted suicide ultimately gives individual
patients control over their dying, but the result is an increase in the medical power. The
second paradox, one of the stated goals of physician-assisted suicide’s advocates is to
bring about a good death. The good death has been threatened because of the lack of
range of options to accomplish it.119
One of the important tenants in the debate on physician-assisted suicide is the
respect the principle of autonomy. Determining one’s life direction is the foundation for
autonomy. If in seeking assistance in dying from a physician, then it can be brought into
question whether autonomy of the patient is truly respected. In spite of many theories
about autonomy, there is agreement on three conditions. The first condition is
independence from influences that would be considered controlling. The second is the
capacity for action; and finally, the comprehension of the information given. If physicianassisted suicide is requested from patients in extreme suffering, their autonomy is
constrained because there is no independence. Respecting patient autonomy does not
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involve doing everything patient request. A positive obligation to grant the patients’
request only can be granted if there is enhancement or restoration of autonomy. Killing
the patient would not restore autonomy; in fact, it would eliminate it.120
Beneficence can play a key role in discussions about physician-assisted suicide. In
the traditional argument for mercy, no one should have to endure terminal suffering. If
the patients’ symptoms cannot be controlled because technology cannot offer relief, then
the argument goes that the physician should be allowed to bring about death.121 Utilizing
palliative sedation, this argument has less validity. Additionally, when considering
beneficence, a capacity to recognize the relief of suffering is required. With physicianassisted suicide, the end of suffering is brought about by the elimination of the suffering
patient who no longer can notice the diminished suffering.122 Proper symptom control
does reduce the need for helping patients kill themselves.123
The Church is clear about its stand on physician-assisted suicide /euthanasia.
“Euthanasia is an action or omission that of itself or by intention causes death to alleviate
suffering. Catholic health care institutions may never condone or participate in euthanasia
or assisted suicide in any way. Dying patients who request euthanasia should receive
loving care, psychological and spiritual support, and appropriate remedies for pain and
other symptoms so they can live with dignity until the time of their natural death.”124
Autonomy.
Loss of autonomy and a diminished quality of life are also offered to justify
Physician-assisted suicide. One of the most important tenants in the debate on physicianassisted suicide is the respect for the principal of autonomy. Determining one’s life
direction is the foundation for autonomy. In seeking assistance in dying from a physician,
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it can be brought into question whether autonomy of the patient is truly respected. In spite
of many theories about autonomy, there is agreement on three conditions. The first
condition is independence from influences that would be considered controlling. The
second is the capacity for action; and finally, the comprehension of the information
given. If physician-assisted suicide is requested from patients in extreme suffering,
autonomy is constrained because there is no independence. Respecting patient autonomy
does not involve doing everything the patient requests.125
This chapter has extended the discussion of medical technology from the start of
life to address end of life dilemmas. The contribution of the Catholic Tradition is to be
highly attuned to protecting the dignity of the patients, especially at the end of life and
even when they request medical technology for assisted suicide. The Catholic Tradition
urges the use of medical technology to alleviate patient suffering without intending their
death.
IV. Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious Directives.
As mentioned in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, the Catholic Tradition’s use of Natural Law
has two general approaches. The first approach focuses on the universal aspect of human
nature. This approach is typically associated with the settled Catholic teaching on
morality. The second approach focuses on the person, presenting a dynamic and historical
view of the human condition as contributors to God’s creation.126 This approach is
typically associated with the Principle of Double Effect to apply traditional Church
teaching in a flexible manner to changing circumstances. Arising from these two
approaches to Natural Law, a third approach has emerged combining the nature-oriented
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and person-oriented approaches to new dilemmas regarding emerging technologies that
may require doctrinal development in Catholic teaching.
In the conclusion of each applied chapter, a critique based on the Ethical and
Religious Directives is presented regarding the main topics of the chapter. The critique
adopts the above approaches to identify three distinct categories as follows. Category A
deals with settled issues in Church Teaching reflecting the Nature Approach to Natural
Law. Category B deals with the controversial issues eligible for using the Principle of
Double Effect reflecting the Personal Approach to Natural Law. Category C deals with
issues requiring doctrinal development in Catholic teaching to address new dilemmas
regarding emerging technologies.
The following analysis applies this threefold critique to the topics discussed in
this chapter on death and dying technology. Each main section is discussed in turn.
Section I: Changing Attitudes towards Death and Dying.
This section discussed how even with changing attitudes towards death and dying,
the Catholic Church has settled teaching on two pivotal points on this issue: first is the
legitimacy of interventions to prolong life; secondly, life is not absolute hence there is no
obligation to prolong it at any cost. These points are settled Catholic teaching (Category
A).
The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services give us
the moral guidance regarding care for the seriously ill and dying. Directive #56 and #57
address these concerns.
A person has a moral obligation to use ordinary or proportionate means of
preserving his or her life. Proportionate means are those that in the
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judgment of the patient offer a reasonable hope of benefit and do not entail
an excessive burden or impose excessive expense on the family or the
community. (Directive #56)

A person may forgo extraordinary or disproportionate means of preserving
life. Disproportionate means are those that in the patient’s judgment do not
offer a reasonable hope of benefit or entail an excessive burden, or impose
excessive expense on the family or the community. (Directive #57)

Recognizing that ordinary and extraordinary treatments are moral distinctions and
not medical distinctions are most critical. The life we have present is a treasure but
extending that life by extraordinary means is not obligatory in Catholic teaching.127 We
are not the masters of our lives, we are custodians of it. Ultimately we are to be in union
with God, thus if the patient deems treatment excessively burdensome then prolonging
life is not mandatory. We are not to desire a long life but a good life.128
Section II: Medical Futility.
The next section discussed the ethical issues around medical futility. There is no
obligation to continue futile treatment- that is settled Catholic teaching (Category A).
Futility is appropriately addressed in Directive #56 and #57. Treatment after the
determination of medical futility is contrary to standards of care and a compromise of
human dignity. Often, continued treatment in these cases is a result of the technological
imperative.129
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It is important to distinguish the withdrawal of futile treatment from
rationing. Rationing deals with refusing treatments (due to scarce resources) that
have a beneficial effect. In contrast, futility deals with providing a treatment that
has no beneficial effect.130
Another topic in this section deals with the compassionate goals of medicine and
health care. Naturally, seeking these goals as a moral obligation is settled Catholic
teaching (Category A).
People often think of compassion as an individual virtue or practice, done by one
person to help another. Compassionate goals, sympathy with or feeling for the plights of
a particular person is what should motivate our actions. Personal compassion is a key
element the Catholic teaching to bring healing and relief to people. Also, compassion has
a critical medical dimension: the prevention of disease and the alleviation of pain and
suffering. Compassion must always be part of the professional duty of physicians.
Compassion as a duty lies in the connection to other duties (e.g., fiduciary responsibility
to the patients, the duty of due care, and the duty to maintain confidentiality).131
Section III: Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment.
The next section discussed the withdrawal of medically assisted nutrition and
hydration when circumstances justify doing so. Justification for doing so is based on
there being no moral obligation to use extraordinary treatment, as discussed above. This
is settled Catholic teaching (Category A).
However, removing life-support from patients in a persistent vegetative state can
be controversial but can be justified as “morally optional.” The Ethical and Religious

333

Directives explain how this is justifiable, adopting the Principle of Double Effect
(Category B).
In principle, there is an obligation to provide patients with food and water,
including medically assisted nutrition and hydration for those who cannot
take food orally. This obligation extends to patients in chronic and
presumably irreversible conditions (e.g., the “persistent vegetative state”)
who can reasonably be expected to live indefinitely if given such care they
cannot reasonably be expected to prolong life or when they would be
“excessively burdensome for the patient or [would] cause significant
physical discomfort, instance, as a patient draws close to inevitable death
from an underlying progressive and fatal condition, certain measures to
provide nutrition and hydration may become excessively burdensome and
therefore not obligatory in light of their very limited ability to prolong life
or provide comfort. (Directive #58)

As a result of the case of Terri Schiavo, Pope John Paul II published a Papal
Allocution in 2004.132 The focus was on the question of medically assisted nutrition and
hydration, which is especially complex for patients who have cognitive impairments.133
The Papal Allocution led to the revision of the Ethical and Religious Directives. That
revision included Directive #58 that accepts the justification of withdrawing lifesustaining treatment from patients in the persistent vegetative state (that is, such
treatment can become morally optional).
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Furthermore, there is continuing data that utilization of medically assisted
nutrition and hydration for many patients may not be as beneficial as anticipated.134 For
example, the American Geriatrics Society has explained in its statement on Feeding
Tubes in Advanced Dementia:
1. Percutaneous feeding tubes are not recommended for older adults with
advanced dementia. Careful hand feeding should be offered; for persons
with advanced dementia, hand feeding is at least as good as tube feeding
for the outcomes of death, aspiration pneumonia, functional status and
patient comfort. Tube feeding is associated with agitation, increased use of
physical and chemical restraints, and worsening pressure ulcers.

2. Efforts to enhance oral feeding by altering the environment and creating
patient-centered approaches to feeding should be part of usual care for
older adults with advanced dementia.135

Another topic in this section on withdrawing life-sustaining treatment deals with
palliative sedation. Two points can be made with regard to Catholic teaching.
First, in exceptional cases, while controversial, palliative sedation can be justified
using the Principle of Double Effect in Catholic teaching (Category B). In other words,
the use of palliative sedation can be justified using the Principle of Double Effect.136
Second, the routine use of palliative sedation for terminally ill patients whose pain may
otherwise be manageable would require doctrinal development in Catholic teaching
(Category C).137
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Also in this section, there was a discussion of assisted suicide. The prohibition of
assisted suicide is settled Catholic teaching (Category A). Church teaching regarding
assisted suicide is explained in Directive #60:
Euthanasia is an action or omission that of itself or by intention causes
death in order to alleviate suffering. Catholic health care institutions may
never condone or participate in euthanasia or assisted suicide in any way.
Dying patients who request euthanasia should receive loving care,
psychological and spiritual support, and appropriate remedies for pain and
other symptoms so that they can live with dignity until the time of natural
death. (Directive #60)

In sum, the threefold ethical critique based on the Ethical and Religious
Directives has been applied to the topics discussed in the main sections of the chapter.
The significance of this threefold critique as explained at the end of Chapter 3 and
applied at the end of the applied Chapters 4, 5, and 6 is further discussed in the
concluding chapter of the dissertation.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion.
This dissertation has discussed the contribution that the normative approach of the
Catholic teaching can provide for resolving ethical dilemmas regarding medical
technology.
The technology discussed ranged from what is currently available to what lies
ahead for the future. First-class health care would not exist were it not for continual
progress and innovation. Medical technology draws and adopts technology from many
fields. Without technology, modern medicine would not have been able to accomplish the
successful methods that are a blessing to mankind. The basics of medical technology that
has made health care so proficient and quality oriented encompass a wide range of
sophisticated systems.
The range of technology also promises a robust future for medicine. Technology
continues to accelerate. The combinations of varying disciplines are converging to
fundamentally change health care. The health care environment is changing at an
unprecedented rate that challenges all to stay current with the “disruptive technologies.”
The technologies seem to reverse fundamental approaches existing previously.
Revolutionary changes are occurring, forcing all to adapt.
With the rapid advancement in medical technology, significant ethical dilemmas
emerge that challenge the established norms. Due to accelerated medical technology
advancements, ethics is pressured to keep pace. This seems to be borne by the lack of
research literature in the areas of reproductive, regenerative, and end-of-life medical
advancement. This dissertation addressed the gap by considering ethical dilemmas in
these aforementioned areas.
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The dissertation analyzed the normative approach of the Catholic Tradition for
resolving ethical dilemmas regarding medical technology. Specifically, the normative
approach focused upon the Ethical and Religious Directives. The Directives maintain we
have a human mandate that transcends all faith traditions and belief systems. The
Directives state we have a social, pastoral, and professional responsibility to our fellow
man. Thus, it is incumbent on us to aid in the correct formation of one’s conscience in
these areas of new and expanding medical technologies.
The significance of this dissertation pertains to the ever-accelerating pace of new
medical technology and its impact on patient care. The Ethical Religious Directives
provide a normative approach for resolving ethical dilemmas regarding pivotal
breakthroughs in medical technology. The normative ethical approach has two
components: a normative framework for Catholic health care ethics that adopts practical
ethical principles as enunciated in the Ethical and Religious Directives (Chapter 2); and
secular decision-making models in organizational and clinical ethics that are consistent
the Catholic Tradition (Chapter 3).
Chapter 2 discussed the Normative Framework of Catholic Health Care Ethics.
The Ethical Religious Directives are grounded on three leading concepts. These concepts
of social, pastoral, and professional responsibility led the Ethical Religious Directives to
develop several practical ethical principles for Catholic health care. First, the practical
principle deals with the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means. The
second principle deals with the principle of double effect. The third principle deals with
the principle of cooperation to address issues of complicity.
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Chapter 3 discussed Ethical Decision-making Models Consistent with Catholic
Ethics. This discussion engaged three related topics. To understand the significance of
moral agency in organizational ethics, its characteristics and their connection with moral
theories were examined. Ethical theories looked at the impact on health care
organizations. This topic focused on clinical ethics and competency by examining the
competency of the patient and advance directives. The fundamental concept in bringing
decision-making of the patient to fruition is that of determining competency. These
challenges reveal the crucial need for advance directives. The third topic dealt with
clinical ethics consultation. An inherent relationship exists between clinical and
organizational ethics. Thus an ethics infrastructure is an essential component of an
organization's ethics integration and strategy. The ethics infrastructure links fundamental
processes in clinical practice to the mission and core values of the organization.
Accomplishing quality and professionalism is a key to success of the ethics consultation.
Finally, an integral part of an ethics consultation is the creation of a patient case analysis.
Chapter 4 then applied the Ethical Religious Directives to consider Reproductive
Technology. The first topic explored the embryo and personhood status. The prenatal
status of the embryo, personhood, and the ethical framework were discussed. This
discussion on the personal or “ensouled” status of the human embryo raises significant
ethical issues for stem cells technologies and in vitro fertilization. The relevance of
personhood, the issue of resourcing of stem cells, and the issue of using in vitro
fertilization for the embryo’s health were reviewed. The discussion on the personal status
of the embryo and its relevance for stem cell technology connected with the ethical
debate on prenatal testing. This is a crucial aspect of the ethics of reproductive
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technology that involves scrutiny of the availability of testing and interventions and the
implications for tomorrow's children. The final topic focused the pivotal ethical debate on
prenatal screening and concerns about screening consequences.
Chapter 5 then applied the Ethical Religious Directives to the area of
Regenerative Technology to raise the crucial issues of genetic enhancement, germline
modification, mitochondrial DNA, and gene editing with CRISPR. First, on genetic
enhancement, two core concerns were explored: the significance of genetic enhancement
for human progress, and the impact on future generations. Second, the ethical debate on
genetic enhancement in general leads to the more specific focus on genetic germline
modification that requires examining mainstream religious perspectives and also secular
perspectives. Next, two recent technologies have emerged that were considered in further
detail: mitochondrial DNA and gene editing with CRISPR. The science and the ethical,
social, and policy consideration or religious concerns of these amazing technological
breakthroughs were discussed.
Chapter 6 then applied the Ethical Religious Directives to technological concerns
on death and dying by examining three related topics: changing attitudes towards death
and dying, medical futility, and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. First, there
was a discussion of the changing attitudes towards death and dying, the characteristics
and philosophical approaches. Second, this discussion offered insight into the ethical
debate surrounding medical futility by examining the debate regarding the meaning of
futility and the compassionate goals of medicine. Third, there was a discussion of the
ethical debate around the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment by engaging two related
topics: medically assisted nutrition and hydration the relief of suffering at the end-of-life.
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The applied Chapters 4, 5, and 6 dealt with practical topics that integrated an
ethical critique based on the Ethical and Religious Directives that was explained at the
end of Chapter 3. The conclusion to Chapter 3 explained how the Ethical and Religious
Directives are based on different approaches to Natural Law. The first approach focuses
on the universal aspects of human nature. This approach is typically associated with
settled Catholic teaching on morality. The second approach focuses on the person,
presenting a dynamic and historical view of the human condition as contributors to God’s
creation. This approach is typically associated with using the Principle of Double Effect
to apply traditional Church teaching in a flexible manner to changing circumstances.
Arising from these two approaches to Natural Law, a third approach has emerged,
combining the nature-oriented and person-oriented approaches to new dilemmas
regarding emerging technologies that may require doctrinal development in Catholic
teaching.
The ethical critique in the applied Chapters 4, 5, and 6, based on the Ethical and
Religious Directives, was applied to the main topics of each chapter. The critique adopts
the above approaches to identify three distinct categories. Category A dealt with settled
issues in Church Teaching reflecting the Nature Approach to Natural Law. Category B
dealt with controversial issues eligible for using the Principle of Double Effect reflecting
the Personal Approach to Natural Law. Category C dealt with issues requiring doctrinal
development in Catholic teaching to address new dilemmas regarding emerging
technologies. This threefold critique based on the Ethical and Religious Directives can
provide guidance for Catholic health care to address emerging technologies in medicine.
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In other words, the theoretical analysis in the dissertation is aligned with a practical
ethical critique to guide ethical analysis in Catholic health care.
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